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THIRD SERIES. No. VI.—APRIL, 1870.

ART. I.—NATURE AND PRAYER.

By Prof. TAYLER LEWIS, LL.D., Union College.

NATURE is all, say some who now claim the highest place in the scientific world. Whatever may be the cautiousness of their language, the spirit of their teachings renders such a conclusion inevitable. It is one, too, from which the boldest of them do not shrink. There is no supernatural—nothing *above* nature, nothing *aside* from nature. Nature is the eternal Power, the eternal Force, the eternal Motion, the one eternal Cause. There is nothing which is not contained in nature, and does not in some way come out of it. Spirit, if there be such a thing, properly named, is only a *result* of natural or material organization. It is only a form of matter, having, as the old atheists said, a certain σχῆμα, τάξις, θέσις, κίνησις—a peculiar *form, constitution, disposition, motion*. A God—if there be a God in any sense, any intelligence or intelligences transcending the human, any one Being as yet highest and greatest—is only nature's latest product, the remotest stage of progress yet *actually* developed from that infinite store-house of hidden powers containing, *potentially*, all life, all thought, all existence. In polar opposition to this stands the view on which is based all religion, all morality, all eternal and neces-

sary truth, regarded as eternal *thought* necessitating the idea of an eternal and necessary Thinker, or Mind containing that eternal and necessary thought. This says, God is first, Idea is first, Reason is first,—“in the beginning was the Logos” (John i, 1), the “Outshining of glory” (Heb. i, 8), “the Image of the Invisible God,” the eternal Truth, manifested as Law in Nature (Col. i, 17; Psalm cxix, 89; xxxiii, 6), as conscience and knowledge in the finite intelligence regarded as an image or reflection of that Eternal Light (John i, 9). To express it in the most general terms, spirit is before matter, before any outward power, before motion, heat, electricity, magnetism, primal nebular fluid—before *σχῆμα, τάξις* and *θέσις*—before any relation or “correlation of forces.” It precedes any dynamical principium ever hypothesised—from the “water” of Thales, the æther of Anaximenes, the *ἄπειρον* or infinitely rare substance of Anaximander, down to the latest and most subtile conception of a Spencer or a Darwin. Such is the scriptural doctrine, the true theistic doctrine, the only doctrine that is consistent with the least degree of reverence, or with any, even the most shadowy, forms of religion. It gives value to the kosmos only as the theatre of the divine glory. Nature and matter, through the divine indwelling Word or Reason (Col. i, 17), becomes the outward utterance or medium by which the Infinite Spirit manifests himself to finite intelligences. It is also the appointed sentient medium, or medium of sentiency, through which finite spirits become known to other finite spirits, and, to a certain extent, objectively, or consciously, to themselves. But not only is spirit *before* matter, as in any way conceived; it also rules *over* matter. It is the ultimate cause of all motions and changes of matter—was so in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be. This is true of the human spirit as a self-moving power, independent of any merely natural causation, and controlling matter within certain limits as ordinarily assigned. The Scriptures declare all this, or assume it as the ground of all they say of God and humanity. They affirm even a supernatural, or nature-transcending, power, as on certain conditions capable of being exercised by man, and sometimes in a way that startles

us as extreme and incredible. We quote the highest authority known to earth—the language of our Saviour (Matt. xvii, 20): “For verily I say unto you that if ye have faith as a grain of mustard seed, ye shall say to this mountain, Be removed hence and it shall be removed; and nothing shall be impossible to you.” This language, and the still more particular expressions, Matt. xxi, 21, have been often an offendiculum, even to the believer in Revelation, while they have furnished a favorite ground of cavil to the sceptic. They have thus been a stumbling-block to some, because they have been understood as expressing the *quantity*, rather than the *quality*, of faith which every Christian must possess, and something of a rebuke for not possessing it to that degree. It can not mean this, since our Saviour himself never outwardly manifested the power of faith in that manner, nor is there anything like it in the history of any apostle whom he commissioned. Again, this miraculous or wonder-working power was never to be used arbitrarily, or by way of experiment. There must be a reason for it, a moral reason, grounded on some moral or spiritual need, and that known and felt by the finite agent. Otherwise faith would be impossible, since, without this, or beyond this, it could never be faith—that is, trust in the God of everlasting truth and goodness, with whom nature, whether in its constancy or in its perturbations, has no value except as a means to spiritual ends. It would, in fact, be the very opposite of such a spiritual state; it would be merely faith in one's own faith—an absurd and contradictory thing. It would be only a curious, and therefore impious, challenge, instead of a true and rational confidence. For though faith is an act of the soul transcending reason in its ordinary exercise, it must, nevertheless, be rational; that is, never irrational.

Thus may we take the language quoted as, in fact, a definition of faith given in extreme, and therefore impressive terms, rather than any direction, or even encouragement, to any specific attempt, much less to any mere thaumaturgic display or wonder-working. If called for by the wants of the Church, or by any great spiritual need, then might faith hear the command, as at the Red Sea: “Say to the children of

Israel that they go forward; and lift up thy rod, and stretch it over thesea;" or, "Smite the rock and let the people drink."^a In either case, the dividing of the floods, the sudden fissure, the flowing forth of the waters (each as much a supernatural event as the removing of a mountain), would be a consequence of a true faith, instead of an impious experimenting ending either in deception or in failure. In Matt. xvii, 22, it is the conclusion of the sentence that contains the great truth the Saviour intended to impress. The rest is illustration given in its most striking form. "Nothing shall be impossible for you;" this is only what is elsewhere said: "All things are yours, be it the kosmos, be it life, be it death, be it things present or things to come; all are yours, for ye are Christ's and Christ is God's." In other words, the least faith, be it true faith, connects its possessor directly with the infinite power that made, moves and governs the universe.

It is only a higher and more startling aspect of a power and a doctrine which the Christian church has ever recognized, and to this day recognizes, in spite of all scoffs and cavils. The Scripture abundantly warrants us, both by precept and by encouraging example (Jas. v, 17, 18), to pray for rain in seasons of parching drought. Our meteorologists are beginning to

^a A divine command is always expressed or implied in such cases. Thus were the Apostles *commanded*, Luke ix, 2, and in the General Commission, Mark xvi, 17. Regarded in this way, *faith* becomes *obedience*. Uncommanded, the attempt to exercise or call out the miraculous power is sheer presumption. It may be a selfish arrogance, or a mere desire of wonder-working, as in many of the alleged Roman miracles, without the least degree of that true submission which is of the very essence of faith. There could be no better test of the true and false miracles. When God says, "Smite the rock," "divide the sea," or "remove the mountain," then only is there ground for believing that the effect will follow.

In regard to Matt. xvii, 20, Olshausen justly says that "the common explanation of it, as a hyperbole merely, (see *Lightfoot*, *Lange* and others,) falls short of the profound idea." If there is anything of this figure of speech it is in the language of diminution by which the faith is described: "If it be as a grain of mustard seed." But there is, in fact, no hyperbole in such proportion viewed in either way. What is the removal of a mountain on the earth to the strength that built the world, whether in a few solar days or in a series of *olams*? What is the mightiest phenomenal change in the nature immediately around us to the *brachia sempiterna*, "the eternal arms" that hold up the universe (Deut. xxxiii, 27).

In regard to the state of soul required in the performance of a miracle, we have something worthy of note from the Jewish Rabbins. They speculate on the question: What is the immediate agency in the production of the mi-

boast that they will yet understand and control nature in this respect. They are approaching a knowledge, they say, which will enable them to provide relieving remedies against such a calamity. Through nature they would correct the defects of nature, and counteract the aridity of the atmosphere by some scientific method for introducing moisture. Why not have equal confidence, to say the least, in Him "who made a law for the rain, a decree for the winds, and a way for the lightning's flash" (Job xxviii, 25, 26)? On the same principle, and with the same encouragement, may we supplicate the Author of life for deliverance from the pestilence, heedless of the men who so wisely tell us that disease is brought about by *natural laws*, and what nature *intends* thereby, and how the "chief end of man" is to conform to her laws, to be careful what we eat, and keep ourselves clean. To such pretentious wisdom we may reply, as Job did to Zophar the Naamathite: "Who knoweth not such things as these." It is easy enough to talk about natural law, as though, instead of being as old as human thought, it were an idea peculiar to this 19th century; but how strangely ignorant, how spiritually dark, are the minds that never look beyond it.

In respect to such petitions there is a difference, arising not from the kind or degree of power, natural or supernatural, re-

raculous effect, and how far it may be said to be the Prophet's own act. The prophetic state, they maintain, is one of union with God, that is, with the infinite divine power. The loss or suspension of this union reduces the Prophet to that ordinary control of nature which all men possess as spiritual powers. Thus Aben Ezra explains, Numb. xx, 10: "Moses failed," he says, "when he first smote the rock; for, in consequence of the exasperating dispute between him and the people, and the consequent predominance of the mere human feeling, there came a separation (חלץ) between him as a creature, and this all-ruling divine power." For this higher state of union with the infinite strength the Rabbinical writers have a technical word רבקות (*conjunctio nostra cum Deo*), which they derive from the language used, Deut. xiii, 5, וְבוֹ תִרְבְּקֶנָּה, and in *Him shall ye adhere*; or, as it is rendered in our English Bible, *to Him shall ye cleave*. This curious passage from Aben Ezra's Commentary is made the ground of a profound argument by Rabbi Levi Ben Gerson in his great work entitled *Milchamoth Hashshem*, or *Wars of the Lord*, a treatise metaphysical, physical, and theological, on the *moving powers* in the worlds of Matter and of Mind. The limited science of the times (the 13th and 14th centuries) formed no impediment to the discussion of such themes. Like the reasoning of Cudworth's Intellectual System of the Universe, which it somewhat resembles in its plan and purpose, it occupies a region of ideas no science can dispute or possibly come in collision with, because wholly transcended by it.

quired for their accomplishment, but from the spiritual conditions which the nature of the prayer, and the relation to us of the thing prayed for, may imply. We may pray for the refreshing rain; we may pray for the healing power, such as that which went forth of old from the person of Christ; we are even expressly permitted and encouraged to do both; but we are not, on the same ground, authorized to pray for the aversion of an eclipse of the sun, as was of late foolishly objected by one of the editorial savans of the day. There is no command, no precept, no ground, moral, religious, or physical, on which faith can be exercised for such a result. It would be a mere *téras*, prodigy, or wonder, and would require a special command for its authorization, adapted to a special condition of things not embraced under a general direction for prayer. There is no human want or necessity, spiritual or physical, connected with it, as in the other cases so immediately affecting our common life. We would not venture to deny that there might be such a special warrant even here, or that it might come under the general warrant for prayer, if our existence were on a larger scale of physical being, and such occurrences as an eclipse of the sun, or the occultation of a star, could affect us like the parching earth, or the pestilential atmosphere. Both classes of events, the seemingly near, and the seemingly remote, are equally under the control of God; and, for all that any science can say to the contrary, through natural means—that is, means connected with the great physical system, and whose action, however rare, may be no violation of its general movement. To our faith, our religion, our reverence, or our belief in prayer, it matters little by what method God does this, or what names we give it—natural, supernatural, extra-natural, extraordinary, simply wonderful, or miraculous in the sense of breach or suspension of natural powers. There may be a hidden machinery in nature which no science has discovered, or may hope to discover—wheels within wheels, far interior, ever energizing, yet unknown because *non-appearing* in those surface phenomena which are the only guides to scientific induction. These rare and deep powers may be truly causative, not inert though non-appearing, ever energizing in their

preparations for effects to be produced, or that may be called for, and, therefore, an ever present, ever acting part of the one great working nature—present, we mean, in their silent movement, although not manifesting themselves in visible results, until the time and occasion that demand their coming forth. There are secret springs and axles in the great machinery of nature far down below the ken of any science. These we may regard as ever silently approaching, it may be through periods we call ages, until at last they strike the hour of some great change. "In a moment, in the twinkling of an eye," vast transformations commence, or are rapidly carried on, presenting phenomena which no Lyelian induction can ever estimate, because it can reason only from such change as has been superficially visible in its little time and space. Who can venture to deny that there may be such a reserve causation for the production of great periodical changes, extending even to the sudden and universal resurrection of an old life, or the coming forth of what may be truly styled a new heavens and a new earth. In like manner may we believe that there is also a reserve machinery for events of lesser magnitude physically, but having a great spiritual significance. The working of such machinery lies ever ready for the hand of God. To science its power may be all unknown, incapable of detection as it mingles with the surface movements; but God may employ it as it pleases him for moral and spiritual ends; in so doing, however, violating no law of nature but only using its deeper resources.

What knowledge of ours is broad enough and deep enough to warrant any one in denying this? How often is science itself compelled to make leaps, to generalize, to hypothesize from exceedingly limited facts, while still continuing to talk about *law*, as though there were some magic in that word filling all chasms, and explaining all difficulties. When the naturalist comes to any place that baffles research, it is this word that immediately makes the imaginary bridge which spans the abyss. It is used as accounting for everything that *appears*; although it would have been applied, with just the same confidence, to any other *appearances*, however different they may have been

The term *law* would have bound them together, just as it is now used to connect existing phenomena. Be it what it may, it is all *by law*; and so they comfort us; but on what substantial grounds? Excluding all but nature (in their sense of the term), and admitting, as they must admit, that the unknown powers even now at work in nature may exceed the known by an amount that no arithmetic can calculate, what security can these, our confident *insurers*, offer us against any manifestations of a power higher than the ordinary, and that, too, brought out by means lying within the vast store-house, the great unknown, even of physical agencies?

That there are such hidden powers for great events, if not reserve forces for more ordinary providences, we have sometimes startling evidence:—

Earth, with its caverns dark and deep,
Lies in His mighty hand.

We are reminded of this by the earthquake that causes the continent to tremble, by the volcano that not only removes the mountains but sometimes “casts them into the depths of the sea.” What spiritual confidence is given here by the repetition of that word *law*? Doubtless it is by *law*, and so also may it be in that dread catastrophe when the inhabitants of earth shall “call upon the rocks and mountains” to hide them from a power transcending nature, yet working through nature from the highest to the lowest gradation of its chain of sequences.

What is the secret of this human fear of the supernatural, or rather of this peculiar scientific and philosophic aversion to the idea? The *great* in nature, the irresistible in its movements, as exhibited in many historic phenomena, is, in itself—certainly in its effects—more terrible at times than any special divine interpositions recorded in the Bible. But here, we think, we can take care of ourselves. Such is the innermost feeling, though not presented consciously in thought, or outwardly expressed in language. There is the shelter of this word we have invented, this magical idea of physical law, whether regarded as known or hypothetical, and we are not afraid of it. It is too impersonal to arouse any apprehensions of a moral

kind. The very thought, how it comforts us! and all the more if we can so use it as to keep out the higher thought of a *law-giver*—of a living personal deity ruling and interposing for moral ends. Better trust nature, we say, though she, at times, makes such awful havoc, and so disturbs us in our confident repose. 'Tis true, she gives us a startling lesson, now and then, but she does not mean to harm us. She is our good mother, who only wants us to learn something of her ways. It is only an appearance of retribution that she puts forth. All this "groaning and travailing" that has been going on for 6,000 years—600,000 some would rather say—and all that is yet to come, on a scale, it may be, immensely transcending what is past, is only a gentle chiding, a necessary part of her loving, maternal education. The earth yawns, the subterranean flames ascend, coasts and islands are submerged, the crowded city sinks, myriads of human beings go down together into the fathomless abyss; nature and law have done it all, says our "spruce philosopher," and hence—

He bids the world take heart and banish fear;

or he hunts up for us some soothing utilities. The loss of 60,000 lives in one convulsion is only a gentle hint to us to build more wisely, to study nature more closely. We shall get the victory at last, or some more fortunate race existing myriads of ages hence. We keep repeating this, though every new discovery only reveals a greater mystery still, a strife interminable, as evidence of the deeper fact that a moral probation, and not the study of nature, is "the chief end of man." There is another voice that comes to us amid the storms, and darkness, and struggle of life. "Be not afraid," says the Saviour, "it is I, only believe." Here is spiritual rest, a "very present refuge though the earth be removed and the mountains be cast into the midst of the sea." What a contrast! Be not afraid, says the sciolist; while that charm still holds, we may say with Falstaff's nurse, "there is no need to talk of God." Cowper's most vivid picture is not yet obsolete. This unknown, awful nature, with its convulsions and devastations, its circling life and death, its utter silence in respect to human destiny, its cycles of seeming retrogres-

sion or advance, making it impossible for any short induction of ours to determine on which side of the great curvature our insect-march may be wending—this unknown, awful nature, with its lack of any intimation that, in the future, as in the past, its seeming progress may be anything more than the destruction of one kind of life to make room for another, the burial of the boasting species *homo*, with its Darwins, and Huxleys, its Comtes, its Humboldts, and its Spencers, in the same abyss that has received the ichthyosauri or the megatheria of old, and the conversion of that phosphoric brain-power which once boasted of its ideas, into a new life for the worm or the fungus—this unknown, awful nature, we say, how comforting does it seem to some souls as sheltering them from the thought of the "Living God." They are no atheists, they would have us know; they believe in a great power somewhere, a great First Cause, but they shrink from the thought of One who is represented as "sitting on the great white throne," and manifesting his highest attributes in that spiritual sphere which transcends all physical causation. They say to the rocks, "hide us;" to the mountains, "cover us;" in other words, they flee to nature to shelter them from such a Presence. They find more to assure them in geologic strata, in upheaving continents, and even in Plutonian fires, than in the voice that says: "Fear not thou worm Jacob, for I have redeemed thee;" however insignificant thou art, physically, thy faith connects thee with the eternal, ever-living centre of the worlds, thou canst not be lost, I "have numbered the very hairs of thy head," "I have called thee by thy name, I hold thee by thy hand—*thou art mine*."

There is a kind of reasoning on this subject which, though proceeding from some of highest note, is entitled to no respect. They define things arbitrarily. They set no bounds to their idea of nature. They include in it not merely what is purely physical, but also spirit itself as a product, or emanation of force and motion; they regard Deity—if they admit the name at all—as inseparable from such definition or as included in it. Having thus made nature *all*, these logicians very gravely deny the existence, or even the possibility, of the supernatu-

ral. Now this is sheer trifling, the merest play upon a much abused word. Whatever its advocates may say, it is also utterly irreligious. Its scientific theism is only a form of atheism more mischievous, because more dishonest, than the open avowal. Unless taken as a mere name for that which *is* or *appears* (whatever and however it may *be* or *appear*), law implies a Lawgiver, and nature is but the outward expression of his divine enactment; in other words, it is a law *imposed*. It is the *regulated* mode of communication between the Infinite and the Finite. In another aspect, it may be conceived as a shading screen between us and the insupportable glory of the immediate divine presence. This screen, though immeasurably wide to the human observation, is infinitesimally thin to Deity. To carry out a comparison which no one can pronounce irrational or illogical, this partition we call nature may be imagined as permeated by chains of causation crossing and connecting in infinitely varied directions, yet all communicating with the central telegraphic station, or with the modulating keys—to use a scriptural metaphor—that are touched directly by the “Finger of God” (see Exod. viii, 15). As deciphered on the lower plane, they may be regarded as communications, ordinary or extraordinary, as manifestations of a general or of a particular providence, and yet with no more breach of law in the one case than in the other. Scripture warrants us in the belief that there have been pure miracles, in the established sense of the term, that is, as suspensions, interruptions or counteractions of some causal series regarded as lying *within* the sphere of nature herself; but such are not here intended. Our belief in particular providences, answers to prayer, peculiar divine interpositions in the history of the world and of individuals, may be maintained on other grounds, and in direct connection with a scheme of unbroken, uninterrupted nature. The final results in such cases may be regarded as linked with all lower *contiguous* causalities. No where is there a severance, either in the near or the remote. Science may penetrate ever so far, and yet discover no abrupt beginning, no movement that had not a natural power immediately preceding. This

is perfectly conceivable, and, therefore, perfectly logical, as a ground of reasoning in a province to which no fact induction can reach. It is law, sequence, cause and effect, all the way, from its upper to its lower side—instantaneously working, or with a speed transcending that of the electric passage. Every where along its track it finds turning switches; or, if that is thought too homely a figure, channels of causation, giving it the direction intended, yet bringing it in unbroken physical connection with all the other physical forces that seem to be nearest the event. A special result has been reached, different from what would have come from any other chains of causation not thus affected, and yet no proceeding *per saltum*, no leap, no chasm, no breach of continuity, no link severed or overpassed. It has been all natural so far as nature's province extends; in other words, it has gone *clear through the natural* in all its breadth, so wide to us, so brief to Deity. We read it *here* as nature, but it had its starting point above nature, in the transcending sphere of spirit,—its *efficient cause*, “the finger of God,” its *final cause* the spiritual want, the finite feeble prayer, it may be, that “moves the hand which moves the universe.”

The rain comes down to fertilize the parched earth, or the burning fever turns to coolness. The naturalist who sneers at prayer affirms that there are fixed laws for such events, which no supernatural causation can affect. This, however, does not deter him from gathering together his few visible facts in explanation of phenomena connected with the vast unknown of a seemingly infinite universe. The meteorologist in the one case, and the physician in the other, may have made their confident predictions. If those are seemingly verified they boast of it as a victory of science. In case of failure they excuse it as something that should not detract from the value of their science, or the correctness of their reasoning. There has been some omission, trifling in itself, though greatly affecting the calculation. Some obscure terms in the series must have been neglected, some hidden processes of nature must have been overlooked. Now, these terms, these processes, may have been the very ones that the higher power

has employed; and there may be others lying back of these, and back of these, to any degree of remoteness, held in reserve, connected with all above, and, at any moment, obedient to the turning hand that connects them with all below. Shall not faith in prayer avail itself of these hidden forces, as well as faith in the resources of science, or that faithless ignorance which would plead them in excuse for its defects?

It is true, the same event may have been without the prayer, but who shall dare to say it may not have been on account of it? Who shall set limits to the mingling of moral and physical causes, or venture to deny the possibility of such coöperation? "Where wast thou when God made nature, and stretched the line upon it, and set its bounds," and gave it its only value as a means to some thing higher than itself? Who shall dare to say he can not answer the prayer that his grace has inspired, and that, too, through the processes and causations that his own infinite power and wisdom have provided? "It is high as Heaven, what canst thou do,—deeper than Hades, what canst thou know?"

It does not affect the doctrine of a particular providence, when we admit that to the natural search, carried ever so far, the result is a natural one, or that the keenest examination can discover nothing else. What is the distance which the utmost science has traveled on this road as compared with the immensity that remains? Imagine the insect crawling amid the complicated machinery of the great Haarlem organ. He may be a most acute, a most intelligent, a most scientific insect, in his narrow sphere. His keen microscopic eyes may even give him a great sense-advantage over the human observer with his most powerful magnifiers. No fact, no sequence, however minute, escapes his searching glance. He traces the most hidden links of this involved interior causation. He may, too, be a most Baconian insect on a small scale, making the most rigorous induction from all the phenomena that fall within the field of his vision. He becomes almost as learned as the dwellers in Plato's cave, who, from long study of the reflected images that are continually passing across the rear wall of their dark abode, discover at last some order in their

successions—*οσα τε πρότερα αὐτῶν καὶ ὕστερα εἰώθει καὶ αμα πορεύεσθαι*—"what of them are wont to go before, what to come after, what to be cotemporaneous"—thus building up a philosophy of shadows as some thing of which they are extravagantly proud, regarding these sequences as the true causation, the only realities. Thus also may we suppose this *δριμὺ βλέπον ψυχάριον*, "this keen-looking insect soul," this small intelligence, to become exceedingly knowing in all the most subtle connections of strings, and keys, and pipes, so far as his sense extends. He groups them together, and calls them *laws*. Now he has got a verbal lever that gives him a mighty advance. He makes one grand classification, and calls it nature. He begins to understand the thing. He has got a key to the cypher that seems to determine every succeeding letter to which it is applied, though leaving the sense of the whole, and, therefore, the true sense of each part, as dark as before. It is all law, all nature, only the same thing over and over again, go as far as you will—one great "correlation of forces," or one force, perhaps, presenting itself in endless variety of strength and aspect. He has found it out, and therefore he bids his ignorant fellow insect not to be afraid of the vast trembling, or, to speak in *organ* phrase, the strange *tremolo*, that is sometimes felt, and that seems to appeal to another sense different from that of his peering scientific vision. Away with superstition, he says, there is a law for it; it comes from the opening of some unknown valve which we shall one day discover; be it what it may it must be nature, and therefore can not be supernatural,—that unreal chimera which an inexplicable kind of instinct makes us so much dread. We have another word, representing indeed an unknown fearful power, yet more soothing in its sound, and more soporific in its effect, to drive away all terror. After all, there is nothing here but metals, wood and leather, motions, forces, varied forms of their inherent powers. There seems indeed to be an intelligence, some thing beyond that confused or classified mass of facts which his sense discerns, some thing that corresponds to his own intelligence however small; for how else could it be comprehended. Yet this in-

telligence, or appearance of design, does go not beyond the adaptation of one link to another. The wire is exactly adapted to the opening of the valve. This he sees ; but it only leads him to the inventing of another word ; it is only Nature's *instinct* ; and so he escapes again what he seems most to dread, that idea of a great personality having a design in these designs, a spiritual plan, a glorious music, transcending all these curious adaptations on which the insect mind so loves to dwell, as though they were the *all* or the highest in the scale. There may be another thought, or feeling rather, that occasionally haunts this "diminutive soul." He sometimes gets the idea—is it from the pipes themselves, or derived unconsciously from some foreign source—of an influence that the visible facts utterly fail to explain. A new sense seems to be opened, and there comes the faint beat of some unknown pulsation,—a throbbing sound obscurely audible,—yet full of awe. There is a strange blowing somewhere, a mighty wind, accompanied by a "still small voice," that seems to be breathing through this interminable machinery. He is a transcendental insect, we may suppose, and would fain explain the mystery on the ground of some higher philosophy than that of sense. It seems to come from some region above the plane of nature, or, at least, outside of this valvular causality. These pipes are certainly *inspired*, he says; the "*all-soul*" is breathing through them; yet still it can be no personality, no *will*, in any true sense, as he had before decided there could be no personal intelligence. There must, indeed, be some universal *anima*, but it has not yet been developed into consciousness ; it has not yet reached that stage of volition which characterizes his own less extended, but really higher being. It is a mighty power, indeed, yet still indissolubly connected with nature; it can only blow as the opening valves may permit, and this is entirely dependent upon the wheels and pulleys, in a word, "the correlation of forces" he sees and feels around him. This brings comfort again ; while this machinery lasts, he says, we have no real cause to fear. And so he constructs the *organic* system, and confidently decides that there can be no power, no *willing*,

personal power at least, that sovereignly interferes with the series of shadowy sequences which fall directly under his exceedingly limited sense-beholding.

Poor insect ! We say it not in any contempt of his physical organization. His brain, or that arrangement of nerves that passes for it, has capacity for only a small measure of phosphorus, but that may be of the very purest quality—only the ten-thousandth part, perhaps, of what is found in the larger Simial heads at the summit of whom stands the human species, but then it may be the very quintessence of the *noetic* substance. His thinking power, his very thought, is only so much force and motion, as measured by its effects in space ; but this is maintained, at present, in respect to the highest efforts of the human, or, if there be such a thing, the superhuman intelligence. It is so much heat, which is only so much motion. It can be measured by an exquisitely constructed thermometer, or by some index most minutely marking the distance to which the force correlative to that thinking heat would raise a given body. This is quantitative value, or the amount of room occupied by a thing and its activities, as compared with the total space, and total sum of activities, in the universe. Such a value is exceedingly small any way, and is continually diminishing as the kosmos is conceivably extending. The bigger the universe of force, heat and motion—for these are *all* that are supposed to be in it—the less, and still less, to an immeasurable degree, become even its greatest parts. As measured by this quantitative proportion, our insect does, indeed, sink almost to zero, but then, in like manner, does the most exalted of human intelligences, or human thinking forces. The difference becomes as nothing, or to use the scriptural comparison, “as a drop from the bucket, as the invisible dust of the balance, yea, as less than nothing, as emptiness, or utter vanity.” Some of our Positivists affect to despise the “obsolete book” as taking a very small and disproportioned view of things, but where has any science, or any philosophy, given us such an illustration of the immeasurable ratio, as the old Hebrew Prophet? Thus physically reckoned we are all lost in a depth of nihility to which no numerical calculation can ever

extend. It is a deep-sea sounding whose bottom no fathoming line can ever reach. But there is another value which no outward vastness can effect. It remains the same whether the universe be great or small, whether it be finite or even infinite in space and motion. It is the spiritual in distinction from the physical value. It is the moral worth, intrinsic, absolute, or, if regarded as having degrees, not measured by any quantitative arithmetical estimate, but by its assimilating moral nearness to God, giving it at once a supernatural position. It is the gem of faith, shining even to the highest heavens, and which, for all we know, may dwell in the simplest and minutest, as well as in the greatest and most complicated, physical organisms. "Fear not thou worm Jacob, I have redeemed thee, thou art *mine*." In its more intellectual aspect it is the degree of spiritual discernment that connects the soul which has it directly with the ever-living centre of all being, and makes the minutest finite, thus connected, a partaker in the dignity of the Immortal, the Infinite, the Absolute, the Divine, and thereby rendering it impossible that it should ever be lost in any conceivable or inconceivable immensity.

Poor insect ! we say again, returning to our comparison ; it is not thy physical minuteness, but the lack of this spiritual discernment (in which thou mayst be like some of our highest savans professedly) that warrants the commiserating epithet. Poor insect ! involved in the intricacies of this endless machinery of the vast organ, yet blind to the idea of One who sits above, and touches the keys and pedals as it pleases him, setting loose these chains of causation, or permitting to breathe through them that preternatural power without which they are but a mass of death and immobility. How keen his microscopic vision of strings, and wheels, and cogs, and pipes, and changing pedal stops, to which he knows no end in either direction of origin or use ; and yet how insensible he may be to the mighty music, the glorious anthem, the grand halleluia chorus, that is rolling above him, and to which this machinery, so vaunted as the only true object of his narrow science, is wholly subservient, having without it neither meaning nor value. ;

Our comparison is suggested by the words of the prophet (Hos. ii, 21, 22), setting forth the heavens and the earth as taking part in a grand responsive choral: "I will hear," saith Jehovah, "I will hear the heavens, and the heavens shall hear the earth, and the earth shall hear the corn, the Tirosh, and the oil, and they shall hear Jezreel." It should be rendered, "I will *respond* to the heavens, etc.," as conveying the idea of a series of ascending petitions with the descending responses as the return vibration in the combined physical and spiritual movement that is represented in the figure. It is drawn from the responsive musical service of the temple. Nature, as thus responding to God, is a sublime anthem, a grand roll of harmony, with each chord so connected (both simultaneously and in melodious succession) with every other, that the result is a diapason movement, a modulation throughout the immense scale as it is touched from the supernal sphere. It is the same figure in the 19th Psalm as brought out by a more poetic, and, on that very account, more literal rendering. Poetry is, in fact, demanded as the more truthful language, transcending in this respect that of any science. It is the Hebrew mode of representing that old idea of the "music of the spheres," the *concentus cælorum*, the song of "peace that God maketh in his high places" — *concordiam in sublimibus suis* (Job xxv, 2). In this grand Oratorio the heavens are vocal; Day and Night speak to each other, taking up the strain in never ending and harmonious successions:

The Heavens are telling the glory of God;
The firmament sheweth his handy work.
Day unto day poureth out speech;
Night unto night revealeth knowledge.
No outward word nor language there;
(To human sense) unheard;
And yet to all the earth goes out their line,
To the world's end their voice.

The music of Haydn may bring it nearer to our sense conception, while failing to reach the reality of the idea as set forth by the Hebrew poet.

The response to prayer, and the means for such response, is a part of this choral movement, and that, too, in the course

of God's continual providence, without any discord or any breach in the physical modulation. Such breaches there may be when startling signs and wonders are required to rouse from atheistic slumber, but the idea is not needed here. God may hear prayer and heal the sick without a miracle in the sense usually attached to the word. But to this our Naturalist would interpose what he would regard as his silencing dilemma. It is vain, he would say, to pray for such recovery, since, if nature would have done it in her own uninfluenced course, there is no need of the prayer, there is no providential agency. If, on the other hand, there be such providential interference from another sphere, then there must be some point *within* nature where it commences, and that would be as much miraculous, that is, an *interruption* of nature, however far interior, as any, the most visible breach that might be made upon its surface. This confident reasoning rests wholly on the assumption that from a given present condition—universal or special,—or from any present state of nature, however complex in its causation, there could be but one result and no other. But surely *they* can not consistently say this who hold, as most of this school of "Positivists" do, that there is in nature the bare fact of sequence and antecedence without any inherent causative power. This is the doctrine of John Stuart Mill, and of all that kindred class of minds who are now regarded as authorities on all questions like those we are discussing. The idea of any inherent power coming between cause and effect shifts the whole diapason, we may say again in musical phrase, and introduces those ghosts of metaphysics and theology which the Positivists have taken such pains to exorcise. If they allow it to come in at all, they can not stop until they find a *spirit* in the pipes, a personal intelligence, and that which is to them more repugnant still, a personal *will* (something like our human will, though infinitely transcending), as the ultimate cause of every universal and every partial movement. And so is it maintained by a late powerful writer, Mr. Rowland G. Hazard, in his admirable letter to Mill: "If *invariability of sequence* (using Mill's own language) is the only relation between flowing or changing events,

all reasoning as to how these events come into existence, or why or how conformed to this invariable order, is precluded, and *philosophy* is reduced to the mere observation of the flow of events and the memory of observed succession." What right have they who hold to such a dead causation (if the term causation may still be used), such a loose unconnected series of mere sequences having no inherent power to produce change, and, therefore, none to prevent—what right have they who thus reduce all conceivable causal *power* to an absolute nihility, to affirm that *one* sequence only *must* be the result of any given antecedent, or state of antecedents, to the exclusion of every other? If their theory of causation, or, rather, of non-causation, be the true one, there is no *must*, no necessity in the case. And thus they might be met by the *argumentum ad homines*. But there is a better answer, and better suited to those who do not believe in such a theory of mere sequences coming from no real causal power in nature, regarded either as inherent, implanted, supernaturally originated, or supernaturally controlled. The answer is furnished by denying their arbitrary definition. Nature is not *all*. There is a world above it, and ever affecting it without destroying its true idea as a nature.

This dead view excludes, moreover, all finite spiritual causation, or the agency of any beings higher than man, and who may exercise control over nature in like manner as human spirits and human wills control it, though in a far higher degree, and from a far more penetrating knowledge. We do not call *our* employment of nature, our turning it this way and that to suit our purposes, or to produce a result different from what might have been had we let it alone—we do not call this a violation of its law, or give it even the name of the supernatural; what right then have we so arbitrarily to reject the idea when it suggests itself in connection with a higher or some possible and easily conceivable superhuman agency? God himself may act through nature—*all through it*—without any interior interruption, as has been shown, or he may control it, and that without physical breach, by means of personal spiritual agencies. It may be as when the angel *invisibly*

smote the Assyrian host, 2 Kings xix, 35 (turning against them the poisonous Simoom, with a mightier strength and a higher knowledge, it may be, than that by which man controls the aerial or electric elements), or openly *appeared* wielding the pestilential forces of the atmosphere, as is related, 2 Sam. xxiv, 16; "Who maketh his angels winds, his servants a flame of fire;" Psalms civ, 4; or, "he maketh the winds his messengers, the flaming fire his minister;" in either rendering it is the assertion, substantially, of the same doctrine. Such effects may be produced invisibly as to their agency, while bringing in a sudden and overwhelming change in the course of things, or they may be silent and untraceable in their immediate consequences, yet making the remoter future very different from what it would have been but for such past unnoticed intervention. It may have been done by turning some of those invisible switches to which we referred as themselves parts of nature, and lying all along the track of its seemingly endless way. All that we know is that the train is speeding on in another direction; had it kept on the old apparent line, or even turned off upon the opposite side, it would have been all nature still, and our Philosophy of History would have been equally successful in making the logical connections that bound it to the past, or the part preceding the divergence, and equally confident in affirming that the car, with its train of passengers, could have taken no other course. Our science also discovers such switches, and calls them *hidden* laws which some other induction, when unsuccessful, had failed to take into its calculation. It boasts of turning such discovery to human account, and sometimes forgetting that humble deference to present experience, that meek Baconian disclaimer of everything that goes beyond what is seen, and which comes up so readily at every suggestion of the miraculous, it talks vauntingly of the good time, shortly coming, when it "shall have brought to light every hidden thing," and given man the victory *over* nature, thus becoming itself a supernatural power. Now, if human science can, in this way, turn nature to account, why may not a higher science, of higher beings, dis-

cover many more such diverging forces and turn them to the accomplishment of still greater ends ?

There is nothing that can be shown to be irrational in such an idea of superhuman spiritual agency. What right, then, has any one to shut it out, or deny it any place among cosmical influences, or to indulge in the stale Lucretian babble, which we so often hear in the lecture room, about superstitious fears, and narrow beliefs, which the galvanic battery or the electrometer have utterly exploded. It seems, indeed, most strange, when we consider how exceedingly limited is the field of our science, notwithstanding the "spectral lines" which assume to tell us that there may be some forms of matter in Sirius resembling such as are found in our earth, a fact, by the way, which our *a priori* thought, without induction, would readily have suggested. The affected humility that protests against metaphysics and theology, or anything beyond sense, seems far more fitting than such a vaunt. But when, on the other hand, we turn the glass, which is equally true when it throws things to remote distances as when it brings them nigh, —when we think how immense the region of the powers unseen, as we must believe it to be (though unseen), in order to get any consistent account of what is visible, —the scale of rationality, and of credibility, turns wholly the other way. It is easier to believe in such spiritual agencies than to hold our minds down to that low view, that exceedingly narrow view, which arbitrarily defines *nature* as being *all that is*, and then would make a show of logic in affirming the impossibility of the supernatural.

Whatever objections, however, any philosophy may interpose, the meaning of Scripture here is unmistakable: "Is any man sick among you let him call for the elders of the church, and let them pray for him in the name of the Lord; and the prayer of faith shall save the sick, and the Lord shall raise him up." This is easily interpreted, if we look at its spirit and design, avoiding unwarranted presumption on the one hand, and all naturalising skepticism on the other. Although given by the apostle in the third person, it is the language of a loving parent to dear children, encouraging them

to pray, and assuring them of his willingness and ability to grant their requests. That such a petition is not mere breath, that it is not a mere subjective self-fulfilling reaction, as some maintain, but that it truly ascends, that it is heard on high, that "it enters the ears of the Lord of Hosts," that the infinite mind notes the finite want, and that there is toward it a corresponding divine complacency—in short, that it is strictly true that "He careth for us"—this is the highest *supernatural*, rendering credible any lower aspect, and a hearty, trusting, unconditional belief in it is the truest act of faith. High as it is, however, it is not profane to interpret it by its counter part in the lower sphere. If an earthly parent had used such language there would be no difficulty as to its meaning, its rational qualifications, and the kind of confidence demanded: "Freely implore my help in every time of need; my ear is ever open, my hand is ever ready, my power is all sufficient, my love unfailing, a sure guaranty that every real want, every thing my higher wisdom may see to be for your best good, shall be supplied, even in cases where difficulties of nature, or of any thing else which your means or knowledge can not surmount, may seem to stand in the way." No one would interpret such an encouragement as expressing, or even implying, an absolute, unconditional promise to give the precise thing asked, in the precise way dictated by the petition, irrespective of the wisdom and goodness of the One to whom it is so addressed. Instead of a believing, it is a faithless spirit which says: it is within the literal breadth of the promise, it must be given simply because it is asked, and, therefore, we will see whether it be literally fulfilled or not. This would not be faith, the very essence of which is submission, trust in the love, the willingness, the unrestricted ability, and, at the same time, the unerring wisdom of the kind father; it would not be faith, we say, but rather that frail support, *trust in one's own trust*, a thing which becomes wholly baseless when put in the place of the promise itself. We are to believe that God *can* do this, or that, if no moral or spiritual conditions intervened, there is nothing physical, even to the removing of mountains, that would present an

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obstacle to his infinite and omnipotent love. "All that I have is thine," believe it; such is the assurance of the Father. "I believe that thou *canst do all things*," and that thou wilt do whatever is needful for me, even to the "healing of my sicknesses," as well as "the forgiveness of my sins, and the redeeming of my life from destruction;" such is the faith demanded on the part of the child. The earthly parent is trusted to the *extent of his power*; there should be a like confidence in God, whose power is unlimited. The granting of the particular thing asked should be regarded as coming within this power and this willingness. Casting aside all speculation about the natural and the supernatural, looking forward to it as something possible, something that has been done in similar cases, and may be done again, something which he has good grounds for expecting, the petitioner should wait in faith for an answer to his request. If granted, it should be acknowledged with thanksgiving; if the specific answer is withheld, the confidence in the love that withholds should be no less than in that which gives.

And thus are we rationally to interpret this verse. The future tense (*καὶ ἐγερῇ*, "Shall raise him up") denotes the ground of expectation, but it must be a submissive expectation, a true and loving trust in an all-wise God, instead of a blind belief in itself, or in the magic power of any form regarded merely as a condition precedent.

We can not give up this belief at the bidding of anything that calls itself science. God *can* do this thing for which he bids us pray. He can heal the sick. He has often done it in answer to prayer. The history of the Church has its facts as well as our pretentious Baconianism. He can do it without making any breach of physical causation, if thus it pleases him. All the powers of nature, the deep unknown, the vast *interior*, as well as those "*ends of his ways*" (Job xxvi, 15), that lie exposed to our surface study—all the energies of spirit, all that immense field of hidden causalities which now and then show themselves so mysteriously, presenting appearances that silence denial, and baffle every attempt to explain them by such names as magnetism, or electricity, or odic

force, or the inane repetition of the word *law*—all these lie in his great store-house of means, to be employed according to his good pleasure, and without disturbing any system of things that he has established.

Alas, for us, if God can not heal the sick, when the highest and latest result of that medical knowledge, to which the human race has been for ages so anxiously looking for relief, is the declaration of its own untrustworthiness. It is certainly a strange thing that the manifest deficiency of our science in this department, so *near* to us as well as so important, should not have made us more humble in our claim to understand the *remote*, the ancient and the universal. There are those who assume to trace things in their most distant, as well as in their most interior, causalities. They understand the universal movement in its great evolutions, they are as familiar with the nebular fluid, from which suns and systems are evolved, as they are with the flux and reflux of the earthly tides. They tell us how worlds arise, how thought and spirit at length come forth from the evolutions of matter, how species have got their present forms from an infinity of lucky selections after a greater infinity of chance failures. They talk and write as though they were very near the secret of life; a few more steps, a few more experiments, and the grand connection will have been made, the long-sought passage safely accomplished. In all that relates to the higher and vaster relations of material, and even of spiritual, things, our Spencers, our Huxleys, and our Darwins, speak with the utmost confidence. In the same strain follow the crowds of inferior physicists, and even physicians whom certain facts in their own immediate profession should have kept far from such boasting vanity. Reviewers and editors and newspaper correspondents are continually striking the same note in their indiscriminate and ignorant laudations. It would seem as though the great kosmos lay clearly before them. But alas for our microcosmos, this poor dying human body, how little do they know of that! This boasted knowledge on the higher scale, as some venture to say, has exploded all the old theology; but the world so near us, the diminutive organism so important for us to know

thoroughly, if the study of nature be, indeed, the ethical end of man—this human frame, with the mystery of its life and death, its complicated machinery of the natural connecting everywhere with the spiritual, its hidden chords vibrating to every outward impulse and to every inward emotion—these have been the object of the most intense study since the days of the Pharaohs; aid has been sought from all collateral knowledge; botany, chemistry, minerology, have been ransacked for every contribution they might be supposed to make to a result so greatly desired; there have been put in requisition the keenest dissections of the scalpel, the most penetrating explorations of the microscope; in despair of visible science the mystic spiritual sphere has been invaded; the anxious inquirers have gone back to old abandoned shrines; they have again consulted oracles anciently in repute but afterwards rejected as irrational and superstitious; after having, like Saul, banished the wizards from the realm of positive knowledge, they are found again stealthily seeking their aid; mesmerism, biology, so called, with its spells and manifestations, magnetic sympathies, odic forces, homœopathic infinitesimals, have had a place in the practice and the vocabularies of men occupying no mean position in the medical schools. From this intense study, from all this science, real or unreal, there has come many a partial revelation of deepest interest; light has doubtless been evolved, but a still greater darkness has ever accompanied it which the light itself has revealed. The abyss of the unknown has only yawned deeper and deeper at every discovery; every torch let down has been like a light shining in a dark, misty vault, making only more visible the surrounding gloom. It would really seem as though there were something here expressly designed to baffle human research, and to make man feel, in the disappointment of this his nearest and most cherished science, how little he can do to remove or even to mitigate the primæval sentence. The idea comes home to thoughtful minds in our own day, just as it presented itself to the earliest musing. "Things many and strange," (in human life) says Sophocles, "but nothing more

strange than man himself." Most vivid is the poet's picture of human power and human progress: "He (man) makes his way over the hoary deep, mid wintry storms and billows roaring round; he tames the savageness of earth; he brings into subjection the still more savage beasts; cities he builds and gives them laws; advancing beyond the more immediate utilities he aims at culture, eloquence, and soaring thought (*καὶ φθέρμα καὶ ἡνεμόεν φρόνημα*); he provides for himself the luxuries of civilization, he protects himself against the tempests' bolts; there is no outward difficulty against which he is resourceless." But one thing he can not do:

*Αἶδα μόνον φεύξιν οὐκ ἐπάξεται,
[οὐδ'] ἀμυχάνων φυγὰς ἐνυπέφρασται—*

From Hades no escape can he provide,
'Gainst fell disease no remedy invent.*

The picture can not be regarded as overdrawn. Such ever has been, such is now, the human failure in this near department of science in which we have so direct and practical an interest. We hear it from the mouths of medical men themselves. Confidence has diminished as *facts* have accumulated, until the highest authorities are those who do most to fill us with distrust. It is, we repeat it, one of the strangest things in our mysterious human history, this boasting on the large scale, this continual vaunt of what science is doing and is going to do, this confident prediction of a scientific millennium that shall banish from the world all moral, as well as physical, ills, this claim of having relieved the human mind from the oppressions of theology with all its ideas of a supernatural providence, this attitude of grand assumption on the one hand, as contrasted on the other with this despair of finding remedies for the evils, the physical evils, that lie so near, and whose incurableness so aggravates for us all others. The physician standing in mute helplessness by the bedside of the dying patient—what spectacle more humiliating to human pride! The suffering, agonizing infant—what physical wonder that our progress has revealed can be compared with the moral mystery revealed in such a sight!

* Sophocles, *Antigone*, 332-364.

And yet they tell us not to pray ; it will be of no avail ; nature is inexorable ; her great general laws have no pity on the individual. In the confession of the utter failure of science here, they take away our only remaining hope. We must not say : "Heaven help us, for vain is the help of man." Some of these baffled magicians dare to affirm that God *can not* heal the sick ; to believe that he does so in answer to prayer, is sheer superstition, irrational, unscientific, unphilosophical, yea, mischievous, as leading man to neglect the study and observance of nature. The highest power of their microscopes reaches not half-way—a millionth part of the way it might be better said—toward the hidden seat of all our physical woes, or that deep region where the human physical mortality comes out of the spiritual death ; and yet they would not have us call upon God "the Former of our bodies and the Father of our spirits." We are forbidden by them to look to him "who knoweth our frame, who remembereth that we are dust." Study nature, obey nature ; this is still their cry. Alas ! have we not been studying nature ever since man sought to find in nature the sole "knowledge of good and evil," and yet in the great matter of which we now speak we are as ignorant as ever. We seem to have obtained many a victory ; we have carried much farther that art of navigation of which the old poet so boasts, though still at the expense of thousands of wrecks per year. "We have sought out many inventions" beyond his utmost dreams, though whether our spiritual advancement has been in any corresponding proportion may well be questioned. We have, in truth gained much from the *outer* nature, while that *within*—the nature with which we are more immediately connected, and with which our spiritual here is so mysteriously bound—is yet so greatly unknown to us. We have learned how to move more swiftly, to transmit intelligence with lightning speed, as we say, —in a word to *live faster*, to use up our brief lives with a more consuming rapidity—but the secret we would so joyfully learn remains as dark as ever, notwithstanding that want of knowledge here seems to take away the value of all other discoveries :

Quid tibi prodest
Aërias tentasse domos, animoque rotundum
Percurrisse polum—*morituro?**

The cry comes down to us from the earliest times; we hear it yet, the same anxious appeal, the same imploring petition to Nature *to save us*; we are yet looking to her for a deliverance which no study of nature can ever give. With all the discoveries of science our modern history, in its earthly aspect, presents the same baffled *ἀγών*, the same fruitless effort, “unavailing, feeble, dreamlike,”†

ὀλιγοδρανίην ἄκικυν,
ἰσόγειρον,†

which Æschylus so mournfully depicts. Or it is the wearisome, unsatisfying repetition, which was all that Lucretius could find in Roman life.. He calls it philosophy; in the absence of any other hope it may rather be styled a wail of despair :—

Denique, tanto opere in dubiis trepidare periclis
Quæ mala nos subigit vitæ tanta cupido?
Certe equidem finis vitæ mortalibus adstat,
Neo devitari letum pote, quin obeamus.
Præterea, voramur ibidem, atque insumus, usque;
Nec nova vivendo procuditur ulla voluptas;
Sed dum abest quod avemus, id exsuperare videtur
Cætera; post aliud, quum contigit illud, avemus;
Et sitis æqua tenet vitæ semper hianteis.‡

It is a ceaseless struggle, where every seeming victory is only the means of introducing a new and more craving want, and every apparent rise only keeps us on the same interminable level. Man, by the fall, put himself into a state of voluntary subjection to nature, and by no effort that he may make can he ever really get above it.

Let us then hold on to the old creed that there may be some efficacy in prayer, however much our naturalizing want of confidence in God may render it unavailing, or present a moral barrier, making it unworthy of a holy spiritual Ruler to grant our

* Horat. Carm. I, 28, in memory of Archytas, a famous Geometrician and Astronomer of Tarentum, who perished in shipwreck :

What good to thee,
That thou hast traced the mansions in the skies,
And measured, in thy soul, the vast rotund,
Since thou must die.

† Æschylus *Prometheus Vincit*, 519.

‡ Lucretius, *de Rerum Natura*, Lib. III, 1089.

faithless requests. When the skeptical caviller, or the sorrowing conscience, holds up to us the fruitlessness of many petitions, it should be remembered that it is only "the energizing (*inworking*) prayer of a righteous man" (a humble, believing spirit) of which it is said, *πολὴ ἰσχυεῖ*, "it hath much strength" with God. We are not, however, to neglect nature, nor deny the value of science. Yet may we believe that along with nature, and without contradicting any of her laws, there may be a higher ground of trust, a higher aim, and a higher way, to which God is leading through this long and mysterious probation, the very essence of which consists in a strife between our fallen spiritual state and our warring physical surroundings.

We have been endeavoring to show that belief in prayer, and in special divine interpositions, is consistent with an unviolated order of nature. But we are not, out of deference to any thing that calls itself Rationalism, to reject that other idea of a direct interference with natural law, by way of obstruction, suspension, counteraction, or any thing else that may be called a breach, if God so wills it, for any moral or spiritual purpose. Such cases seem to be set forth in the Scriptures, though even here it should be deemed no heresy if one refers them to *reserve forces*, or some hidden physical machinery ever standing ready, and striking at the least touch of a superior spiritual force. The former, however, is the more common view of a miracle (*σημεῖον, τέρας*), when employed for the conviction of unbelief, or an attestation of the near divine presence; and this is its moral power, which some, in their hyper-spirituality, have denied as belonging to any such outward portent. In this case there is supposed to be a direct counteraction of a preëstablished order. If we admit such a view as warranted by the sacred narrative, we may also well believe that a condition of things, in which such interruptions are allowed or required to take place, is not the *normal* one that God has ordained for his universe of rational beings. For us as fallen, sunk in nature, and in that lethargy of natural sequence which comes upon souls that have lost the true knowledge in losing the love of God (Rom. i, 28), there is need of the extraordinary to awaken us to a sense of

the divine presence. The great, the sudden and startling in nature itself, has something of this same moral power. In the earthquake's awful tremor, or when there peals upon the ear the loud electric bolt with its simultaneous lightning flash, and the shattered tree or rent building bears witness to its irresistible force, no science keeps off the feeling of some dread power very near us, bringing with it the thought of personality demanding reverence instead of curious speculation, and rendered all the more vivid and startling by our own sense of utter helplessness. The dark unknown, too, rises before the mind, and all the knowledge that we possess gives way to the overpowering thought of unseen agency. We know, or think we know, the scientific nexus of such phenomena, but this is of little avail. We tremble, as we do not at other things in nature far more destructive of life, yet less feared because of those more gradual processes against which we have some feeling of self-protection, though really as helpless in the one case as in the other. From ordinary disease we somehow think that we have a tolerably reliable security in our own prudence; here we can take care of ourselves, and we feel no special alarm, though the scientific Calculus of Probabilities would tell us that there are a thousand chances of a man being carried off by fever to one that he should perish by lightning or the earthquake. Even in these more sudden phenomena, however, or in these more stupendous exhibitions of power, there comes in again the sheltering idea when the shock is over; it is only nature after all, we say; and so it would be if miracles were common. How soon would they be classified into laws, and with this arrangement lose all their spiritual efficacy?

The portentous becomes natural—to use a seeming paradox—because of our own moral state. We are out of order, and, therefore, there is demanded, as our reflex, the extraordinary and the irregular in the natural world. Its prodigies, or its unaccountable anomalies, if we prefer so to call them, hold up to us, as in a broken mirror, the vastly greater prodigy of our deformed spiritual condition. But this is not normal, it may again be said, on either side. Even for the human mind, when spiritually enlightened, the great glory of God in his physical

works is manifested by the beautiful constancy, rather than by the interruptions of nature, or even her own extraordinary doings of the aweing and confounding kind. It is the former placid aspect on which the Scriptural writers most love to dwell when pouring forth the emotions of a serene yet enraptured piety. Let the reader compare the example already given from the sixth Psalm, or the calm majestic eighth : "when I survey the heavens the work of thy fingers" (*thy curious embroidery*), the wonderful beauty of Psalm civ, the silent glory of Isaiah xl. 26, or that sublime "*concord in his high places*," which is set forth in Job xxv, 2. But, perhaps, the most striking illustration of this idea is found Gen. ix, 12—17, although that passage respecting the rainbow has been regarded, wrongly we think, as belonging to the miraculous or prodigy-exhibiting kind. It is called *אוֹת* (a sign), in the account, but that word, as Maimonides well maintains, is used of preëstablished things in nature appealed to as attestations of God's power and goodness. It is employed Gen. i, 14, as denoting the divisions of time made by the constant and harmonious movements of the heavenly bodies. The most careful study will show that it has a similar meaning in Gen. ix, 13: "Behold I *have set*" (not I *will set*; the Jewish commentator calls attention to the fact that it is the past time) "*my bow in the cloud*" —*my bow* that I created when I gave both origin and law to nature. The design there was to soothe the minds of the preserved remnant after the terrible and *extraordinary* scenes of the flood, to raise them to a calmer and more exalted contemplation of the divine unchangeableness; and hence, instead of some startling prodigy, some new thing before unseen, there is taken the beautiful rainbow as an assurance that the old order of nature was now restored, and that there should be no more recurrence of such an awful deluge until the end of the world. It was the very symbol of *constancy*, coming forth so beautifully, as it does, and so regularly after the storm. (See *Lange, Gen.*, on the passage, and Note). A *τεράς*, prodigy, or portent, as Homer represents the old tradition (Iliad xi, 28), or in the sense of some thing startling, and before unknown, would seem ill adapted to the spirit, purport, and security of

the passage : as sure as *my never-failing* bow. They wanted nothing startling. They had had evidence enough of the great power of God, whether regarded as miraculous, extraordinary, some awful change in nature, or directly supernatural ; and now they needed the other assurance that the helm of nature had not been lost, but was still held by the same firm, constant hand, that had ordained it in the beginning. The design now was to allay fear ; the peace-speaking rainbow was to be an attestation of unfailing goodness—not of power or retribution. To one who keeps in mind this idea, such an interpretation, instead of seeming forced, will more and more appear as the most natural and consistent one that can be given of the sublime passage.

ART. II.—IS THIS A CHRISTIAN NATION?

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THE question of excluding the Bible from the Public Schools opens into the deeper question of the relation of the civil Government to the Christian religion. It is not an uncommon opinion, that in such a government as ours all religions are equal. Some would say that the Christian religion is no more protected, fostered or encouraged under our government than any other religion, or than infidelity or atheism. A somewhat eminent Protestant clergyman has recently said, that the government was “entirely divorced from religion,” and has insisted that this was both right and safe. The opinion is loosely adopted, that in effecting a separation of Church and State, our government became strictly secular, that it has no religion of any sort, nor has the right to teach any religion in either the public schools or any other public institutions.

Some are grieved with this supposed condition of things, and seek to put the government on Christian ground by an amendment of the Federal Constitution. Others, equally grieved, refuse to vote, or to take any part in public affairs. And others still—some for one reason and some for another—are satisfied to have it understood that the government is “di-

vorced from religion," and to have all forms of belief and unbelief put on absolutely equal ground before the law.

What the relation of the government to religion ought to be, is one question; what it actually is, is another question; and in this shape is it that the subject chiefly concerns us. Is the government of this country entirely divorced from religion? Are all religions precisely equal before the law? And are atheism and infidelity, under our institutions, put upon the same ground as the Christian faith? These questions we are prepared to answer with a decided negative. With certain qualifications, in no way detracting from the principal statement, we shall undertake to show that this is a Christian Nation.

Of course this statement is made with the understanding that we have no established Church. That is something forbidden in the Federal Constitution, and something on which the people of these United States are perfectly agreed. "Congress shall make no laws respecting an establishment of religion"; but instead of being the less a Christian nation on that account, we are the more so. "My kingdom is not of this world."

Neither is it claimed that we are a Christian nation in the sense of putting any man under civil disabilities, or in any way injuring or punishing him on account of his faith. The same amendment of the Constitution which takes from Congress the power to create an established Church, also forbids any law "prohibiting the free exercise of religion"; and the Article requiring public officers to make oath to support the Constitution, provides that "no religious tests shall be required, as a qualification to any office or public trust." If the people choose to elect a man to office, and if in other respects, he is eligible, his religion, be it what it may, does not disqualify him. If any man is a peaceable citizen, be his religion what it may, he shall not be prohibited the exercise thereof. As no sect can be exalted to the position of an established Church, so no individual can be deprived of his rights as a citizen because his religion may not agree with the recognized religion of the land. "The Catholic and the Protestant, the

Calvinist and the Arminian, the Jew and the Infidel, may sit down at the common table of our national councils, without any inquisition into their faith or modes of worship.* No American, however, will be likely to say that this is any the less a Christian nation, because it refuses to proscribe any man for his religious faith.

Others still say that we are not a Christian nation, because our laws do not conform to the Christian rule. Is that a Christian nation that disregards the Sabbath by its arrangements for "Sunday mails?" Is that a Christian nation that could enact such a statute as the Fugitive Slave law? Are those Christian States that pass such laws as some have done on the subject of marriage and divorce? That some of our laws are thus opposed to the Christian rule we will not deny. If we are a Christian nation, certainly we have not yet attained unto Christian perfection. Yet just as in the case of a Christian man, we sometimes find a prevailing and predominant Christian tendency, in spite of some great faults, so is it possible that a nation may be called Christian, in spite of some great imperfections in its laws. The main body of our laws, however, is not open to these animadversions. Our legal system is based upon the code of Christian morals, and applies it with rare fidelity to all classes of men. A good legal authority says: "A slight glance at our laws will show how deeply they are imbued with the spirit of the Christian religion. Even the common maxim 'so to use our own as not to injure another's right,' is of higher origin than Roman Law. The recognition of the Sabbath, the mode of administering oaths, the punishment of the crimes of bigamy and adultery, the domestic arrangement of families . . . all show the prevailing influence of Christianity in shaping our institutions."† It is to be deplored indeed that our laws should ever conflict with Christian principle, but perfection is not to be looked for here either in governments or men.

Perhaps as common an allegation as any against our Chris-

* Story on the Constitution.

† Willard's Equity Jurisprudence, Chap. 7. Trusts.

tianity, is made to rest upon the omission of the name of God from our Federal Constitution. Some have called it, on that account, an infidel document ; others have still more logically called it atheistic ; and many grave assertions have been made concerning the infidel management under which it was concocted. That the Constitution would be improved by some clear acknowledgment of the existence of God can not be denied ; and doubtless there might have been in that instrument a plain recognition of the Bible as God's Word, and of Jesus Christ as the Saviour of men, without any wrong to any citizen of this country. But when it is claimed that the Constitution is infidel or atheistic, because of this omission, we can not concede the point. The Book of Esther makes no mention of God ; but is the Book of Esther atheistic ? It is usually held that God is sufficiently seen in the statements of the book and in the spirit which it breathes ; and so we say of the Constitution of the United States. It is the ripest, latest product of Christian statesmanship. It errs perhaps in some particulars, but it is one framework of Christian principle and Christian charity applied to all classes of people in the land.

That there were some infidels in the Convention that framed the Constitution, need not be denied ; but the Convention itself was neither infidel nor atheistic. Did George Washington preside over an infidel convention ? Says Dr. Robert Baird : " All the leading men were believers in Christianity ; and Washington, as all the world knows, was a Christian. Several of the more prominent members were well known as members of churches, and lived in a manner consistent with their profession."* Such men would never knowingly have given their votes for an infidel document as the fundamental law of the nation ; and if they had, the people would never have adopted it. Chief Justice Story says that at the time of the adoption of the constitution, and the adoption of the amendment pertaining to religion, the general sentiment in this country was that the government ought to foster and encourage the

* Religion in Am. page 243.

Christian religion. It was only the intention to hold an even hand among the various sects, and to prohibit all persecution. Beyond this the subject was left, as many other things were, to be acted upon by the several States. He adds, "An attempt to level all religions, and to make it a matter of state policy to hold all in utter indifference, would have created universal disapprobation, if not universal indignation."² It is a well known fact that at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, several of the States had established Churches. In one or two cases this continued for years afterward. The Constitution controlled the general Government only in this particular, and left the States to manage their own affairs.

On neither of these grounds, then, can it be successfully maintained that this is not a Christian nation. We do not need an established Church to make us such, nor do we need to place any man under any civil disabilities on account of his religion. We may be a Christian nation even though some of our laws are repugnant to the spirit of the Gospel, and though the Federal Constitution is perhaps defective in not making formal mention of the name of God. Some of these things are blemishes indeed, but others only show how truly the American people have apprehended, and how honestly they have endeavored to carry out, the principles of the faith which we profess.

We discover one feature of the Christian religion in our government in the use of the oath. "An oath," says Webster, "is an appeal to God for the truth of what is affirmed. The appeal implies that the person imprecates his vengeance and renounces his favor, if the declaration is false." An oath therefore is an act of religion; and as the God to whom appeal is made is the "only living and true God," or the God of the Christian, it is an act of the Christian religion. This view is the more sustained because the oath is ordinarily administered upon the Bible, thus recognizing that book as the word of God. It is true that an oath may be taken by the uplifted hand, but

* Story on the Constitution. Amendment 1.

that is not the ordinary mode. It is also true that the law provides a solemn form of affirmation for those whose consciences forbid the oath. But it remains nevertheless true, that the administering the oath, the oath upon the Christian Scriptures, is one of the most common practises of the government of this country. The President of the United States assumes his office by an oath. The Vice-President does the same. The judges of the supreme court, and the members of both Houses of Congress do the same. And even the postmasters and their deputies all do the same. It is the same in our military affairs as in our civil affairs. Everywhere and continually, does the government meet men with the demand for the oath ; and the ordinary way into the government service, from the highest office down almost to the lowest, is through this act of Christian worship, which we call the oath. What a folly to call that government atheistic which asks men so continually to acknowledge the existence of God ! What a misnomer to call that instrument infidel under which men are every day offered the Bible, as a book so sacred that he who lays his hand upon it must be assumed to speak the truth !

We discover another feature of the Christian religion in our government, in the recognition of the Sabbath. This recognition occurs even in the Federal Constitution. It is found in the clause concerning the returning of bills by the President to Congress: "If any bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days (Sunday excepted) the same shall be a law." The point of inquiry at present is, Why this phrase, "Sunday excepted," was introduced ? If it were to give the President more time, why not simply say eleven days instead of ten ? If it were to afford him a day of rest, why not as well give him some other day. No such view of the case can be taken. The Constitution was framed for a Christian people. That people observed the day commonly called Sunday as a Sabbath ; and the Constitution, going down to the people to be adopted, was obliged to recognize that day. The people made the Constitution, and could unmake it and make another, and they would have unmade it had it abolished, even by implication,

the Christian Sabbath. Hon. Theo. Frelinghuysen, in a speech before the U. S. Senate, says : "The public recognition of the Sabbath is recorded in the Federal Constitution. The President of the United States, in the discharge of the high functions of his legislative department, is expressly relieved from all embarrassment on Sunday. The Supreme Court, the highest judicial tribunal of the country, is by law directed to be suspended on Sunday. Both houses of Congress, the offices of the State, Treasury, War, and Navy departments, are all closed on Sunday ; and all the States in the Union, I believe (twenty three certainly), by explicit legislative enactments, acknowledge and declare the religious authority of the Sabbath. And these state laws do not merely notice the day, but they in terms require its religious observance, and prohibit its profanation under proper penalties." * The force of these facts is not to be broken by the circumstance that we have laws also protecting people who observe another day. That only adds another Christian element to the one already noticed : we not only observe the Sabbath but in a Christian spirit protect those who observe another day. But the Sabbath observed by our government is the first day of the week commonly called Sunday. And Dr. Robt. Baird, who was as conversant with other governments as perhaps any American that ever lived, says that our public authorities respect the Christian Sabbath "to an extent rarely witnessed in other countries."

We discover still other features of the Christian religion in various public Proclamations. We have had two Presidents who have declined, even when requested to do so by Congress, to issue religious proclamations. These were Jefferson and Jackson ; yet both Jefferson and Jackson in their inaugural addresses and messages, repeatedly recognized the existence of the one only living and true God, and referred to his care over us, and to our accountability to him ; and the other Presidents, as occasion has demanded, have appointed days of Fasting, or days of Thanksgiving, to be observed by the people of the whole land. At the commencement of the Revolu-

* Life of Frelinghuysen, page 73.

tionary War, the Continental Congress voted an address in which the people are called upon "by a sincere repentance and amendment of life, to appease God's righteous indignation, and through the merit and mediation of Jesus Christ obtain his pardon and forgiveness."^{*} In 1812, when the last war broke out with England, both Houses of Congress waited upon the President with an Address that had been unanimously adopted, requesting him to issue a proclamation appointing a day of fasting, humiliation and prayer. President Tyler appointed such a day when Harrison died. President Taylor appointed such a day, the subject being brought into the Senate and advocated there by Henry Clay. President Buchanan appointed such a day, by unanimous request of Congress, at the beginning of our troubles in 1861; and President Lincoln, during the progress of the Rebellion, appointed such days again and again. During the war also, we had a coin struck bearing the motto "In God we trust;" and since peace has returned, we have had the appointment of a national Thanksgiving Day each year. Now these appointments may not be accompanied by any express utterances of Christian theology, but they are eminently Christian acts. They harmonize with the Christian religion. They are chiefly gratifying to Christian people. They constitute a most appropriate and beautiful national recognition of the power of prayer, and of the acceptableness of praise with the Great Being whom Christians worship, and who alone governs nations and men.

Another Christian feature of our government is, the large provision it makes for Christian Worship. It does not maintain worship indeed for the people: that it could not well do and keep a perfectly even hand among the Christian denominations. Neither do the people ask or need any such thing. They are perfectly competent to maintain worship for themselves. For its own servants and officials, however, and on its own ground, the government does sustain Christian worship, and has done so from the very beginning. In each of the two

^{*} Baird's Religion in America, page 243.

Houses of Congress, a chaplain is appointed, who opens the services daily with prayer; and in the hall of the House of Representatives, one of these chaplains preaches every Sabbath day. It may be indeed that these chaplaincies are not always well filled, or that the members of Congress are not always reverent in their attendance upon the service, but the fact remains. A Christian minister each day invokes upon their counsels the Divine blessing, and on each Sabbath stands up to speak to them of salvation through our Lord Jesus Christ. He is appointed to do this work. He is awarded a stipend from the government treasury for his services.

The same thing is true of some of our most important government institutions. At West Point there is always a chaplain, and the cadets regularly attend upon the services. Even at Annapolis, where it is said the students are required to pursue their studies on Sunday, there is yet a chaplain, and some sort of Christian service. A chaplain is also appointed for each one of our larger vessels of war, and one is in like manner stationed at each of our great military posts; and during the recent war, a chaplain was allowed for each regiment that took the field.

This is a common custom of our Government. For its own servants, and on its own ground, it sustains Christian worship. It has been so from the beginning. In the two Houses of Congress, in the army, in the navy, at our military academy, and at our naval school, the government causes Christian ministers to be appointed, to officiate regularly in Christian services. How could this be done by a government that was essentially atheistic or infidel? How could this be done by a government that had divorced itself from all religions of every sort? How could it be done by men sworn to sustain a Constitution which was intended to level all beliefs and hold them as a matter of utter indifference? Against every allegation of that sort we place this pregnant and indisputable fact—this Government sustains the worship of God through our Lord Jesus Christ.

To show that these conclusions have not been hastily drawn, and that the ground we have taken is tenable, permit us to

cite the opinions of some of our most eminent jurists, and to refer to some of the more important decisions of our Courts.

Law in this country is of two sorts—written law and unwritten—sometimes called Statute Law and Common Law. Common law is one of our inheritances from the mother country; and like the *habeas corpus*, and the trial by jury, has always been regarded as an inheritance of special value. What this common law is, we determine by the decisions of our Courts, and when once determined it remains in force, unless repealed by express legislation.

What we wish to show, as germane to this discussion, is that our common law is based upon the Christian religion, that it recognizes that religion as divine, and that the Christian religion is so interwoven with it as to constitute its life and soul. Of course we refer here only to the Christian religion in general, and not to any sectarian form of it; and equally we avoid the error of supposing that we have the right under common law to erect an established Church, or to persecute any man for his religion, be that what it may. We mean that by virtue of this common law the Christian religion is recognized, fostered, and practised and obeyed by our government to the extent that no other religion is, or can be, and that it is introduced into and supported at our state and national institutions, in unsectarian form, as the religion of the people.

Judge Allen of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, sitting in General Term, May 1861, tried the case of Gustav Lindenmuller, who had been indicted for Sabbath-breaking, and pronounced a decision embracing the following statements: "The Christian religion has always been engrafted upon our laws, and entitled to protection, as the basis of our morals and the strength of our government." If this decision has any meaning, or any relevancy to the case to which it was applied, it must be that the Christian religion enjoys this protection above Mohammedanism, above Paganism, and above any other religion existing in the land. To show that this was his meaning he goes on to say: "The constitutionality of the law under which Lindenmuller was indicted, does not depend upon the question whether Christianity is a part of

the common law of this state. Were that the only question involved, it would not be difficult to show that it is so in a qualified sense—not to the extent that would authorize a compulsory form of worship common to all denominations styling themselves Christians, but to the extent that entitles the Christian religion and its ordinances to respect and protection as the acknowledged religion of the people. . . Religious toleration is entirely consistent with a recognized religion. Christianity may be conceded to be the established religion, to the qualified extent mentioned, while perfect civil and political equality, with freedom of conscience and religious preference, is secured to individuals of every other creed and profession.” The learned Judge then takes the case out of common law, and puts it upon the statute: “The constitution of 1777, that of 1821, and that of 1846, embrace provisions and recitals which very clearly recognize the Christian religion as the religion of the people. . . The several constitutional conventions recognized the Christian religion as the religion of the State by opening their daily sessions with prayer, by themselves observing the Christian Sabbath, and by excepting that day from the time allowed the governor for returning bills to the legislature. . . In this State the Sabbath exists as a day of rest by common law, and without the necessity of legislation to establish it.” The firm hand with which Judge Allen met this question, has given his decision great notoriety. It was a bold opinion to utter, but he uttered it from the bench, and the decision has never been reversed. Christianity is the established religion of the state.*

Chancellor Kent gave a similar decision in a case of blasphemy. A man was tried for aspersing the character of Jesus Christ and denying the legitimacy of his birth. In that decision the Judge held that “the people of this State, in common with the people of this country, profess the general doctrines of Christianity as the rule of their faith and practice; and to scandalize the Author of those doctrines, is not only in a religious point of view extremely impious, but even in

* The main points in this decision have been confirmed in the Court of Appeals.

respect to the obligations due to society, is a gross violation of decency and good order. Nothing could be more offensive to the virtuous part of the community, or more injurious to the tender morals of the young, than to declare such profanity lawful . . . To construe the Constitution as breaking down the common law barriers, against licentious, wanton, and impious attacks upon Christianity itself, would be an enormous perversion of its meaning."* The learned Judge therefore remanded the prisoner to his sentence, consisting of both fine and imprisonment.

Judge Story of the U. S. Supreme Court, in his great work on the Constitution, goes even further than the authorities just named : holding that it is not only the duty of the government to protect the Christian religion, but to foster and promote it. On that point he assumes that there can scarcely be a difference of opinion. "There will probably be found few persons in this or any other country," he says, "who would deliberately contend, that it was either unreasonable or unjust to foster and encourage the Christian religion generally, as a matter of sound policy as well as of revealed truth." Then alluding to the sentiment, sometimes broached, that the adoption of the Federal Constitution divorced this government from religion, he says : "At the time of the adoption of the Constitution and the Amendment, the general, if not the universal, sentiment in America was, that Christianity ought to receive encouragement from the state, so far as was not incompatible with the private rights of conscience, and with freedom of worship. An attempt to level all religions, and to make it a matter of state policy to hold all in utter indifference, would have created universal disapprobation, if not universal indignation . . . the real object was not to countenance, much less advance, Mohammedanism, or Judaism, or Infidelity, but to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects, and to cut off the means of religious persecution."*

The only remaining citations necessary to establish our

*Johnson's Reports, 290.

*Story on the Constitution, Article 6, § 3, Amendment I.

position may be taken from the celebrated Girard will case. Stephen Girard of Philadelphia made a large bequest for the founding of a college for indigent orphans : specifying that " No ecclesiastic, missionary, or minister of any sect whatsoever, shall ever hold or exercise any station or duty whatsoever in said college, nor shall any such person ever be admitted for any purpose or as a visitor within the premises." He explains this prohibition by saying, " As there is such a multitude of sects, and such diversity of opinion among them, I desire to keep the tender minds of the orphans. . . free from the excitement which clashing doctrines and sectarian controversies are so apt to produce." He however adds, " My desire is that all the instructors and teachers in the college shall take pains to instil into the minds of the scholars the purest principles of morality."*

This will was contested; and the case was carried up to the Supreme Court of the United States, sitting in equity. On the part of the contestant appeared Daniel Webster; and the point which he undertook to make was, that the bequest was not a charity, and therefore was void. It seems that the words, " a charity," have in law a technical meaning ; and that no bequest is recognized as such, or is counted valid, which endows an institution opposed to the Christian religion. Judge Willard speaks to this point in his *Equity Jurisprudence, Chap. 7, Trusts*, where he says, " Donations,† for example, to aid in propagating the doctrines of Mohammedanism, or Mormonism, could not be supported." Mr. Webster contended that the Girard College was opposed to the Christian religion, and therefore that the will was void. The opposing Counsel, Hon. Horace Binney, met his argument, not by denying the principle on which it was based, but by denying the facts alleged. He simply undertook to show that Girard College was not intended as an infidel institution. He said that on the terms of the will the Bible might be taught

* Howard's Rep. Vol. 2.

† Judge Sharswood, of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, has recently pronounced the same opinion in the case of Levi Nice, who bequeathed property to " The Infidel Society of Philadelphia."

there as the word of God. Nay, he contended that it *must* be taught, for in no other way could the teachers inculcate "the purest morality." And the Court only held that if the will were to be overthrown Mr. Webster must make out a case of clear and indisputable opposition to Christianity. Said Judge Story, "An institution for the propagation of Deism or any other from of infidelity is not to be presumed to exist in a Christian country; and therefore it must be made out by clear and indisputable proof . . . there must be plain, positive and express provisions, demonstrating not only that Christianity is not to be taught, but that it is to be impugned and repudiated." Mr. Webster affirmed that there were such provisions in the will. This he said was the meaning of the strong clause against sectarian teaching, and especially the meaning of the clause excluding ministers from the institution. Had he sustained that point the will would have been overthrown. The decision was made on the ground that there was nothing in the will "inconsistent with the Christian religion, or opposed to any known policy of the state of Pennsylvania."^{*}

It is to be observed in this case that neither Court nor counsel undertook to controvert Mr. Webster's position, that "a charity" in the eye of law, must never oppose the Christian religion. It was admitted without a question, that if Mr. Girard's bequest was opposed to the Christian religion, it must be held null and void. All that the Court maintained was, that "it was sufficient if the testator did not require anything inconsistent with Christianity," and that the contestants must show "not only that Christianity was not to be taught, but that it was to be impugned and repudiated." Mr. Webster undertook to show that, but did not succeed. Therefore the will was confirmed. But had it been shown that the Girard College was to be an infidel institution, erected to oppose the Christian religion, the will would have been overthrown in the highest Court of the United States.

⌚ This is common law. It is solemnly affirmed by the highest judicial tribunal of this nation. The Christian religion

^{*} Howard's Rep. Vol. 2.

must not be impugned and repudiated. Even the sacred bequest of a dying man would be set aside, and his intended charity to helpless orphans pronounced null and void, if by that charity the testator undertook to make an assault upon the established faith of the country.

Mr. Webster's argument in this case is a masterpiece of eloquence. His tribute there to the Christian religion, and to the Christian ministry of this country, is one of the most touching and magnificent utterances ever put in human speech. He says: "It is the same in Pennsylvania as elsewhere. The general principles and public policy are sometimes established by constitutional provisions, sometimes by legislative enactment, sometimes by judicial decisions, and sometimes by general consent. But however they may be established, there is nothing that we look for with more certainty, than the general principle that Christianity is a part of the law of the land. . . Everything declares it. The massive cathedral of the Catholic; the Episcopal church, with its lofty spire pointing heavenward; the plain temple of the Quaker, the log church of the hardy pioneer of the wilderness; mementoes and memorials round about us; the consecrated grave-yards, their tomb-stones and epitaphs, their silent vaults, their mouldering contents, all attest it. The dead prove it as well as the living. The generations that are gone before speak it, and pronounce it from the tomb. We feel it. All, all proclaims that Christianity, general, tolerant Christianity, Christianity independent of sects and parties, that Christianity to which the sword and the faggot are unknown—general, tolerant Christianity is the law of the land.*

On one point this conclusion needs guarding. The Christian religion, thus pronounced the law of the land, is and must be entirely unsectarian. It is not Episcopal Christianity, nor Methodist Christianity, nor Presbyterian Christianity, nor Roman Christianity; but a Christianity consisting of those great principles in which true Christians agree. Between the various sects the government must hold a perfectly

* Works Web. VI: 176.

even hand. What it exhibits must be those "general doctrines" of the system described by Chancellor Kent; "the Christian religion generally," as affirmed by Judge Story; Christianity, as Mr. Webster says, "independent of sects and parties." The government is Christian; and for that very reason must never put itself into the hands of a sect, or exalt one Christian church above another.

Some persons deny that there is any such thing as unsectarian Christianity. In common speech, however, such a thing is recognized, and popular opinion on the subject has been confirmed by the courts. Such institutions as the American Bible Society, are recognized as unsectarian, and so are numerous asylums, hospitals, and other eleemonysary institutions, existing in our land. The Girard College was recognized as an unsectarian institution, although it was decided that the Bible might be taught there as a divine revelation, and although in fact it has been kept under the very purest of Christian influences to this day. Girard carefully guarded the institution against sectarianism, but the Court held that this did not exclude the Christian religion; and it was upon that ground that the will was sustained. The same rule also prevails in state institutions. In our prisons, our reformatories, our penitentiaries, our houses of refuge, we have, or ought to have, the Christian religion in unsectarian form.

Certain sects may object to this rule because they are virtually excluded by it; but this can never change the law. Certain sects always carry their sectarianism with them; and indeed, make it a kind of law never to officiate in public worship without some sectarian demonstration. This however is their misfortune. Nearly all the Christian sects are willing to conduct worship in an unsectarian manner. The few who refuse to do so, necessarily put themselves at a disadvantage. At least such is the law of our State Christianity, though it has thus far been but imperfectly carried out. A Presbyterian minister, officiating in a State institution as chaplain, must not appear as a Presbyterian, but only as a Christian. He must not bring in there any of those peculiarities which distinguish his own sect from all others. Whether it be the

teaching of Christian doctrine, or the celebrating of Christian worship, in which he engages, he must be unsectarian in it. And it must be the same with the Baptist, the Methodist, the Episcopalian and the Roman Catholic. The religion such men bring into our public institutions, must come with *none of the trappings of a sect*. The public law, rightly understood, is as rigid in this particular as was Girard's will.

Some persons, of late, have assumed to call the *Bible* sectarian. It is not so considered by the people generally, but some who do not like the book, put this name upon it, and some very liberal souls seem inclined to fall in with them. It is, therefore, a fortunate circumstance, that this question has been made the subject of a judicial decision. It was one of the questions pronounced upon in the case of the Girard will. Girard guarded his institution against sectarianism by the most stringent provisions. He even refused to allow any minister of any sect to come upon the premises as a visitor; and so pointed were his words that Webster believed that he could show that he had excluded Christianity itself. But counselor Binney held that the Bible might go in there notwithstanding: nay, that it *must* go there to fulfill the condition of "inculcating the purest morals." And the Court said, "Why may not the Bible be read, especially the New Testament, without note or comment, and taught as a divine revelation?" Clearly, this decision pronounces the Bible unsectarian.*

And just as clearly it answers the question, *Which Bible?* Judge Story did not mean the Douay Bible, when he pronounced this decision; for he says the Bible "without note or comment; and the Douay Bible is never published in that way. The Douay Bible is a sectarian book, always conveying sectarian teaching, and is used by but one sect in this country, and by that sect but very little. The Court clearly referred to what is sometimes improperly called King James' Bible, to what is more properly known as the Authorized Version, to the Bible in common use in this country; and in

*Since the above was in type, Judge Storer, in the Supreme Court of Cincinnati, in the case of Minor and others vs. the Board of Education of Cincinnati, has made a decision, highly important in its relations and effects, confirmatory of this view of the question.—*Editors*.

that famous decision, that book was pronounced unsectarian by the highest judicial tribunal in the United States.

This Bible goes into our State institutions, and is used in our Government chaplaincies everywhere. It goes with the worship which the state provides for our prisons, for our reformatories, and for our asylums for the insane, the deaf and the blind. It is read in these institutions as the word of God. Lessons of general Christian doctrine, and of practical morality, are taught from it. It harmonizes perfectly with that unsectarian Christian worship which alone has rightful place in such places. And on this ground we base the right to use it in the Public Schools. If the Bible is properly used in other state institutions, why not in these? If we are a Christian nation we have a right to sustain Christian worship in our public institutions, and the public schools are no exception to the rule. That worship must be unsectarian, indeed, but the Bible just meets that necessity. This is the common sentiment and the common practice, and the unanimous decision of the Supreme Court of the United States pronounces the Bible, the common version, an unsectarian book.

It is sometimes said, indeed, that it is unfair to tax our "Roman Catholic brethren" to sustain an institution, of the advantages of which they can not conscientiously avail themselves; but that mode of reasoning would require us to give up our schools entirely. By their own showing they could no more "conscientiously" avail themselves of our schools, after the Bible was removed than now. Their children need not be compelled to attend upon those school exercises in which the Bible is used. They can enter school after the opening worship, if that be necessary, or leave it before closing worship; but we are a Christian nation, and as such have the right in all our public institutions, to worship God, in the use of the Bible, through Jesus Christ our Lord.

ART. III.—SIN AND SUFFERING IN THE UNIVERSE.

By ALBERT BARNES, Philadelphia, Pa.

[THIRD PAPER: CONTINUED FROM PAGE 68.]

(12.) A solution of the difficulty is not to be found in the doctrine of universal salvation.

For the correctness of this proposition the following two reasons may be offered:—*First*, it can not be proved that that doctrine is true; and *second*, if it were true the difficulties in the case would not be removed.

First. It can not be proved that the doctrine is true.

(a) It can not be demonstrated that the *Bible* teaches the doctrine of the salvation of all men. This, I think, may be made plain by a few considerations. The Bible seems at least to teach the doctrine of the future eternal punishment of the wicked, and so clear appear to be its teachings on that subject that one of two results will follow: either that the mass of men will reject the Bible altogether, or they will embrace the doctrine of the future punishment of the wicked. It is as clear as anything can be, that the mass of mankind can never be made to believe that the doctrine of universal salvation is found in the Bible. If that book teaches anything clearly; if it has any meaning; if there are any proper rules of interpreting language, it is plain that it teaches the doctrine of the eternal punishment of the wicked, and that it can never be made to teach otherwise, and that no interpretation can be put on its language which will convince the world at large that it teaches the doctrine of universal salvation. The real alternative is not found in the question whether the Bible teaches the doctrine of the future punishment of the wicked or not; but it is between the belief of that doctrine and infidelity. It is undeniably a fact, that the great mass of men have held, and do hold, that the Bible teaches the doctrine of future eternal punishment, and that it can not be made to teach otherwise. Ninety-nine in every hundred have held this. The great body of Christians have averred this in their creeds as their belief; and the great body of infidels and sceptics have held

Christians to this belief, and have insisted that in embracing the Bible they have bound themselves to embrace this doctrine as it teaching. It is impossible to convince infidels that the doctrine of future punishment is *not* taught in the Bible, or that it *does* teach that all men will be saved. All men—Christians and infidels—except the very small class who call themselves Universalists, have held that the Bible teaches that the wicked will be punished forever in the future world. If that doctrine is not taught in the Bible, it is not taught anywhere, nor would it be possible to convey that doctrine in human language, for no words can affirm it more plainly. Even the language which has just been used in regard to this doctrine is not clearer or stronger than that which is found in the Bible, nor is the doctrine expressed in any plainer language in *any* creed held by any Christian church, Catholic, Greek, or Protestant—in the Heidelberg Catechism, in the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England, in the Augsburg Confession, in the Decrees of the Council of Trent, or in the Westminster Confession. Nay, in almost all of these creeds and confessions, the doctrine is stated in the very words of the Bible, and if it is maintained that the doctrine is not taught in the Bible, the very same process of reasoning, and the very same principles of interpreting language, would prove that it is not taught in any creed of Christendom, and that in fact it is not held by any class of mankind. He, therefore, who rejects the doctrine of the future punishment of the wicked, can not consistently maintain his belief in the Bible. To be consistent, he should become at once an honest infidel and reject the Bible altogether. The infidel is the only consistent man in this respect. He gains nothing who, in defending the doctrine of universal salvation, attempts to maintain his faith in the Bible, or to defend his views from that book; he only makes it certain that he can not secure the respect of mankind as an interpreter of language; that he will be regarded by the world as setting at defiance all that can be fairly derived from an ordinary use of words. And if this remark is correct, then, we may have an explanation of the reason why there are so few avowed Universalists as compared with the

real, though secret, number of infidels in our country, and why it is so difficult to keep up the system of Universalism as an organization. The number of persons in any community who can be made to believe that the Bible teaches the doctrine of universal salvation, *must* always be small ; the number of those who for various causes reject the Bible altogether, may be and probably will be much larger. It may occur therefore in any community that the number of avowed or secret sceptics may be increasing, while the number of those who believe that the doctrine of universal salvation is taught in the Bible, and consequently the organization of Universalist societies, may make but little progress. It is certain, therefore, that the world at large will never adopt, as a method of explaining the admission of sin and suffering into the universe, the idea that the Bible teaches that all men will ultimately be saved. It will remain true in the future, as it is now, that the mass of men will prefer the theory of infidelity to that of Universalism, or to the theory that the doctrine of universal salvation is taught in the Bible. The world at large can not be convinced that the latter theory is true.

(b.) The doctrine of universal salvation can not be proved to be true, if the Bible is rejected. He who rejects the Bible gains no advantage on the subject by the rejection. Nature certainly does not reveal the doctrine. There is no basis on which we can demonstrate it by a process of natural or philosophical reasoning. Science does not teach it in any of its departments. Neither astronomy, nor chemistry, nor any other of the natural sciences, throws any light on the subject. After all the light which science throws on great and important questions, they leave all questions about the future destiny of man as much in the dark as before. No man by nature has power to penetrate the future. No one can rend the dark vail between this and the future world. No one, of all the departed millions of heathens and infidels, has come back from the regions beyond the grave, to show what is the condition of the departed ; no man has ever come from those regions to assure man that there is not a hell of woe ; no one has come to tell him that there is a heaven for all. No one can, on phi-

losophical grounds, *assume* that God is so merciful that he will save all ; no one can *assume* on any such ground that he will save any. Philosophically speaking, it is no more proper to assume that God will save *all*, than that he will save *none* ; and no man is a true philosopher who *assumes* either the one or the other. Yet what light has nature to throw on the question whether *either* of these points is true or false ?

(c) It is clear in the mean-time that the *probabilities* in the case are against the doctrine that all men will be saved in the future world. The same thing which has caused sin and misery on earth would make it not improbable that they may exist in a future world, or, at least, would make it certain that it can not be *proved* that they will not exist there.

There is so much evidence of *uniformity* of laws in the arrangements of the universe, as to suggest at least the *possibility* that its uniformity may be found to exist on moral subjects as well as on other subjects, in this world and in the world to come. If sin and suffering have been allowed to come into the system here, philosophy has no reason to assign why they may not be allowed to continue in the system there, and to continue forever.

Second. If the doctrine were true, it would not remove the main difficulty, for the great question is not why sin and suffering *continue* in the universe, but why they *came in* at all. The essential difficulty is not in the *eternity* of suffering—that is, in its existence at any future period however remote, but in the fact that it should have been allowed to come into the system under any circumstances. Even if it could be proved that all will be saved hereafter ; that all suffering and sin will come to an end ; still *this* would not explain the reason why sin and suffering existed at any past period, or why they have extended so far, and continued so long. The fact that a disease can be cured, does not explain the reason why it was allowed to exist ; the possibility or the certainty of a rescue from drowning, does not explain the reason why one was suffered to fall into the stream. In like manner, if it could be shown that a period will arrive in the history of the universe when all sin and suffering will come to an end, still there would

remain all the sin and sorrow of *this* world to account for, involving essentially all the difficulties of the case. The fact that all *would* be made happy would not explain the reason why so many *were* made miserable and were miserable so long ; and all that there is, and all that there has been, and all that there will be, of sin, crime, sorrow, sickness and death in *this* world would remain to be explained as really then as now, nor could the fact that these would cease altogether throw any light on the question why they existed at all. The fact that a man dies, that his sufferings, so far as they are originated by disease, terminate at death, does not explain the reason why the disease came upon him, and throws in fact no light on the question whatever. The difficulty remains the same as it was before. If it could be proved that the fact of his dying was some compensation for his sufferings, making the aggregate of his happiness greater than it could otherwise have been, this fact *might* have the appearance of an explanation or a vindication of his sufferings, but in that case the difficulty would be to explain why this arrangement should not be universal, extending to all beings, in all worlds ; and in like manner, if it could be shown that the happiness of the future state will be augmented by the fact of sin and suffering here, so that the *aggregate* of happiness may be greater than it would have been otherwise, then *this* might perhaps be admitted as an explanation, but then, as in the other case, the difficulty would be, why this arrangement was not universal, and why *all* beings were not allowed to fall into sin, and to experience sorrow, pain, sickness and death in order that their future joy might be augmented, or that their temporary sufferings might be compensated by increased blessedness in a future world.

It is further to be added, that it can not be *proved* that any explanation of the reason why sin and suffering are allowed to exist now, would not be a sufficient explanation of the reason why they should exist at any future period in the history of the universe. At *any* period in that future which we call *eternity*, sin and suffering would be no more inconsistent with the character and government of God than they are now. If it be assumed, or if it can be proved, that they are not in-

consistent with that character and government *now*, or at any time in this world, they could not be shown to be inconsistent with that character and government *then*. There would be, obviously, nothing new to explain; there would be no difficulties existing then which do not exist now. The mere fact of their *continuance* does not constitute such a difficulty, for they *continue* here. They are here prolonged from age to age. They last through the entire lives of many men, and *if* they extend into the world to come, even indefinitely, that would add no new feature to the difficulty, or make it more inexplicable.

In these remarks nothing is assumed or attempted in regard to the *reason* why eternal punishment should be inflicted on any. That reason may be wholly beyond our grasp; but it is not essentially more beyond it than is the reason why suffering is inflicted as it is in the present life. No one can explain either the one or the other. But as the fact that the reason is unknown why sufferings are inflicted in the present life, in the manner in which they are inflicted, is no proof that they are *not* thus inflicted, so the fact that we are ignorant of the reason why eternal punishment should be inflicted, is no proof that it will not be. As we could not have argued beforehand that such sufferings would not be inflicted in this world, so we have no basis for arguing that they will not be in the future world, and at any period *in* that world—that is, forever. The question *why eternal* punishment should be inflicted on any of the creatures of God must be admitted to lie beyond the range of the human faculties; just as, and no otherwise, it must be admitted that the question why sin and suffering should have been allowed to come into the universe at all, must be admitted to lie beyond the range of the human powers. All attempts to explain the one or the other have failed.

It is not to be assumed that eternal punishment is threatened, or will be inflicted, because sin is an "*infinite evil*," as has been often maintained. Sin is never spoken of in the Bible as an "*infinite evil*," nor is that ever assigned in the Bible as the reason why the wicked shall "go into everlasting punishment." That this has been represented, by certain

classes of theologians as the reason for the future eternal punishment of the wicked, and that they have attempted to vindicate the justice of it on that ground, can not be denied ; but the argument is one of their own, it is not in the Bible. The proposition that "sin is an infinite evil" conveys, in fact, no idea to the mind, nor is there any sense in which it can be conceived to be true. Any argument, therefore, based on that idea, makes not the slightest impression on the minds of men. As no man could comprehend the meaning of the proposition, so no man could see the force of an argument based on that idea. When God has not assigned a reason for his doings, it is not a very "innocent employment" of our faculties, as Bishop Butler would say, for us to undertake to do it ; for it can not be an innocent employment to attribute that to God, as a reason for his doings, which he has nowhere authorized us to do. It may be admitted that *we* could not demonstrate the justice of eternal punishment from any views which we could take of the evil of sin : just as, and in no way otherwise than that, there are many things occurring in fact under the divine administration, in our own world, which we should not have anticipated as either probable or possible under such an administration, and which we can not vindicate by any process of reasoning of which we are capable in the present state of our powers, and of which we should have said beforehand that we *could* demonstrate that they would not occur under the government of an almighty, a just, a holy, and a benevolent God. We could not, for example, by any reasoning of our own, vindicate the sufferings which come upon infants, nor, in thousands of other cases, could we show how the sufferings which are experienced in the present life are *exactly* measured by the guilt of the sufferer. They are, at least, not such as *we* should think it just to inflict. The whole subject is quite too high for us in our present state of knowledge, and we can not hope to be able to determine the reason of the existence of sin and suffering in the one case, or the other. We *must* be content, in the one case, to take the facts as they exist *as facts*, with the belief that there *may be*, and that there are, sufficient reasons for them, or that they may,

in some way unknown to us, be reconciled with goodness, justice and mercy ; and the statement in regard to the other must be received in the same manner, and left as it is. The rue philosophy is to receive the one as *facts* actually occurring under the government of God, and somehow entering into his plan ; to receive the other as the undoubted affirmation of the Bible, an affirmation in that case as clear as the facts are in the other ; and to leave the whole matter of the *reason*, in the one case as in the other, equally with God ; the one as clear in the statement as the other is in the fact, and both beyond our power of explaining them, or of reconciling them with justice—and the one no more so than the other. In fact, so far as has ever been shown, the one is as inexplicable as the other, and, for aught that we can know, the reasons which would explain or vindicate the one would explain and vindicate the other ; and until we can understand why sin and suffering came into the universe at all, the whole matter of their introduction and continuance must be left with God. They *seem* to be parts of one vast and comprehensive plan, to be explained on the same principles, leaving indeed the question fairly open—a *proper question to be asked*—whether their existence can be reconciled with the divine perfections, or, whether, admitting the *facts* in the one case, and the *statements* in the other, God can be worthy of confidence and love ? Certainly, the doctrine of universal salvation will not remove any part of the difficulty.

(13.) A sufficient explanation of the difficulty can not be found in the hope that men will be in a more favorable condition in the future world than they are here, and that, although the wicked may suffer there, there will be a better system of probation, so that evil will ultimately come to an end.

Perhaps there is a much more general belief in this opinion than is commonly supposed ; probably a much more general belief in this than in the doctrine of universal salvation. This belief may not be embodied in any avowed creed, but there are but few of the current opinions of the world that are embodied in creeds and confessions of faith. This opinion has been well

expressed by the Hon. Gerritt Smith, in the following language :

"Indeed, we may reasonably hope that men will not sin forever—that, if not in this life, nevertheless in the next, their increasing knowledge will conquer their ignorance, and their increasing virtue will conquer their temptations. So far from falling in with the irrational and God-dishonoring doctrine that the sinner will have no opportunities for reformation and improvement, we should allow reason and virtue to inspire the expectation that such opportunities will be far greater there than here."—*Letters*, pp. 47, 48.

This language undoubtedly expresses a very prevalent hope or expectation among men—a hope and expectation which, though not often so frankly avowed, is nevertheless so extensively entertained as to make the inquiry proper, whether it is so well-founded as to be a just ground of hope, and whether if there were reason to believe that it would occur, the fact would relieve the difficulties in regard to the origin and the existence of sin and suffering in our world.

It is proper in conducting this inquiry, to make the following remarks :

(a) This does not meet, and does not profess to meet, the main, the primary difficulty—the fact that sin and woe have been allowed to come into the system under the government of God, and that death and sorrow have been permitted to spread devastation over this world, and to extend and perpetuate their dominion for so many ages and generations. These things are undoubtedly in the world ; they exist under the government of God ; they are unexplained. Whatever may occur hereafter, it is difficult to see how *anything* that can take place—any new and better system of probation—any arrangement for checking these evils—would throw any light on the question why they were allowed to come into the universe.

Even if it be supposed that a "*better system*" will exist in the future world, under which all these evils will come to an end, still it may be asked, why should not that "*better system*" have been enjoyed in this life ? Why should the *not better* one have existed at all ? Why should man be doomed to go through all the sorrows, the dangers, and the calamities, of the *not better* system in order to reach that *better system* ? Why

should we have been allowed to sin here with the vague hope that in a future world there *may* be some *better system* for the sinner and the sufferer, where "increasing knowledge will conquer his ignorance and increasing virtue conquer his temptation?"

(b) This supposition admits the fact of future punishment, at least for a time, and therefore it involves the essential and the unexplained difficulties connected with that doctrine. It furnishes no help in explaining the difficulties of that doctrine, as it affords none in solving the questions why sin and suffering were allowed to come into the system at all.

(c) Such a theory would not conduct us to a certain conclusion that sin and suffering would ever *cease* in the universe, and therefore would not aid us in the explanation of the subject. If it might be a *better system* than the one existing on earth; if it were *more* favorable for man; if it provided greater facilities against temptation; if it furnished better means of escape and recovery from the ways of sin; still as the system here has failed, that might fail also; as men in fact break through all the restraints of law here, so they might there; as sin and woe are prolonged here, so they might be there. The arranging of a "better" system by no means necessarily implies that men will be themselves better; the devising of means to escape from the temptations of sin by no means makes it sure that men will use those means. The system might in fact fail as the system has failed here.

(d) Such an arrangement in the future world would imply a concession on the part of God that injustice has been done here; that there was some severity, or harshness, or inequality in the system here which made it bear *hard* on man; and that justice required that another and a better system, or one more favorable to man, should be granted in the future world. The fair interpretation of such a system would be that the one existing here was stern and unjust, and that God was *bound* to provide a better, in vindication of his own character and honor. It is not necessary to attempt to show that there can be no presumption or probability that a system of this nature will exist in the future world, or that God will do anything the fair interpretation of which would be a concession on

his part that a former system of his own arranging and devising was wrong ; and that he has suffered that *not better* system to exist for ages, to spread woe and sorrow over all lands, to make the earth a vast burial-place, and at last to leave innumerable multitudes to enter another world of sin and sorrow, under, indeed, a better system, but with no assurance that the results would be essentially different there.

(e) Of the existence of any such arrangement in a future world there is not the slightest evidence : nothing that could furnish a ground of belief or of hope. Nature furnishes no such evidence, for the subject lies beyond the range of human reason, pertaining to a world which reason can not penetrate. No one has returned from that world to assure living men that such arrangement exists there, or ever will exist.

There is no intimation in the Bible that there will be such an arrangement: not the slightest hint that can be construed into proof on that point. All the declarations in the Bible are against any such belief. Whatever may be the opinions of men about the Bible, there can be no doubt that it represents the close of this life as the close of human probation, and describes all beyond as fixed and unchangeable, the result of a judgment on mankind, determining their everlasting doom. It nowhere speaks of another trial ; nowhere promises a Saviour for the future world ; nowhere holds out to man the hope that, if he fails in securing his salvation in this world, he may hope for a "better system" in the world to come.

This method of reasoning, therefore, will not meet the difficulties in regard to the existence of sin and suffering in the universe.

(14.) It is not a sufficient explanation of the difficulties referred to, to suppose that the soul is necessarily mortal or destructible, or that the wicked will be annihilated.

It will not be necessary, in considering this point, to consider the question whether this is so in fact ; but all that is necessary to be shown is, that if this were proved to be true, or if it be assumed that it is so, this would not remove the difficulty. True, in such a case, suffering would ultimately come to an end, and the *surviving* portion of intelligent be-

ings would be happy ; but still the very difficult—the unanswerable question, would remain, Why should countless millions of souls—innocent beings—have been made, only at last to be annihilated ? Why should they be created, only to suffer, and then cease to be ? How can we account for it ? How can we reconcile it with our ideas of justice and of right, that there should be no compensation for these sufferings ; that there should be no return of happiness ; that there should be no mercy and compassion ? And even could it be shown that there would be good to others arising from their sufferings ; that there would be some manifestation of the divine perfections to *them* that they would not otherwise experience ; that there would be some display of the divine character to the universe which would not otherwise have been made—still the main difficulty would remain. How could we account for it ; how could we reconcile it with our ideas of justice, that one class of creatures should have been made only to suffer and then be annihilated, in order that other beings should be made happy, or that their bliss should be augmented ? We can easily understand how this can be when the sufferings are *voluntary*, for we are familiar with that thought. Pain, privation, and sorrow are often voluntarily endured in order that others may be blessed and happy. Thus the mother watches voluntarily through long nights by the side of a sick child ; thus the father toils, endures privation and fatigue, crosses oceans, and wears out his life, in order that he may provide for his children ; thus the patriot goes to the tented field, and endures the hardships of a soldier's life, or perishes on the field of battle, in order that his country may be saved from invasion or oppression, and in order that generations to come may enjoy the blessings of freedom ; and thus the Saviour laid down his life in order that the world might be redeemed—all this is clearly right when it is voluntary. But the difficulty is, how it could be reconciled with justice or benevolence that creatures should be *made* for this purpose, and should be doomed to involuntary woes, in order that others might be benefitted or made happy. We could not, for example, reconcile it with

our ideas of justice, that God should have commanded or compelled his Son to endure the bitter pains of Gethsemane and the cross, without his own consent, even in order to save a whole race of sinners ; and if we are so made that we could not reconcile such things with our conceptions of justice, then the conclusion is inevitable that we could not admit this as an explanation of the difficulties in regard to the introduction of sin and suffering into the universe. These probably are the only explanations of the difficulty which has ever occurred to man ; and if the remarks made on these theories are well-founded, then we have reached the conclusion that the subject lies beyond the range of the human powers ; or, in other words, that the subject is involved in *impenetrable mystery*. A very material inquiry, however, is at once suggested whether these facts and difficulties are consistent with confidence in God, as a holy, just, and benevolent Being ? This will lead us to consider the relation of these facts to the Bible and to Christianity.

§4. THE RELATION OF THESE FACTS TO THE BIBLE AND TO CHRISTIANITY.

There is a very common impression among men that the difficulties which have been referred to in regard to the introduction of sin and misery into the universe, pertain especially, if not exclusively, to the Bible and to Christianity, and that the Christian religion is to be held responsible for all the difficulties which pertain to the subject : in other words, that none but the friends of religion have any embarrassment or difficulty in regard to the subject, and that in proportion as men can emancipate themselves from the belief that the Bible and Christianity are from God, they will escape from the difficulties in the case. In connection with these also, there is a very extensive impression among men, when the claims of the Christian religion are urged upon them, that by embracing that system of religion they involve themselves at once in all the difficulties that pertain to the problem, and are responsible for all the embarrassments that necessarily adhere to the subject. The feeling is that if they reject the Bible

and the Christian religion, they will in a great measure escape from these difficulties; and this is equivalent to saying that, in the apprehension of very many, the statements in the Bible are a very serious objection to its reception as a revelation from God. Especially is this the case in regard to what may be called the *sterner* doctrines of the Bible and to the Christian religion.

(a) The difficulty is supposed by many to be connected particularly with Calvinism. It is somehow felt that this subject pertains to the stern form of belief, and to the articles of the creed embraced by those who hold that belief. That system is somehow supposed to be responsible for the origin and the prevalence of evil in the world, for the doctrines which are held on the subject by mankind, and for the probabilities of punishment in the future state. When men look at that system they approach it with the belief that if they embrace the system they must embrace as a new doctrine all the alleged facts in regard to the introduction of evil in this world, and its continuance in the next: in other words, that they must materially modify the views which they have been accustomed to entertain on the subject, or what they might take if that system were not embraced.

(b) The same thing is true in reference to the doctrine of *decrees*, as held by Calvinists, and as they *appear* to be stated in the Bible. It is a favorite idea of those who reject religion, and especially the form of religion which admits the doctrine of decrees, that according to that system God *ordained*, in an arbitrary manner, and by the mere exercise of will, the existence of sin and misery on the earth, and their continuance forever; that far before the existence of any created thing—far back in eternity—in calm contemplation, and by a fixed and unchangeable purpose, only because he *chose* that it should be so, he determined to bring into existence a world of sin and misery; and that, by the same arbitrary purpose, he resolved that a large part of the race, embracing, as they find a pleasure in representing it, the vast majority, and including infants, the feeble and the ignorant, as well as those who should be openly and preëminently wicked, should

be doomed to eternal suffering. It is supposed by such persons, that the doctrine of decrees is, so to speak, responsible for the introduction of sin and misery, and for the fact of future punishment, and that by rejecting the doctrine they will escape from the difficulty altogether.

(c) In like manner the difficulty has been supposed to be connected with the doctrine of election, as if it was the divine purpose to permit sin and misery to come into the universe in order that the divine sovereignty might be manifest in choosing some to life; or as if the divine sovereignty had been exercised in determining to create a certain number who should be among the "elect," and a certain number who should be among the "non-elect"; and that, in order to accomplish this purpose, it was necessary that men should be so made, and should be placed in such a condition, that the eternal purpose would be certainly carried out: that is, that sin and suffering should spread over the earth, and involve the whole race in ruin, in order that a part might be chosen to life and a part—much the larger part—might be passed over and left to ruin, for the glory of God. It is not meant by these remarks that any true believers in the doctrine of election and sovereignty ever held or avowed this as an article of their creed, or as a part of their system, but that in the apprehension of many who reject the Bible, the two things have been connected as a part of one system, and that the one—the doctrine of election—necessarily involved the terrible doctrine expressed by the other.

(d) In a more special manner it has been supposed that the main difficulty in regard to the existence of sin and woe on the earth, is derived from its connection with the doctrine of future punishment, and that the difficulty presses in a peculiar manner, if not exclusively, on the advocates of that doctrine. It has been a favorite opinion that if that doctrine is denied, and if the doctrine of universal salvation could be established, the difficulties in the case would be substantially removed. The idea thus entertained, is that the great—almost the sole—difficulty in the case is that men are to suffer *forever*; that there is something in that idea essentially different,

so far as the explanation of the difficulty is concerned, from the fact that sin and suffering exist on the earth ; and that if the doctrine of future punishment is rejected, the perplexities of the human mind on the subject of the introduction of sin and misery into the system may be effectually calmed down.

It becomes, then, a very important matter, in order to a full understanding of the subject, to inquire whether these suppositions are correct, and what *is* the relation of sin and suffering to the Bible and to Christianity, or what, so to speak, is the responsibility of the Bible and of Christianity, and especially of the sterner doctrines of the Christian system, on the subject.

(1) It is to be remarked, then, that the Bible did not *originate* sin and suffering, nor is it in any way responsible for their entrance into the system, or for their continued existence, either in this world or the world to come. This proposition, perhaps, will appear plain enough on its mere statement, but the bearing of the statement on the whole subject demands a few additional remarks in illustrating it.

(a) The Bible is a *history*, and, so far as this matter is concerned, is a *mere* history, and its responsibility in the case pertains only to the correctness of the historical record ; or, in other words, its responsibility begins and ends there. It had no more to do with the introduction of sin and suffering into the world at large than Tacitus or Livy had in the disorders and crimes of the Roman Empire before their time, or than Mr. Gibbon had in the corruptions connected with the Decline and Fall of the Empire, or than Mr. Hume had in the wars and crimes that prevailed in England in the times of Stephen, Richard I., Edward II., or Richard III. The Bible has indeed its own statements about the *manner* in which sin and suffering were introduced into our world, and for the accuracy of those statements it is indeed responsible, but not at all for the fact of their introduction. If the Bible had never been written ; if there had been no record of these things beyond what sin and suffering themselves have made in the desolations and wars of earth, in sick-beds, tears, and graves, still

the facts would have been the same ; the same, whether recorded in the Bible, or recorded nowhere.

(*b*) As a history, the Bible is responsible, like all other histories, only for a fair record—for a correct statement of facts. In this respect the Bible, like all other histories, may be held, so to speak, to the strictest responsibility. This is a principle that is applicable to all histories, and could not be departed from in any case without manifest injustice. No one could hold Mr. Gibbon responsible for the crimes of Nero and Caligula, or for the persecutions of Diocletian ; no one could hold Mr. Hume responsible for the crimes of Richard III. ; no one could hold Mr. Prescott responsible for the crimes of the Duke of Alva, the persecutions of Philip II., or the acts of Hernando Cortes—for the atrocities committed in the conquest of Mexico ; but the world may, and will, and should, hold each and all these historians responsible for the correctness of the statements which they have made in regard to the characters of these men, and the accuracy, so far as they had the means of acquiring a knowledge of the truth of their narratives, as to the facts. This responsibility in regard to the Bible is varied only because the Bible professes to be an inspired book—a revelation from God, and because it is to be assumed in such a book that there is, and must be, an exact knowledge in writing the book of all the facts recorded, and of all the motives which prompted to them, and because there can not be claimed in its vindication what may be claimed for any merely human record, the plea that the record is made by imperfect men who were liable to be deceived in their statements by the want of perfect information, and by the uncertainty which must attend, in some measure, any record that depends on mere human testimony. It is to be conceded in regard to the Bible that, as it claims to be a divine revelation, there should be entire accuracy in the facts which it records, and that no new development of knowledge, either from the profound study of the course of events, or from the disclosures of science, should differ from those statements : or, in other words, that the narrative in the Bible is not to be modified or amended by any new light to be thrown on the subject, as it is ad-

mitted there may be in the statements in other histories. But beyond this the responsibility of the Bible does not go. The Bible *may* be held responsible for its statement of facts in regard to the fall and ruin of man ; in regard to the fact of the existence of sin and woe in the future world ; and in regard to the manner in which sin and woe were introduced into the system, but in no sense whatever for the fact that sin and woe exist here, and that they will exist in the future world ; in regard to the fact of their introduction into the system at all, or to the manner in which it has been done.

It is manifest, therefore, that the difficulty remains the same whether the Bible is true or false, as the facts of history are the same whether they are recorded or not, or whether the record that is made is correct or false.

(2.) Christianity is not responsible for the facts referred to in regard to the introduction of sin and suffering into the world, or in regard to their perpetuity in the next.

(a) Christianity did not *originate* these things any more than the science of the healing art originated disease and death. Like that science it finds the facts in existence, and proposes a remedy, whatever may have been the origin of the malady, or however it may be accounted for and vindicated, or whether it can be accounted for and vindicated or not. Sin, disease, death, pain, crime and exposure to the consequences of crime in this world and the next, actually exist, and will exist, whether Christianity is true or false, just as disease will exist in the world whether the science of medicine is found to be based on correct principles or not, or whether the application of the remedies which it prescribes actually alleviate human suffering or diminish the amount of disease in the world or not.

(b) It can not be denied that Christianity, instead of originating sin and suffering, has done much to alleviate that which existed in the world. In particular, it has done much to diffuse intelligence ; to diminish barbarism and to propote civilization ; to elevate the character and condition of woman, and to redress her wrongs ; to abolish slavery, and to

bring savage and inhuman sports to an end; to alleviate suffering by the founding of hospitals and asylums; to alleviate the sufferings of prisoners and captives in war; to comfort the sick and the dying, and to impart peace to mourners, and to dry up fountains of tears.*

(c) Christianity, therefore, is not responsible, and should not be held responsible, for the existence of sin and suffering in our world, and their existence should not be regarded as having any peculiar connection with that system of religion, whether it be true or false. The fact of their existence in no way affects the evidence of the divine origin of the Christian system, any more than it does the divine origin of Buddhism, Mohammedism, or the Mormon system, or than the questions in the different schools of medicine affect the facts in regard to the existence of disease in the world, or the question why diseases were allowed to come into our world at all. Disease is in the world. The science of medicine finds it. It did not originate it. It proposes a remedy. It actually does much to alleviate human suffering. Disease exists whether the prevailing modes of practice in medicine are true or false. Men by no means get rid of disease by rejecting one or the other of the various modes of treating it, or by rejecting all the modes proposed. And, in like manner, sin and suffering are in the world whether Christianity is true or false; whether men embrace it or reject it; whether the system lives or dies. The facts are the same to the infidel and the Christian, and the system of the one has no more to do with the facts than that of the other.

* Lecky, after a very striking description of the prevalence and horrors of gladiatorial games in the Roman Empire, makes the following remarks: "It is well for us to look steadily on such facts as these. They display more vividly than any philosophical disquisition the abyss of depravity into which it is possible for human nature to sink. They furnish us with striking proofs of the reality of the moral progress we have attained, and they enable us in some degree to estimate the regenerating influence that Christianity has exercised in the world; for the destruction of the gladiatorial games is *all its work*. Philosophers indeed might deplore them, gentle natures might shrink from their contagion, but to the multitude they possessed a fascination which nothing but the new religion could overcome." —History of European Morals, Vol I, p. 299.

(3.) The *sterner* forms of Christianity are in no way responsible for their existence in the world, nor have they any special connection with them, nor is the fact of their existence affected in any way whether those doctrines are embraced or not—whether they are true or false.

(a) The difficulties are not connected with Calvinism as distinguished from Arminianism. The Arminian system furnishes no explanation of the difficulty which Calvinism could not furnish in a manner equally clear; it has no explanation of the origin of evil which the system of Calvinism has not; and there is no difference in regard to the facts in the case, whichever system is embraced, or whether both are rejected. If it should be alleged, indeed—which could not be shown to be true—that the system of Arminianism furnishes an easier method of escape from the difficulties; that that system offers salvation more freely to mankind; that there are fewer hindrances in embracing the gospel under that system than there are under the Calvinistic system—still the same facts would remain in regard to the introduction and prevalence of evil in the world, and the same difficulty in explaining the reasons why those evils were allowed to come into the system. If, in a case of shipwreck, there were two methods of escape proposed, one of which would be much better and easier than another—if it should be supposed that two boats were pushed off from the shore, one of which would accommodate the whole of the crew, and the other would accommodate only a part, leaving the rest to perish—still this fact, while it would change the aspect of the case in some respects, would do nothing in explaining the causes of the shipwreck, or in showing why the sea was so made that shipwreck should ever be allowed to occur, or why God did not make the oceans and shores so that they could not happen. Whether two boats were provided or none; whether a larger or smaller boat were sent off the shore; or whether an invitation was given a part or to all to enter the boat with an assurance of safety, still the same difficulty in regard to making a world where shipwrecks would be allowed to occur, and where life would be endangered, would remain, and that difficulty and that fact would not be affected.

by any arrangement in regard to the method of escape from a watery grave.

(b) The difficulty in the case before us has no special connection with "Orthodoxy" as distinguished from "Liberal Christianity" or Unitarianism. If the latter system is embraced there are the same facts to deal with, and the same difficulties to be explained. The Unitarian has no more light to shed on the subject than the Trinitarian; he has no new explanation to offer. He is embarrassed with the same perplexing problems which embarrass other men, and the views which he embraces as peculiar, do nothing to explain the matter. Whether God subsists in Three Persons or in One, the facts in regard to the existence of evil are the same; the difficulty in the explanation is the same. The mere fact of the Unity of God explains nothing in the case, and removes none of the difficulty. And, in like manner, the solution of the question whether Christ is equal with the Father, or whether he is an exalted angel, or whether he is a mere man, does nothing to explain the difficulty. The Socinian, the Arian, the Trinitarian, are involved on this subject in the same difficulty, nor is one any more responsible for the difficulty than another. In the same manner, also, the question whether Christ died to make an atonement for sin, or whether he died as a martyr, in no way affects the subject of the introduction of sin and suffering into the universe, or the difficulties about their prevalence in this world or their continuance in the world to come. If it could be shown that Christ did *not* die as an atoning sacrifice, and that *no* expiation has been made for sin, still that would not affect or modify the fact of the existence of sin, nor would it do anything to solve the mystery of its introduction into the universe, or its prevalence on the earth. It would not diminish the amount of sin; it would do nothing to prevent the commission of crime; it would not preserve one human being from suffering, from death, and from the grave; it would not alleviate one pang of the sufferer; it would not wipe away one tear.

(c) On the same principle, and for the same reason, the subject has no peculiar connection with the doctrine of decrees

or predestination. That doctrine *may* present difficulties of its own to be explained, and men may suppose that they are relieved on some of the subjects connected with morals and religion by rejecting that doctrine ; but whatever may be true on that point, it could not even be pretended that the rejection of that doctrine, and the fact of embracing the opposite doctrine, could affect the reality of the existence of sin and suffering in the universe, or make that reality any less difficult of explanation. The *facts* are the same, whether the whole matter has been determined by a decree formed before the creation of the world, or whether they are the result of mere chance or free agency on the part of man ; whether the universe has been made in accordance with an eternal plan, or without a plan ; whether the divine purposes have been carried out, or whether God has been disappointed in regard to the result of his creation—that is, whether he has made a world the power of controlling which he lost the very moment in which it was rolled from his hands ; whether he foresaw what was to occur, and arranged all according to his foreknowledge, or whether he was short-sighted, and things have occurred which he could not foresee, and which he did not anticipate, and for which he made no arrangement. It is obvious that in some respects there would be more difficulties on one of these theories than on another, but the main facts, and the main difficulties, would not be affected. The facts are to be explained by those who hold the one view as well as by those who hold the other, and it is plain, therefore, that the subject has no particular connection with the doctrine of decrees or predestination. Whatever explanation will meet the facts in the case will meet the question about *permitting those facts to exist*—for, if the facts are capable of vindication, it can not be proved to have been wrong that it should have been determined beforehand that the facts should occur as they actually have occurred. If it be right for a man to do a certain thing, or to pursue a certain course, it can not be wrong for him to determine beforehand to do as he actually does. The difficulty in all such cases is in the *fact*, not in the purpose formed beforehand. The more resolutely a man

determines in all cases to do right, the more exalted is his virtue; and the more such a purpose has entered into all his past life, the more claim has he to the confidence of his fellow-men.

(d) In like manner, the difficulty is not affected in any way by the doctrine of *election*. Whether any men are or are not elected to eternal life, or whether any portion of the human family is passed over in the purposes of salvation, in no way affects the question about the origin of sin and suffering, or about their prevalence in the world, or about the exposure of those who commit sin to punishment in the world to come. There may be, indeed, great perplexities in regard to that doctrine, and there may be much difficulty in explaining or vindicating it, but that difficulty does not add to the original difficulties respecting the introduction of sin and misery into the universe; nor would the difficulty be materially lessened, if lessened at all, could it be shown that the doctrine of election is untrue. Even if it should be admitted that, on the general subject of religion, some difficulties would be avoided by the denial of this doctrine, still this would in no way affect the main points involved in the introduction and existence of sin and misery in our world. If it should be held that all men are chosen to life in the same sense, or if it should be held that none are chosen at all, still the original question would remain the same. Neither of these suppositions would contribute in any way to an explanation of the reason why sin and sorrow were allowed to come into the system, or why men should ever have been placed in such circumstances, either by their own act or by the divine agency, that the questions of election and reprobation should ever have been raised. Whether the doctrine of election is true or not, the facts in the case remain essentially the same.

(e) The same is true, as has been remarked more than once—but the remark is so important that it is not improper to refer to it again—in regard to the doctrine of universal salvation. In reference to the question of the *origin* of the evil, the Universalist has no advantage over him who believes in the doctrine of future punishment, unless he can show

that an amount of happiness is secured in the end by the introduction of sin and suffering which could not have been secured without it, or unless he can show that the blessedness to be enjoyed in the future will be more than an equivalent or a compensation for the sufferings endured in this life; and then, if that could be shown, the difficult problem would at once occur, why, if this is the result of sin and suffering, the arrangement was not made universal, or why all creatures, in all worlds, should not enjoy the advantage to be derived from sin and sorrow overruled for their good. It is plain that the denial of the doctrine of future punishment does nothing to explain the reason why sin and suffering came into the universe at all; why they were not sooner arrested; why they have been allowed to spread over the earth—making the world an abode of sick-beds, and hospitals, and graves for six thousand years; why infants suffer and die; or why sin and sorrow are entailed from generation to generation. The fact, if it could be shown to be a fact that evil will come to an end, does nothing to explain the reason why it exists at all; nor would the fact that at any future period of the history of the universe—near or remote—it would cease to exist altogether, do anything to explain the reason why it exists now. That evil *exists*, is a fact that can no more be denied by the Universalist than by the believer in the future punishment of the wicked; that it has spread woe and sorrow over the earth for at least six thousand years, is a fact that can be denied by neither; that it has existed for a much longer period than the believer in the Bible is willing to admit, is what many who have a lax faith in the Bible, or no faith at all, who are relying on the results of the investigations of “science,” are laboring most zealously to prove—increasing the difficulty by all these efforts to get rid of the Bible as a word of truth. Geologists of that class are laboring to prove that the actual history of the world, and the existence of man on the earth, extend much farther back than the Mosaic record would warrant—extending back twenty, thirty, or a hundred thousand years. When Lepsius, Bun-

sen, Darwin and Lyell endeavor to prove that man, with other animals, has existed for a vast, an indefinite period, on the earth, (since the proof of the existence of suffering and death in man and the inferior animals extends to the utmost limit of the existence of animated beings on the earth) the difficulty, on that theory, is increased by all the accumulation of suffering through that vast extent of years.

(4.) The facts, so far as the difficulty is concerned, are the same whether the Bible is a revelation from God or not; whether Christianity is true or false. It is not possible to see how the facts in the case are in any way affected by these questions. The relation of the Bible to the case is substantially the same, as already remarked, as the relation of secular historical records to the facts which have occurred in the world. The facts are the same whether they are recorded or not; whether the history which proposed to record them is correct or incorrect; whether true or false. The facts in the reign of Nero or Caligula have no special relation to the history of Mr. Gibbon; those pertaining to Richard III. or Charles I. to Mr. Hume; those pertaining to Charles V. to Dr. Robertson; or those pertaining to the Duke of Alva, or to Philip II., to Mr. Prescott or Mr. Motley. If none of these things had been recorded, if there had been no monuments to perpetuate them, if they had passed away from the memory of mankind as soon as they occurred, still they would have been the same. The fact that they had not been recorded would not prove that they had not occurred, and whether the record if made was true or false, still they would have remained the same forever. It would be, indeed, a hard thing for the historian if he was held responsible for the facts which he records, or if his record, true or false, was to be supposed to be in any way involved in the question of their actual existence. He is responsible for a correct record, and for that only.

The same principle must be held to be correct, also, in regard to the Bible and to Christianity. The question is one pertaining solely to the accuracy of the record, not at all to the facts. It can scarcely be repeated too often that the facts are

the same whether they are recorded or not, and that the limit of any responsibility is in regard to the accuracy of the record.

Suppose, then, that all Bibles were burned, or that the Bible was proved not to have any well-founded claim as a revelation from God; suppose that it was demonstrated that Christianity is an imposition; suppose that it was proved that the doctrine of the trinity, or the incarnation, or the atonement, had no foundation. Suppose that all creeds were destroyed—still all this would in no way change the facts under consideration, or the inquiry before us. Suppose it was true that the histories of Tacitus, Gibbon, Hume, Robertson, Prescott, Motley, were all ingenious forgeries, this would in no way change the facts which have occurred in our world. Recorded or unrecorded, they are, and ever will be, precisely the same. So the reality of sin and suffering; of pain and death; of sorrow, groans and tears; of crime and the consequences of crime in our world, would remain the same. The Bible gone, the sacred records all destroyed, all creeds and systems of theology obliterated from the memory of man, infidel geologists would take up the subject, and demonstrate from the records of the rocks precisely what the Bible affirms in regard to the existence of suffering and death, on just as wide a scale and with as many forms of suffering and agony; and the desolation of empires the memory of which would be found in old inscriptions on temples and tombs, would demonstrate the same thing in regard to the existence of crime in the world. Men can not get rid of the record of guilt and woe in our world by denying the truth of the Bible or of the Christian religion.

(5) No advantage is gained in any respect, on the subject, by rejecting the Bible and the Christian religion.

This is but another form of presenting the idea already expressed, but it seems necessary to repeat the remark in order to complete the argument.

(a) Men do not get rid of the difficulties by infidelity. Infidelity turns away the mind from those difficulties; it does not annihilate them, lessen them, or explain them. The facts

remain the same as pertaining to this world and the world to come, as pertaining to the origin of evil, to its continuance, and to its apparent irreconcilableness with the character and government of God. As infidelity has no explanation to offer in regard to the *introduction* of evil and to its existence in this world, so, as far as it has anything to offer, the evil *may* exist in the future world—may exist forever. Indeed, on the common principles held by the rejectors of the Bible, this is likely to occur, since it is a favorite idea with many of those who reject the Bible, that the universe is governed by fixed and unchanging laws over which even God has no control, and that nothing can ever occur to change those laws. As it is, therefore, a law of our present mode of existence—a law that seems to be uniform in this world—that evil shall exist, the presumption would seem to be that the same thing would occur in the future state at any imaginable period: that is, that it will exist forever.

(b) The difficulties are not explained or removed by science. It has been, and still is, a favorite idea in the scientific world that science will, in its progress, do much to lessen the amount of sin and suffering on the earth, and will ultimately remove evil altogether. This idea lies at the foundation of the philosophy of Comtè, and enters largely into all the systems of those who reject the Bible. This idea is expressed in the following manner by the Hon. Gerritt Smith in the Letter referred to in the Introduction of these articles, and which is here reproduced as expressing not merely his own view, but a view that is believed to be prevalent in the world. "Doubtless," says he, "the day is coming when there will be comparatively little sin on the earth. Science, more than all other agencies, hastens the coming of this day. For we may reasonably hope that when science shall have fully more revealed to men the laws of their being, obedience to those laws will be in greater proportion to the knowledge of them than now is." "When men shall have learned, as they yet will learn, the laws of life and health, and shall, as they yet will, faithfully keep them, there will not only be few or none of those premature deaths,

but the ordinary length of their existence will probably be at least double its present three-score and ten years." Respecting this theory, it is obvious to make the following remarks :

Thus far science has not done very much to lessen the amount of crime upon the earth, or to reform mankind ; nor have scientific men been the most zealous, as they have certainly not been the most successful, reformers.

The progress of science has not as yet tended materially to lengthen human life. It is a fact that since the time of Moses—a period of more than three thousand years—no perceptible progress has been made in that direction ; nor are there any indications that any material progress is to be made in the same number of years to come. In the time of Moses the regular limit of human life was "three-score years and ten." (Psalm xc, 10), and the same is the termination of human life now ; nor does it appear, from any statistical tables, that more persons exceed that limit now than there were in the time of Moses. Indeed the limit of life of all kinds on the earth seems to be unchangeably fixed, and to be under laws which are in no way subject to human control, and which are not to be affected by any progress in human knowledge. Each order of plants and animals—of trees, flowers, grasses—of fowls, fishes and wild beasts—of insects and reptiles—seems to be under the same laws in regard to the duration of their being which they obeyed in the earliest periods of the world's history. The oak, the cedar, and the palm-tree lived as long, so far as appears, in the days of Abraham as they live now ; the age of the horse, the camel, the elephant, the eagle, and the humming-bird, was the same ; the length of life in the serpent tribes, the insect tribes, and in the inhabitants of the waters, was the same. Time has done nothing to produce any change in these respects, nor has a "better knowledge of the laws of their being" on the part of men, or any arrangements which men have been able to make, done anything to affect a change in regard to the laws of their existence.

It is difficult to see, therefore, on what ground there can be any hope or expectation in relation to the future, respecting

the duration of their being, as it regards any of the orders of animated existence on earth.

It is obvious to remark that if this *should* occur, the facts in the case would not be materially varied, nor would the difficulty be essentially diminished. *Death*, the great source of the difficulty, would still exist as really, and to the same extent, as now—for all living beings would still die, and, so far as appears, death would occur in as varied and as trying forms. If science does much to alleviate pain, if it cheats disease for a time, if it makes even the death-bed more easy, still it *is* death, and is essentially the same. It is now to all intents and purposes what it was when the first man expired, nor in relation to great men, to kings and princes, to rich men and to nobles, to the learned, and to men eminent in genius and talent, essentially different from what it is to men in humbler life and of more humble birth.

Said a Puritan physician of the time of Elizabeth: "I have been looking over the list of diseases to see if I could find one that I would wish to die by, and *I have not found any that is entirely satisfactory.*" The daughter of Dr. Franklin, when the great philosopher was dying, proposed to him to allow her to change his position that he might have more ease. "No position is easy," said he, "to a dying man"—and so it will be to the end of time, and in all lands, and being so, the great difficulty in regard to the introduction of death into our world still remains, after all science has done, or all that science is likely to do. To the scientific man as such, and to the Christian as such, the difficulty remains the same and pertains as much to the one as to the other: no more, no less.

(c) The progress of the world in material wealth, in civilization, in better modes of government, in philosophy, and in ameliorated laws and customs, would not relieve the difficulty, or answer the question involved in the introduction of sin and suffering into the system.

It can not be denied that great hopes have been entertained from these sources in regard to the amelioration of the world and the diminution of the evils which exist; and it need not

be denied that much has been done in this respect, and that much more may be hoped for in the future.

But it is to be remembered that these causes have been in operation for six thousand years, and that the condition of the world, so far as the matter under consideration is concerned, has not essentially changed. In Greece, where the best systems of philosophy that were known to the ancients prevailed, the condition of the people at large was substantially the same as it is now; under the various forms of civilization in Egypt, in Babylon, in Assyria, in Greece, in Rome, the condition of the world was essentially the same; and under all forms of government—the monarchial, the aristocratic and republican, it is essentially the same. Sin and suffering abound as they did in the first periods of the world's history, and perhaps to an equal extent under all these forms of government, of civilization, of philosophy and of law. The past history of the world, even if it should hold out the hope that in some far distant age the condition of affairs on earth will be alleviated in these respects, and by these agencies, furnishes no ground of hope whatever that the entire evil will be removed, or that the condition of human affairs will be essentially different from what it is now, and from what it has been in past times. It is to be remembered, also, that even if all that is claimed and hoped for from civilization, from philosophy, from better forms of government, and better laws, should be realized in the future, *the great question*—the material point of the difficulty—would not be removed or explained. The question why sin and suffering were allowed to come into the system, would remain unsolved. The past is fixed. No subsequent condition of things will affect that; and though it should appear in the end—in far distant ages—that human affairs shall become righted, still it would not explain the reason why they were allowed to get into such a condition that they *needed to be righted*: as the fact that a capsized ship was righted, would not explain the reason why it was allowed to fall into breakers, or to impinge on hidden rocks.

It is obvious, from these views, that men *gain* nothing by any of these systems. The great difficulty about the *introduction* of evil, remains the same. The appalling *facts* are the same. The prospects respecting the future, so far as these systems are concerned, are essentially the same: the same for this world, the same, so far as appears, for the world to come. Nothing, therefore, is *gained* by the rejection of Christianity, and by denying the divine origin of the Bible.

If it should be asked here, as it may with propriety be asked, whether anything is gained by *believing* in Christianity and the Bible, it must be replied that this is not the place for the consideration of this point, and it will be reserved for a subsequent part of this essay. All that is necessary to say now is, that if Christianity does not explain the cause of the introduction of sin and death; if it does not authorize us to hope that we may escape from sickness, pain, sorrow, and death in this world; if it does not remove all the evils which we experience from the introduction of sin and suffering in this world, it *does*, nevertheless, reveal a way by which we may hope to escape from *all* these evils in the world to come—from sin, and woe, and pain, and sorrow, and DEATH FOREVER AND EVER. No other system does this.

[TO BE CONCLUDED.]

ART. IV.—CHRISTIANITY CAPABLE OF SELF-DEFENSE.*

By Rev. G. N. BOARDMAN, D. D., Binghamton, N. Y.

"WHAT is the best treatise on the Evidences of Christianity?" is a question sometimes asked of the minister of the gospel. Is not the best reply, "Christianity itself"? Is it not the best reply that even the philosopher and the theologian can give? Is not the system itself the best evidence of its truthfulness, to all those who can possibly be convinced of its truthfulness? The following classes will comprise all, perhaps, before whom we could even suppose the system to be presented: 1. The Pyrrhonist. 2. The Atheist. 3. The Deist, or Infidel. 4. (A possible class) The believer in a Provi-

* This Article was originally prepared as an Address before the Philadelphian Society of Middlebury College.

dential Government, but not in a Revelation. 5. The believer in a Revelation other than the Christian.

It is obvious that classes 1 and 2 are in no condition to examine the proofs of the worth and genuineness of the doctrines of the New Testament. Those who wish to do anything for them must begin with convincing them of their own existence and moral nature, and of the government of God. But with the other three classes, is not a fair statement of Christianity, with the exposition of its relations to their own several peculiar beliefs, the most convincing argument in its favor? What is the thing to be proved, in order that Christianity may be established as entitled to the assent of the judgment? We need not deny or doubt that its *absolute* truth may be demonstrated: still, is it not sufficient to show that it is more rational to accept it than to reject it? If those who believe in some revelation find that that contained in the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures is better than Buddhism, or Brahminism, or Mohammedanism, are they not compelled intellectually to accept it, and to reject any rival schemes? And if any are disposed to admit a providential government of the world, can not Christianity be so presented as to appear more probable and more desirable than anything that can be brought into comparison with it? Some hold to the existence of Deity, but refuse to go beyond nature for their theology and their religion: is not the right method of argument with them, also, a comparison of creeds, and, when the infidel belief is fully brought out, can not Christianity be so attached to it, and be so shown to be its completion and perfection, that the deist will be obliged to become either Christian or atheist, be obliged to reject all creeds or accept the Bible?

In the defense of our religion, is not the true method to refuse to discuss the claims of revelation with those who have *no* creed, and to compare creeds with those who have a faith to confess? When the Pyrrhonist and atheist say, "I don't believe," is not the only issue we can raise with them, whether they have a right not to believe? Christianity would then be called upon simply to show itself better than any other form of religion.

With this view, the statement of the doctrines of Christianity should be exceedingly simple, and the more peculiar and marked features of the system should be reserved for its commendation and confirmation, after it had shown itself in its outlines as the grandest and most convincing system of truth ever presented to the mind. The question, therefore, which this article is intended to aid in answering, is this: Is it possible so to present Christianity, as either to avoid or obviate the objections which it usually encounters from skepticism? In still other words: Can our religion itself be made so to *stand* before the mind as to *exclude* or overpower opposition?

1. It may be noticed, in the first place, there is a strong presumption in favor of an affirmative reply, in the fact that almost all who do accept Christianity accept it on a general view, and before they are aware of the objections raised against it. Its learned defenders, for the most part, received it in youth, while yet unlearned. Indeed, minds of every class are convinced of the truth of religion in the same way, and rest on evidence of the same kind.

The most profound doctor in Biblical and speculative theology holds to the truth of our Christian doctrines for the same reason that the most simple-minded Christian does, for the same reason that all the intermediate classes of believers do. Our revealed religion, justly presented, *strikes* every mind as superior to whatever comes in comparison with it. The unlettered but warm-hearted toiler on earth, who hopes for heaven, finds it for him better than anything of which he has heard; the intellectual and educated man of the world has the same reason for giving it the preference over other things; and he who studies nothing else than theology has this same reason for adhering to it. It is the best thing he can find. We do not deny that there is such correspondence between religion and our nature as to compel the confession that they belong to each other. But *this* is the truth properly *appreciated*, viz.: our religion has such elasticity, adaptation and compass, that it appears the better when brought into comparison with *anything*. In the world of ideas it is *facile princeps*, and as easily towers above the conceptions of the most

brilliant intellect, as those of the most stolid. It has the power of overshadowing and quenching all rival systems. John Milton, who is as well entitled to the designation *metaphysician as bard*, in his Christmas Hymn has given the real method of vindicating Christianity; it is in pointing to, and insisting on, the weakness and folly of all rival systems of religion :

"The oracles are dumb,
No voice or hideous hum
Runs through the arch'd roof in words deceiving.
Apollo for his shrine
Can no more divine,
With hollow shriek the steep of Delphos leaving.

* * * * *

Nor is Osiris seen
In Memphian grove or green.
Trampling the unshowered grass in lowings loud.

* * * * *

He feels from Judah's land
The dreaded infant's hand,
The rays of Bethlehem blind his dusky eyne ;
Nor all the Gods beside
Longer dare abide,
Not Typhon huge ending in snaky twine :
Our Babe, to show his Godhead true
Can in his swaddling bands control the damned crew.

The rays of Bethlehem, enlightening the lands that have been sitting in darkness, the hand that reaches out from Judea and opens the prisons of Spain, lifts up the fallen in London and Paris, that unbinds fetters in America—these are the powers that commend Christianity. What system can by its effects maintain such claims to the regard of men ?

Or, turn from the external to the internal needs of our humanity, the need of hope for the future and help for the present, and what system *promises* so much as our Christian system ? These considerations commend our religion to the young, to those without prejudices and without ambitions ; while those who have *thus* accepted it, for the *same reasons* adhere to it after years of experience, and after protracted investigation of its claims. The adherents of *other* religions inwardly laugh at their futility while they perform their rites ;

the confessors of the Christian faith view its mysteries with deeper awe as their acquaintance with them increases.

2. We notice, in the second place, as a consideration in favor of an *affirmative* reply to the question: Whether we may take such a view of Christianity as to avoid or obviate the current objections to it, that a *correct knowledge* of the *Scriptures*, i. e., of their *nature*, does much toward avoiding or obviating those objections. Our Lord has shown us the proper method of defending our religion. When the Sadducees—the skeptics of his day—came to him with their insidious questions, he said to them, “Ye do err, not knowing the Scriptures, nor the power of God.” Well-meaning men have raised prejudices against our religion by their unwarranted estimates of the Bible. It may be that the Church at large has exercised too little discrimination as to the relation of the Bible to religion. The believer has sometimes been compelled to accept the criticism of the unbeliever, because he had not sufficiently noticed what the Bible claimed to be. It may be that we all hold the Scriptures themselves responsible for some things which should at once be traced to a power existing independently of them, a power whose *word* simply the Scriptures are. Jesus said, “Ye do err, not knowing the Scriptures, nor the power of God.” It will aid us much in avoiding skeptical doubts to notice how these two are related to each other, where the Scriptures end, where God’s power becomes the authority on which we must rely. What, then, are our Sacred Scriptures, taken by themselves, judged in accordance with their own claims—their *own*, not those *made* for them?

The Bible is a small book. It was written in fragments; its composition is to be dated at various points during a period of 1,500 years. Its unity is not in its form; the book of Isaiah was written before that of Ezra; the Psalms form a collection from the writings of several authors. Its unity is not even in its ideas; the teachings of Leviticus, and of the Epistle to the Hebrews, are at variance, except they be reconciled by the progress of *events*, by *facts* of *history* intervening between the composition of the two books. Moreover, the chief

value of the Bible has not yet been found when we discover its *unity* and its *general* import.

The *Old Testament* was a very good Bible for the old Jews, and even the precepts of the Pentateuch were long their only guide in faith and worship. In our own day the New Testament is alone made too often the *sole* directory of Christian life. And the gospels, one of the epistles, even a single text, may be sufficient to lead us into the life of blessedness. What then is the Bible? It does not claim to be the sole revelation of God, but presents itself before us as a narrative of some out of many revelations. The Bible may be said to be a collection of the finger-boards which God has set up pointing to his works, specially to those works by which he may be best known. He has been *manifesting* himself in many ways from the creation of the world to the present time. He prepared Moses, and David, and Matthew, and Paul, to point out some of his manifestations, that all the world might have the advantage of them. These men were directed in selecting those which should be presented, and were divinely instructed in the meaning and aim of the events of which they wrote. But their inspiration made little, if any, addition to the *revelation*; it simply preserved the revelation and made it available for human use. The Bible does not profess to teach *all* that God has revealed, nor to point to all the events which would convey to man instruction as to the divine government. God revealed himself in the creation of the world. Moses points us to that work, and requires us to see in it, what his pointing out in detail, the process of the work of God's power and glory. The Bible by no means tells us all that God did in calling the world into existence. Indeed, the modern science of Geology has sometimes made claim to be a better Bible than Genesis. But the claim is founded on ignorance of what the Bible professes to be. Moses has done what he aimed to do, has given us knowledge of God sufficient to constitute a foundation for the first four commandments of the Decalogue. The Bible, as a whole, by no means claims to give us all the *revelations* which God has made. It has not told us of the conversation of Enoch when he walked with God, though we learn from Jude

that he did receive communications which have not come down to us. But the Bible has given us *this* cheering view of antediluvian hope and enjoyment that one walked with God and was not, for God took him. The Bible shows us what God is, by pointing to the wars of Joshua and of David; but who doubts the Lord of Hosts is as truly revealed in the wars of the Reformation or of resistance to the Saracenic power, as in those narrated in the Old Testament? The Bible is not as large as it might have been made; it only claims to have told us enough to show us how to live and how to die.

The Bible is a *selection*.

God had doubtless manifested himself sufficiently to afford the material for a divine Testament, one perhaps as large as our Old Testament, before the call of Abraham. He has walked amid the candlesticks long enough, he has done work enough, since the death of John the Apostle, to supply a Scripture volume larger than the New Testament. But these things it was not necessary to point out. We have enough without them. We have the central things revealed and described for us—the law, Judaism, Christ and his cross. These inspiration has selected; to these it points us; and so has secured for us all we need to know of past revelations, and has, moreover, given us the clue by which to interpret all that God shall farther require us to witness.

What then is the Bible? Is it a mass of disordered utterances from which we are to select what happens to suit an occasion? Is it a conglomerate of heads, each glittering, but as a whole without form or comeliness? Or has the Bible somewhere a unity? We reply, the power of God is a unit. A unity pervades *revelation*, which is a manifestation of his power, and when the Scriptures are considered as indices, noting at different points the advancing revelation, they too become a unit. Then one sentiment pervades them, from Genesis to Revelation; part illustrates part; for the ultimate aim of each portion must be the same. There is a majestic harmony pervading all the texts of the Bible, the authors of the separate portions unconsciously addressed each other and made response across intervening centuries. Moses wrote of Christ

when he foretold that the serpent's head should be bruised, and Matthew wrote of the law when he wrote of the consummation of Judaism in the 24th chapter of his gospel. Connect the Scriptures with the power of God ; make the former the exposition of the latter, and the Scriptures become a single book, the *one* book of the world which we call the *Bible*.

But the unity of the Bible is in its outlines, not in its incidents. Though we thus make it one compact book, it still presents itself as consisting of two essentially distinct parts, or different elements running side by side through all the years of its composition. One part consists of the narrative of the great cardinal events connected with revelation, such as the call of Abraham, the giving of the law, the birth and death of Jesus of Nazareth ; the other part consists of subordinate events which accompanied the leading occurrences, and were their necessary incidents or divine attestations ; such as the ram provided for a sacrifice in the place of Isaac, the thunder and lightning at the giving of the law, the miraculous healings in the days of Christ.

Now it will be noticed that those who assail the Bible, and proclaim their doubts about our religion, fix upon these subordinate and illustrative incidents as the weak points upon which attack is to be made. But our Christian system renders it right for us to ask them to begin the attack by an assault upon the other part. We may justly call upon them to show that there was no occasion for the signs and wonders that are said to accompany the great facts of our revelation. Our religion is not in the miracles, it is in the events which they attest and signalize. A fair opponent will therefore attack the thing itself, not busy himself with ridiculing accompanying incidents.

The first thing to be settled is, has the Bible told the *truth* in the leading and important narratives which it presents ? Did Abraham live in Canaan ? Did his descendants go down into Egypt ? Did Moses give the law ? Did Israel live under judges and kings and priests for a series of 1,500 years ? Was there a scheme of Levitical sacrifices in which an atoning lamb was offered for the sins of the people ? Was it in

the very nature of the Jewish ritual that it was typical of higher and better things than itself? And was the lamb slain *understood* to be an emblem of the Lamb of God that was to take away the sins of the world? And did Jesus of Nazareth finally appear upon the earth and live such a life and die such a death as the narrative of the New Testament declares? Of these things there can be no more doubt than there is of the career of Julius Cæsar, than of the conquests of Alexander, than of the banishment of Napoleon. There is the law-keeping nation of the Jews, the living evidence of Abraham's life and Moses' writings. There is the Church, the living evidence of the life and death of Jesus of Nazareth. The Bible is certainly truthful in its main statements. The persons and the ordinances of which it speaks are no myths.

We are aware that the skeptic will complain of us for tarrying so long over this portion of revelation; but we complain of him for hurrying over it too rapidly. He will declare his readiness to grant all these things, that he may hasten on to the other topic—the signs and wonders of the Bible. But we must ask him to pause yet longer before talking about miracles. There are still other things to be spoken of before we come to them. We have no objection to his taking them up at the proper time, but he must know for what reason they claim a place in the Christian system before he judges of them.

If he admits the truthfulness of that portion of Christian narrative to which we have already attended, we ask him, what is the import of these narratives taken as a whole? Do they mean anything? Is there an aim pervading that system, so slowly evolved, yet so consistently carried out? This is a question which no one may refuse to answer. And no one has a right to admit facts, and yet refuse to recognize the necessary inferences which flow from them. We notice, then, in favor of an affirmative answer to our question that:

3. A just view of God's power does much towards obviating the current objections to Christianity. Judaism and Christianity, as they are set forth in the Bible, and have appeared in the history of the world, are an exhibition of the power of God.

They manifest his control of human events, and much more of human thought. They manifest especially the moral phases of his power, the motives from which he acts, the sentiments and purposes which direct the Almighty arm. We have a right therefore at this point, in speaking of our religion, to ask, What is the kind of power which God is exercising in governing the world? and to take a *general* survey of the divine movements, instead of fixing the attention simply upon *one isolated fact* like the healing of a sick man. This is a right which Christ asserts in the remark to which we have referred. The Sadducees were ridiculing the resurrection. Christ did not attempt to prove the probability of that miracle by *itself*, but said, "Ye do err, not knowing the power of God."

Let us attempt to avoid their error by a proper contemplation of the divine power. And we shall find no view of it more suggestive, or more truthful, than that afforded us by the apostle John. He was permitted to look through an open door into heaven, and he saw there a throne, and one sitting upon it, and a rainbow round about the throne. The meaning of this vision is this: *God* orders the affairs of the world, but orders them in kindness, and with the promise of good to the human race. The throne is in heaven, and so beyond our reach; it is visible only to those who look through the door that is opened, and so may be concealed from many, but still exists and exerts its sway. And, whether seen or unseen, a rainbow is round about it, typical of the blessings which the Divine Ruler bestows upon his subjects. Without, however claiming now any divine sanction for the representation, we will adopt it as the best statement of our view of God's government. We trust it will not be looked upon as a view too highly poetical, too little philosophical, as rhetorical rather than truthful. The friends of revelation would hold that a description of God's power, which was *not* poetical, would not be truthful. They consider, that the poetry is in nature, and in providence, and should therefore be in the statement. They believe that God's authority is productive of happiness among men, and of glory in heaven; that therefore the statement of it should be in eloquent language; that rhetoric as well as

logic should be taxed to set forth the truths relating to it.

Those who would avoid collision with the skeptic; who would either obviate his objections or preclude them by the very view they take of Christianity, will fix themselves very firmly in the position which we here take. They will spare no pains to make it clear, that, for the soundest of reasons, John's representation of God's government—a throne and a rainbow about it—may be adopted. It will be necessary here simply to indicate a course of argument which might be pursued for this purpose.

Does the throne exist? Does the rainbow exist? Is there a Ruler who may truthfully say, "By me kings rule? By me the nations make their advancement, from me they receive their blessing?" All these questions can be answered at once.

Look at some recent events of history; follow back the line of decisive movements in the world's affairs, and see if there are not traces of an over-ruling Power. When, in our own country, the slave-power attempted to establish a new government on the corner-stone of slavery, and thereby effected the emancipation of the slaves, did that power in heart think so, and did it mean to effect what has been accomplished? or did man propose one thing and God dispose to another? When France attempted to introduce the reign of Reason in opposition to that of Christianity, did she mean, and in her heart think, that a military *despotism* would be the scourge by which her atheism was to be lashed? When avaricious England inflicted unjust taxation on the American colonies, did she intend to raise up a rival power, to defy her authority and eclipse her glory? When Spain attempted to enforce her false Christianity on the Low Countries, did she intend to weaken her own power, and reduce herself to a subordinate standing among the European nations? When the Catholic emperors attempted to crush the rising Reformation, did they intend that their very strength should, through jealousies and rivalries, be their weakness? Did they intend that the Reformation should become invincible, while they were watching each other? Did the Pope design, that the

death of Huss should lead to the curtailing of his power? Did Mohammed intend by wars on Christianity to purify and strengthen the kingdom of Jesus Christ?

Is anything clearer, as we survey the progress of events, than that the throne is in heaven? Is not the door open to every one who will look heavenward? Who does not see that man proposes, God disposes.

The conclusion, which is so inevitably enforced by profane history, is still more clearly enforced by sacred history, and in this addition, the mercy of God is more fully manifested; the *rainbow* now more clearly appears. Look upon the Jewish and Christian dispensations, extending through 37 centuries. Who does not see that he who ordered their events saw the end from the beginning? Is the God of Abraham the God of the churches of the present day? Is he the Friend, the Father, the Teacher of the children of our Sabbath-schools? Any candid and fair-minded observer will see a unity in the moral and religious sentiments of Abraham, and of his followers to the present time, which shows that they have one faith; which excludes the possibility of a manifold origin. And is it not wholly obvious, utterly undeniable, that Christ is the central object of all these sentiments? Can not any one see at a glance that Jesus of Nazareth is really the beginning and the ending, the first and the last, in this entire scheme? And if Christ is indisputably the centre of this religious system of 3,700 years duration—a system of *typical* sacrifices, and of sacrifices *abolished*—a system made perfectly one by him, but without him consisting of two antagonistic parts: if he *be* the *centre*, by whose plan was his place allotted him? Did Abraham conceive the plan and appoint Jesus as the fulfilment of his schemes? Did Moses? The Jews never knew Christ, not even when he appeared among them? Is the scheme one that men have devised? Men do not accept Christ. His principles, his method of life, are repelled by our nature: are accepted only by a transformed and renewed nature. Who did devise this stupendous scheme of which Christ is the centre? Israel disowns it; the church says: "I am of *him*, not he of me." Nature repels it; earthly

powers persecute it. Are we not shut up to the conclusion that Christ's system of religion, as manifested before and after his advent, is a revelation from another world? When we ask the question, then, "Has God, from his throne in heaven, made a revelation?" the reply comes to us: "He has really done nothing on earth which is not a revelation. He has hovered over the world since its foundations were laid. His delights have been in the habitable parts of the earth. His peculiar works have been with the children of men. For 3,700 years he has journeyed with his people in a pillar of cloud and fire. Moses, Abraham, and David, were in the habit of holding converse with him. In our Christian age we can take counsel of God. Luther was accustomed to say that he could not carry forward his work without three hours daily communion with the Most High in prayer. Has God ruled his people, and revealed himself as their protector? There can be but one reply: God is with his people. His majestic presence has been a protecting wing spread over them from age to age.

We believe it to be right thus to detain the skeptic, that he may, if he choose, give us his views, and certainly listen to ours upon some preliminary topics before we attend to his assaults upon the signs and wonders of the Bible. We have a right to ask him, whether he accepts the Bible as historically true in its outlines; whether he recognizes a divine government in ordering the things of which a narrative is given, before we listen to his criticisms, and his doubts as to the probability of miracles.

And we have a right to make one other demand of the skeptic before we listen to him, and that is a moral demand. We have a right to know how he personally accepts the government of God. Here is the critical point in practical and speculative theology. The cardinal question is a moral one. Moral truth lies at the foundation of intellectual. How does he accept the government of God? How should we all accept it? And this is a question which can not be subjected to demonstration, it must be answered by each man for himself, and upon his own conscience.

We say we ought to accept God's authority with a spirit corresponding in the subject to that with which it is exercised by the Ruler. We can not prove this, but we affirm it, and believe that every right-minded man, will, from his own sense of the fitness of things, assent to it. If God sits upon a throne, and we are subjects, we ought to accept the position of subjects; if a rainbow surrounds God's throne, we ought to lift up our eyes sufficiently to see it; if the rainbow is indicative of blessings which flow from the divine sovereignty, we ought to acknowledge them with thanksgiving. These things we can not prove, but we demand them of every one who assumes to be our teacher in theology. We are assured in our own mind that no one can *know* the truth, even if compelled to assent to it, who does not accept the divine authority with a spirit responding to the divine kindness. The difference at last between the infidel and the believer, is the difference between a cordial recognition of a kindly personal Friend in the Creator and Governor of the world, and a heartless, unwilling recognition of an irresistible overruling Power. It is natural, of course, for the *infidel* to subject the particular events narrated in the Bible to a heartless criticism, which takes no note of circumstances, has no regard to the purposes for which God reveals himself. It is to be expected of him, that he will refuse to believe in miracles, unless he see the evidence which the original witnesses saw. This is the point at which Hume comes in collision with the believer; and these are the reasons for which his arguments should be at once rejected. This wildest, coldest, and most annoying of all the skeptics, becomes perfectly harmless, if you demand of him a *heart* as well as a *head*. He said: "I don't know that miracles have occurred," but he *meant*, "I don't care whether or not they have occurred." Here he should receive his answer, and here alone. So long as he don't care, so long as he refuses to look through heaven's door, and declines to see the throne and the rainbow, it is of no consequence what he thinks of miracles. When he talks of the wonders of God's government, without regarding the government itself, he is

but the blind man who assumes to lead his fellows, at the worst not more blind than he.

When the infidel will accept the view of religion above presented, (and if he has any creed can he avoid it?) we have no objection to his discussing the question of miracles as fully as he may choose. If the skeptic will (to present our topics of remark in the reverse order) accept *cordially* the authority of God, carefully and candidly survey the government of God, discriminatingly study the Scriptures, and justly apprehend their relation to revelation, then he may bring miracles to such tests as his reason dictates. But before he arrives at this point he will find his occupation gone. He can have no possible motive for assailing miracles, or disproving their occurrence. The believer finds them of essential value to himself; the unbeliever gains nothing by erasing them from history. There is revelation left; there is the government of God still remaining; there is the Throne, and the rainbow is about it. If he destroys our Bible, the index to revelation which we have, let him prepare another. The revelation remains; we desire some aid in interpreting it. Our religion remains; we desire some guide in making it practically our own. Let the infidel be aware that he is to furnish a Bible if he destroy that we have. Certainly, we need lay no other charge upon him to protect the Scriptures from his destructive hand.

ART. V.—BIBLICAL THEOLOGY WITH ESPECIAL REFERENCE
TO THE NEW TESTAMENT.

By Rev. C. A. BRIGGS, New York.

[CONTINUED FROM PAGE 133.]

3. ITS RELATION TO SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

Systematic Theology must be rooted and grounded in the Scriptures, must derive its life and power therefrom; yet it depends for its method and system in philosophy, for its controlling principle on the doctrinal development of the age, and for its peculiar body of doctrine, on the symbols of the particular church to which the theologian may belong. System-

atic Theology is usually divided into three departments : 1. Apologetics, 2. Dogmatics, 3. Ethics; in each of which we will find Biblical Theology exerting an important influence.

Apologetics has to do with Religion, and especially with the Christian Religion, on which all Christian doctrine depends. Religion is the vital blood of theology, the doctrines are its bones, and morals are its beauteous, blooming flesh; but it is the Word of God that breathes the breath of life into the system, giving it strength, energy, and motive power. No system of doctrines can be a living one without the vitality of true religion. No religion can be a living one without the vital breath of the Divine Word. Now, religion in its idea and first principles may be established on a speculative basis, it may be unfolded in the light of history, as the various religions appear before us among the different races of men, or the various historical religions may be compared, and the fundamental principles and basis of unity of them all may be found; but if we would have the true and divine religion we must receive it from the inspired Word of God, we must see it embodied in the person and life of the God-man. Now, Biblical Theology presents the Jewish and the Christian religions in their organic unity and variety; it affords the materials in their complete and finished form, ready for use in the discipline of Apologetics. There inspiration, prophecy and miracles appear as the nervous system of one divine religion, which was born of God in Paradise, matured through the ages of the Old Covenant history, culminating in the person of Jesus Christ, the incarnate Word of God, and through the Pentacostal gift of the Holy Spirit embracing all mankind. Apologetics has hitherto been handled mostly on a speculative basis; it needs the introduction of the elements to be derived from Biblical Theology that it may attain the victory over the false systems of atheism, pantheism and rationalism.

Dogmatics naturally divides itself according to the various sources from whence it derives its material, into Philosophical Dogmatics, Biblical Dogmatics, Historical Dogmatics, and Symbolical or Ecclesiastical Dogmatics. Biblical theology is related to systematical theology in the sphere of physical dog-

matics alone. It may be mentioned here, that some have given the name of biblical dogmatics to biblical theology. Thus Lutz and Hagenbach ; * though they maintain its place as a historical discipline. But the name Biblical Theology has justly assumed its place, and may now be regarded as the generally received term. Weiss thus distinguishes between the two:† “To a correct conception of the purpose of Biblical Theology, it is of essential importance to distinguish it from Biblical Dogmatics. The former is a historical, the latter a systematic discipline, as the former has to do with the variety of the forms of doctrine in the New Testament, the latter with the *unity* of the truth recorded there.” “Biblical Dogmatics presupposes Biblical Theology, and stands in a critical relation thereto.” “If ecclesiastical symbolism describes the religious ideas and doctrines laid down in the symbols of a particular Church, and ecclesiastical Dogmatics is the systematic presentation of its doctrines in their inner consistency, so Biblical Dogmatics is related to Biblical Theology as ecclesiastical Dogmatics to ecclesiastical symbolism.” These statements of Weiss, although in general correct, are yet marred by his view of excluding the *unity* of biblical doctrine from biblical theology. Biblical theology has to do with the unity of biblical doctrine, just as much as biblical dogmatics, though in quite a different way and from quite a different point of view. Biblical dogmatics regards the unity of Scripture doctrine with a critical and an analytic eye; it would examine and analyze in the interests of a theological system and from the standpoint of the theologian himself. He seeks Scripture proofs for his system—he seeks these proofs in their variety of conception as well as in their unity, the variety in the unity: his conception is determined by the particular doctrine which he is at the time investigating—he seeks the ideas of the individual authors and the entire Scripture respecting this one head of doctrine. Now, Biblical Theology has an entirely different point of view: it presents the unity of Scripture doctrine as the resultant of its investigations, the finished work of its synthesis; it contemplates biblical doctrine from

* Encyclopædia, p. 198, seq.

† Sec. 1, d.

the standpoints of the biblical authors themselves, and finds the unity only in their agreement.

Biblical Theology is the fruitful source of Biblical Dogmatics ; it presents the unity of Bible doctrine in a finished synthetic form ; it produces the rich and varied fruits of exegetical theology in their proper historical genetic order—it is the rich Scripture soil in which biblical dogmatics may take root. Biblical dogmatics regards the unity of Bible doctrine as a source from whence it shall derive the scriptural elements of the system, whence it shall receive its nourishment and vital power. Biblical dogmatics is incorporated in systematic theology and is determined by its methods ; biblical theology is a resultant of exegetical theology and is determined by its methods.

Biblical Dogmatics goes to the Scriptures, rightly estimated and synthetically arranged by a thorough-going biblical theology, and from its rich storehouse derives biblical truth in its biblical form in order to incorporate it in the theological system. The dogmatist, who goes to biblical theology with preconceived philosophical opinions, or opinions based merely upon the symbols of his church, will find there a proper corrective ; the living organic system of biblical theology will test and try all these theological opinions ; as a living rock it will resound with the ring of the genuine metal, or echo a deadened sound to the fictitious coin.

But some will ask, If this be true, what further use have we of systematic theology ? Why not cast our creeds to the winds and betake ourselves to the clear fountain of Scripture truth ? Such questions arise from a misconception of the true nature of biblical and systematic theology as well. Biblical theology presents theology ever in its biblical form, whereas theology in the course of history, while ever based upon the Scriptures, gives biblical truth a form, a force, a direction and an emphasis such as the wants of the respective periods require. The Bible is ever the *ideal* source, and presents to us a theology adapted to the wants of each and every age ; history, however, has shown us that each age has its own peculiar tendencies, and these must receive the stamp and decision

of holy Scripture. The form that scripture truth takes to itself in the various periods of history, is not the same as that which is presented to us in the Scriptures, which was determined by scripture-times. The vital question of the Reformation was justification by faith alone—yet no one would contend that this doctrine has been the vital question for all times, or is the radical doctrine of the entire Scripture. We find it brought out prominently in the Epistles to the Romans and Galatians, but in the other epistles of Paul, in Peter, James, and John, and in the discourses of our Lord, other doctrines are much more prominent. Yet it was necessary for the Reformers to look at all questions through this, to them, fundamental doctrine; while other ages have looked through other doctrines just as important in their place. Historical Dogmatics has therefore its importance as well as Biblical Dogmatics, and the systematic theologian who understands his duty will not neglect this important department. The church symbols are also important; in these the churches mark themselves off definitely from all other religious parties and theological positions, and present us the result of the historical development through which they have passed, and their present position. This is the form which Scripture doctrine has taken in his own and other churches, and the theologian must use the materials to be derived from these sources.

History has sufficiently proved that a theologian who neglects the scripture source, will either present his theology in a cold philosophical form, or else a dead orthodoxy, a barren scholasticism. On the other hand, he who neglects the symbols of his church is apt to fall into theological indifference, or else, neglecting history and the creeds alike, falls into a no less dangerous mysticism. Mysticism and scholasticism are no less foes of a true scriptural theology, than destructive rationalism or heedless indifference. Biblical theology must ever be the fruitful source of biblical dogmatics, and biblical dogmatics must ever be the mainspring and life-power in systematic theology, while systematic theology, using all its sources—philosophical, biblical, historical and

ecclesiastical—will take to itself a form adapted to the age, and present itself a living, organic, progressive system combining all the elements in true harmony.

Ethics is the rich fruit of systematic theology. Religion and doctrine produce their fruit in morals, and doctrines of faith bring forth ethics of life. Religion and doctrine can not exist without morality: morality is the true and inevitable test of the truth and the divinity of the religion and the doctrines. Hence the importance of ethics in the theological system. Ethics, as apologetics and dogmatics, has its various sources, among which the biblical are the vital and the fruitful ones. Ethics has hitherto been handled mostly from the philosophic source; the historical and biblical sources have contributed but little to the systems that have been made. The sublime ethical principles of Christ have too long been hid under a bushel, while the ethics of Plato and of Aristotle have usurped their place in the systems that have been brought out. Ethics and theology have been too long divorced. It is one of the benefits of the conflicts of the past century, that the ethical elements have begun to be estimated and valued—for while such distinguished scholars as Baur, Rothe and Schenkel, would reduce the whole of theology to a system of ethics, we have yet as the fruit of their labors the stepping of this important branch of theology into its exalted place in the entire system; and it is not without significance that Christian ethics and biblical theology, like twin sisters, have grown up along side of each other. Christian ethics depends upon biblical theology for its distinctive and vital principles; upon the sublime principles of the Law of the Prophets and of Jesus. These are brought together in their unity and variety in biblical theology. The chief characteristic of the entire revelation of the Old and New Testament alike is the holiness of God. The awful holiness of the God of Sinai reflected on the stony tables of the Ten Commandments, is softened and mellowed into the sublime yet beautiful holiness of the Son of God, who was at once the perfect image of the holy God, and the ideal holy man. Christian ethics finds its vital source in that historical Christ present-

ed to us in the Scriptures, as the radiant centre and source of holy love, peace and all perfection. Biblical theology has traced those radiant words of truth, those beaming deeds of love, scattered in such rich profusion through the gospels, to their source in the person of the Holy Jesus. Biblical theology has seen in the twinkling stars of prophecy before the dawn, and the mellow morn of the Mosaic law, heralds of his glory. Biblical theology sees in the apostolic word and work the twilight of the evening. As evening clouds, they catch the glory of the setting sun, and reflect his light in beauteous colors of every hue. Biblical theology sees the moral sun lighting up the entire Scripture—shining upon the entire world with the sunlight of holiness and truth. Thus biblical theology exerts its quickening influence upon all branches of systematic theology, affording the vital and fruitful material for them all.

4. ITS RELATION TO PRACTICAL THEOLOGY.

Practical Theology must be rooted in the Scriptures, not merely in the ordinary sense of Bible texts and paragraphs, but in the word of God as a living organism, a connected, systematic whole. The most important work in Practical theology is the use of the Scriptures in the pastoral, as well as in the homeletical, work. Now, Biblical Theology is enabled to greatly assist the pastor and the preacher by presenting to him the richness and variety of Scripture truth, while at the same time it will prevent false interpretations and applications of the Bible, by giving more general ideas of divine truth. There is a danger common to systematic and practical theologians of a false use of Scripture. He who searches the Bible with an *end* in view, will often find in the text or paragraph what he seeks and hopes to find, whether it be really there or not, and will often put into the Scriptures the subjective fancies of his own brain. Hence the common remark, "You may prove anything from Scripture." When a man searches the Scriptures in the interest of a system of doctrines for proof-texts, he is apt to go with philosophical and ecclesiastical preconceptions, and he needs the

corrective of a system of biblical theology as we have seen. Just so the pastor and the preacher, in searching the Scriptures for guidance in every day life, will be in danger of a misapplication of Scripture to himself and others. The preacher is liable to expand the meaning of his text beyond its proper limits, and unduly emphasize its ideas, it may be to the detriment of the general system. He may thus, instead of producing a healthful result, unbalance the hearer's mind and involve him in difficulties. The Scriptures are adapted to the wants of every man, of whatever condition of life he may be, under whatever circumstances of need he may be placed ; but not every text, or portion of Scripture, is adapted to every man and every need. There is no such expansive power in the Scriptures as that every verse or paragraph may be made to contain every conceivable idea. We are not to strain and stretch the Scripture to see how much we can possibly crowd into its meaning. Each verse and paragraph has its own proper meaning in its context, which may not be pressed beyond its legitimate sphere without danger ; each writing has its own stock of ideas, each author his own individuality, which may not be overlooked or disregarded with impunity. The Bible must be used with wisdom and caution. There is no *magic* power in the Scriptures, as some would seem to think, working upon the reader or the hearer in some mysterious way *ex opere operato*. There is a *real* power in the Scriptures, but this consists in the fact that it contains *divine* truth adapted to the varied wants of man, truth which is used by the Holy Spirit in his effectual workings. An indiscriminate use of Scripture may work harm, often does work harm, as experience and history sufficiently show. The pastor, like an unwise physician, may present the strong meat to babes, who need the pure milk of the word, or the pure milk to men who need the strong meat, and may thus injure the soul and retard its growth in grace.

Now, Biblical Theology removes many of these difficulties, prevents these dangerous results, by presenting theology in its biblical system, each doctrine in its proper place in the scheme of biblical ideas, in its proper place in the author's own conception of it ; and a man who is a master of biblical

theology will be in little danger of misapplying Scripture truth. Having a general knowledge of Pauline theology—having caught up into himself and appropriated the general spirit that pervades the writings of Paul—he will detect in an instant any misapplication of the apostle's words, any deviation from his mode of thought. He is a disciple of Paul, impregnated with his idea; he knows his master as his disciple and pupil, and will not misunderstand or misquote him. So with the other biblical authors. Here the old principle of hermeneutics, "Scripture must be interpreted by Scripture," first appears in its richness and power.

Moreover, a good knowledge of the variety of the Scripture types of doctrine, presenting the various natural tendencies of the human soul, meeting and supplying its varied spiritual wants, will enable the skilful pastor to apply to each soul the precise tendency of doctrine that he needs, to speak to men through minds kindred to their own. Some will need the strong dialectic theology of Paul, others the more simple and hopeful theology of Peter; some will need the stern legalism of James, others the spiritual contemplation of John; while the great mass of simple minds will be satisfied only by the simple, gentle, childlike words of our Lord Jesus himself—for we find in the Scripture presentation of truth, the same manifold richness and variety that is found in human nature, and this variety admits of a wise pastoral application to the corresponding phases of human character, as they appear in every community, among all men. We sympathize with kindred souls, we appropriate readily their conceptions, and through them alone can we be brought to a full knowledge of divine truth:

Moreover, Biblical Theology will help to a more general study of Scripture by pastor and people alike. The people, taught by their pastor to take more general conceptions, to enter into the spirit of the various scripture authors, will no more be bound in the fetters of verses and paragraphs, but will read with delight more extensive portions of Scripture; they will sit down to the life of Jesus and read an entire gospel at a sitting, thereby attaining a general idea of Jesus,

such as the mere reading of chapters and sections can never give them. They will not stumble to read Paul's epistle to the Romans, as it was meant to be read—all at once—but will catch the spirit of the master's mind, and feel themselves sitting at his feet and hearing his words. Thus Scripture will no longer appear as an unconnected mass of details, a code of laws, irregularly put together, but as an organic system of truth, full of life and power.

Thus we see that Biblical Theology, while furnishing for Practical Theology a rich and varied store of biblical ideas, in their organic form, will serve as a corrective and critic of all practical use of Scripture.

We have now examined the relation of Biblical Theology to the various branches of theology, and have found that it sustains an important relation to them all. It is, indeed, the central member of Theological Encyclopædia, partaking of the essential nature of exegetical theology as a kind of higher exegesis; using the historical genetic method of historical theology, it presents itself as a living, organic system of scripture truth, the rich soil in which systematic and practical theology must be rooted, and from whence they derive all their nourishment, life and power; while, at the same time, it exerts a critical and purifying influence upon all branches of theology. It rises in generalization from the individual types of doctrine, as presented in the various scripture writers, to the common type of divine truth, in the mind of the Holy Spirit, the vital source of all revelation; it presents the Divine, shining through and beautifying the Human: we see the written word beamed upon, illustrated and vitalized by the revelation of the person and life of the Incarnate Word.

III. THE IMPORTANCE OF BIBLICAL THEOLOGY.

We have seen its value and importance in relation to the various branches of theology, presenting an organic system of biblical truth, serving as a faithful critic of them all; we have now to determine its value in relation to the general problems of our day.

1. We have seen that Biblical Theology was revived, and re-

ceived its form and character in the discussions respecting the life of Jesus and the origin of the Christian church. Strauss first appeared with his mythical hypothesis. Baur presented his theory of a development through the conflict of opposing forces. The critical school, as it now appears, while valuing the critical results of Strauss and Baur, do not accept their theories; the present state of the problem is, to construct a Life of Jesus that will account for his pure doctrine and holy life, as presented in the New Testament writings, and to explain the origin of these writings, and the life and character of such men as Paul and James, Peter and John, and the historical origin of Christianity through their influence.* Strauss even has yielded to the prevailing influence, and attempts to distinguish between the historical Jesus and the mythical Christ; while clinging to his hypothesis, he thus admits that it does not account for the facts; he must seek and find a historical basis. What has produced this change of front, and forced the critics to abandon the negative and *destructive* work and undertake the work of *construction*? We think it can be attributed to no other cause so important as the working out of Biblical Theology, especially in its *ethical* department. There are none of the rationalistic school who do not admit its importance: many of their leading minds have devoted themselves to the working out of those twin sisters, biblical theology and Christian ethics. Their aim is to distinguish the pure historical Jesus from the conception that the evangelists give of him, which they regard as colored by their historical and theological positions—to eliminate the doctrine of Jesus from that which the evangelists put into his mouth. There is such a deviation in the evangelists, especially between the synoptists and John, that they regard the accounts as irreconcilable.

Now, Biblical Theology alone can solve the problem and explain these difficulties—for it is prepared to admit and exhibit the peculiar conception of each evangelists *true* conceptions, *inspired* conceptions, yet nevertheless *distinct* and *different* conceptions. Biblical theology is prepared to estimate

* Dorner, *Gesch. Prac. Theologie*. p. 832, seq.

and duly value every individuality and difference, and in *the variety* will show the *unity*. Biblical theology has grown up between the opposing forces, has claimed and received a recognition from both parties, and has modified their statements. It will continue its important work until Jesus stands forth in the midst of the conceptions of the evangelists, reconciling them in the unity of his person; until the apostolic church appears as one united body, the unity the *grander*, as it is based on human individualities and differences, as the various fundamental tendencies of human nature were breathed upon and united in one organic whole by the all-inspiring Spirit of the Lord.*

2. Biblical Theology has entirely modified the doctrine of the nature and use of the Scriptures; in estimating the human element and individual peculiarities, it has shown that the old idea of inspiration is untenable. We can no longer believe in an inspiration of the very words, letters and signs of Scripture, or that the biblical authors were merely *passive* instruments of the Holy Spirit, scribes writing from dictation; but inspiration admits of the self-conscious, active, and assured operation of the human soul, in all its activities, according to the varied characters of the writers themselves, and the varied conditions of their birth and training, their geographical position, and their place in the world's history. Biblical Theology recognises an inspiration which gives truth in manifold forms, while one eternal spirit breathes through the Word of God, giving it its life, richness and power. While all the elements of human character show the evident humanity of its composition, the marks of the Divine tracings may be clearly seen, giving to the human elements their direction and efficacy, their sacred harmony and glory. Biblical theology alone can solve the problem of the Inspiration of the Scriptures, and show the proper relation of the divine and human elements therein.

3. Biblical theology has also an important problem to solve in the doctrines of justification and sanctification, and to show

* Neander *Gelegenheitsschriften*. *Petrus und Jacobus*. Die Einheit des evangelischen Geistes in verschiedenen Formen.

the relation of faith and works in the conceptions of Paul and of James. Baur regards these apostles as in irreconcilable conflict, nor can we regard the problem of reconciling them as solved. On this point the Romish and the Protestant churches stand over against each other—it is a burning question of the age. Now Biblical Theology is alone competent to this. It will examine the various modes of conceiving the relation between the gospel and the law; Christ and the old dispensation, and then show their higher unity. This must be done, not by a strained and stretched comparison, forcing the various conceptions into ill-adjusted unison, but the discussion must be a strict and fair one. James must be presented in his distinct conception, in his individuality, and Paul in his distinct conception; we must compare these conceptions with the more fundamental theology of Jesus, according to the respective evangelists, and in the variety seek the unity. In the solution of this question we may expect much light to be thrown upon the doctrine of sanctification and the relation of justification thereto—light which may do much toward clearing up the difficulties of the Romanists and the Antinomians as well.

4. Biblical Theology may also have an important influence upon the *union tendencies of our times*, for, in exhibiting the diversities of view in the apostolic church, and in the Scriptures themselves, while there is one spirit of union, it will enable the churches, representing different phases of human nature, corresponding more or less with the scripture differences, to come closer together in the spirit of Christian charity, according to the example given in bible theology.* No more will the churches demand a stiff and stern orthodoxy, the very *letter* of the Confessions, preventing all differences and progress, producing a lifeless scholasticism, but will catch the true spirit of the Confessions, interpreted historically, in accordance with the fundamental differences present in the assemblies that adopted them, allowing difference of statement and progressive growth so long as the *real spirit* of the Confessions is retained. While starting from the Confessions as

* Neander - Gelegenheitschriften, p. 18, seq.

landmarks in the historical developement of doctrine, preventing regression, showing us what our fathers have accomplished for us, that we may not waste our energies in battling over again the same ground, they will be finger-posts pointing us forward in the proper direction, showing us what yet remains to be done, in what fields to bestow our labor. The spirit of Christian union is presented on the very face of Biblical Theology.

Biblical Theology may expect rich fruits in its growth—fruits which will give new life and power to all branches of theology, results which will help in solving the mighty questions of the day, practical principles which will assist in the evangelization of the world. It meets the critic and the dogmatist alike with problems which neither the one nor the other can solve, with solutions that undermine every pet theory, and overcome all preconceptions. It is the only proper fruit of criticism, the only safe foundation for dogmatics. From its origin and history, from its important place in theological encyclopædia, from its good fruits in the past and present, and from its future prospects, it may claim the attention of theologians as a productive field in which to labor, a branch of theology to be studied and valued.

ART. VI.—MISSIONARIES, AND BRITISH RELATIONS
WITH CHINA.

By JOHN F. N. TALMADGE, D. D., Amoy, China.

[The mission and success of the Chinese Embassy to the Western nations marks a new and important era in Chinese history. There can be no doubt that the policy of the Central Government favors more liberal views in her intercourse with other nations. But *too much* must not be expected from this fact. The views of our missionaries long resident in China, are entitled to profound respect. And they are of such a tenor as to excite grave apprehensions that the anticipations excited by Mr. Burlingame's mission, and favorable reports respecting China, are doomed to disappointment. The anti-foreign prejudices of the people are fearfully strong, and the Central government is too

remote if not too weak to control them. Dr. Talmadge, of the Reformed (Dutch) church of this country, has been twenty years or more in China as a missionary, and his opinions carry great weight with them. An able article in the last number of *The Westminster Review*, on English Policy in China, confirms fully the views he here expresses.—EDITORS.]

MUCH has been said of late in the English newspapers, and even in the House of Lords, unfavorable to Missionaries and their work in China.

Missionaries are said to be uneducated men ; to be very ignorant of the Chinese feelings, sentiments and language ; to be very imprudent in their manner of preaching, giving needless offense to the prejudices of the people ; to desire the propagation of the gospel by the sword ("every missionary must have a gun-boat at his back"); and to be the cause of almost all the troubles that have arisen between the Chinese and British Governments. In the House of Lords, while discussing the Yang-chow affair, the Duke of Somerset said, that if the British government wished to reduce their navy in China they "must reduce their missionaries." "If a missionary is not an enthusiast, he is probably a rogue." "We ought to recall these inland missionaries." "The London Missionary Society had better send its missionaries to some other part of the world and leave China unconverted, than pursue their present course." The Earl of Clarendon *thanked* his noble friend for having brought up this question before their lordships, and said: "I dare say very few of your lordships have read the papers which have been laid on the table, and probably the general public know still less on the subject than your lordships:" True he takes some exception to the Duke's opinion of missionaries. "I can not quite agree," he says, "with my noble friend that a missionary must be either an enthusiast or a rogue." "That I think is rather too strong." After stating the views of the Government, and communicating the instructions given to the British authorities in China, Earl Clarendon read the advice he had given to the London Missionary Society, which closes thus: "The missionaries will do well to follow in the wake of trade, when the people have

learned to see in it material advantage to themselves, rather than seek to lead the way in opening up new locations. In the former case they will find the people prepared to receive and listen to their instructions, but in the latter there is too much reason to believe that their proffered instruction will be rejected, and their persons exposed to indignity and even danger."

The subject of the troubles in Formosa was discussed in the House of Lords, manifesting the same animus toward, and ignorance of, the missionary work, and, if possible, still greater ignorance concerning the Formosa affair than had been shown concerning the affair at Yang-chow. The Duke of Somerset attributes the whole difficulty to the proceedings of missionaries. Earl Clarendon corrects this so far as to say, "that there were also some commercial matters for which redress was sought." He says that the government had decided that the compensation money paid by the Chinese authorities should be returned with an apology to them for what had been done, and that the vice-consul, Mr. Gibson (who conducted this case so nobly and to such a satisfactory termination)—should be removed as a mark of disapprobation. The Earl adds—apparently quoting from the despatches of Sir R. Alcock, British Minister at Peking: "If ever Christianity were to become general in China, it would be through the upper classes, and not in spite of them." He hoped the missionaries' "zeal would not altogether exclude discretion, and that once they became thoroughly convinced of the dangers to which they exposed themselves, of the risk they ran of producing riot and bloodshed, and of embarking this country in war—when convinced, too, above all, that they were not in the path leading to success even in their own calling, both they, and the societies which sent them forth from this country, would see that the system hitherto pursued must be abandoned." He closes by stating that he had received a telegram from Sir R. Alcock, that order was restored in all quarters, and "that our relations with China had never been more satisfactory." As a comment on this last sentence, the next mail from China carried the news of the affair at Swatow, and then a few mails

later reported the affair between the French Legation and the Government.

The English newspapers, commenting on the discussion in the House of Lords, with a few marked exceptions, seem generally to approve of the sentiments of the Duke of Somerset and the Earl of Clarendon. The *Times*, on the whole, approves also of the advice of Sir R. Alcock to missionaries. It says: "Sir Rutherford's conclusion is, that if China is ever to be Christianized, it must be through the ruling class, not in spite of them, and that the efforts of our missionaries should therefore be directed to win over the representatives of this class in the principal treaty ports. We must own there would be something to be said for drawing a different conclusion. Since it seems an almost impracticable task to overcome the fears and prejudices of the governors, it might be thought wise to obtain a footing in the country through the hearts of the governed. . . . But, on the other hand it should be remembered that if the governing class is won all are won, and it would seem only natural to address ourselves to the only obstacle which obstructs our progress."

Such is the state of information concerning Chinese matters, and such the sentiments concerning Christianity and Christian missions of the Foreign Minister of the highest branch of the Legislature, and of the leading papers of that nation which regards itself as the most intelligent, and the most Christian of civilized and Christian nations! It may not be amiss for once to repel these false charges and wrong sentiments. And to do this properly let us notice the charges and sentiments more specifically.

The charge that missionaries as a class are deficient in education, is hardly worth answering. The majority of them pass through the same literary institutions, colleges and universities, and obtain the same degrees as other young men preparing for the liberal professions in their respective countries. As a class, most surely they are not inferior to any other class in China. The same may be said of the charge against them of ignorance of the Chinese language, literature, etc. If the charge were true, it would be difficult

to account for the fact. If that class of men who spend their whole lives in studying and preaching in the Chinese language be so ignorant of it, to what class of men will you look expecting to find acquaintance with it? But they who make the charge, if they believe what they say, prove themselves thereby sadly ignorant of the literature of Western nations concerning China. It is not strange that men who make the above charges, so contrary to reason and to fact, should add the charge of imprudence. It is a charge of the same character, altogether gratuitous.

We may add, so are almost all the flippant charges against the missionary work. Men tell you that the missionary work in China is a failure; no Chinese are converted; the few professing conversion are influenced by sinister motives; the worst Chinese are those professing conversion to Christianity. They will say, these things are facts which have come under their own personal observation—they know them to be true. But ask them: "Are you much acquainted with missionaries and their work? You have been in China, and would be very glad to see the Chinese converted, if the conversion were only real; have you been to many of the missionary chapels? Have you been to *any* of the assemblies of the Chinese Christians on the Sabbath, or at their prayer-meetings? Have you ever been to the Christian schools? Have you visited any of the out stations, far off in the country, where, at least, there can be little pecuniary inducement for the people to become Christians? Have you obtained the facts, from which you have formed so decided an opinion, from any one at all qualified to give facts on the subject—from any one better informed than yourself?" The answers to all these questions will probably be in the negative. We are accustomed to hear such charges against the missionary work, but, knowing that they are usually made by men who have not sufficient interest in the subject to make careful inquiries as to the progress of Christianity in China, we seldom notice them. The mass of those who support the missionary work have too clear views of the excellency of Christianity to be influenced by such unjust and unfounded statements against its efficacy. So with

all the charges mentioned above ; usually we care not to answer them ; but when they are bandied in the English House of Lords, and apparently concurred in by the British Foreign Minister, and that too for the purpose of giving effect to the more serious insinuations and charges, that missionaries desire to propagate Christianity by the sword, and have been the cause of almost all the disputes which have arisen between China and Great Britain, it would seem proper to take some notice of them. If those who make these insinuations do not know them to be utterly unfounded, their ignorance proves them to be unfit for the position of legislators on matters connected with China.

The preaching of missionaries, and their habit of seeking protection for their propagandism from the civil and naval authorities of their respective governments, hinder the progress of Christianity in China, and excite the hatred of the people both toward themselves and all foreigners, thus obstructing the progress of trade and continually threatening to involve the country in war ! Such are the more serious insinuations and charges. The troubles at Yang-chow and Formosa are made the occasion of giving currency to them.

Let us notice briefly these troubles, and see if there be not some better way to account for the spirit of hostility thus manifested by the Chinese toward foreigners.

A company of missionaries went to Yang-chow. According to law they rented premises, and began putting them in order. The *literati*, probably with the connivance of the magistrates, circulated grievous falsehoods concerning their object in coming, the character of Christianity, and of foreigners in general, thus raising a violent mob against them. The missionaries were attacked, their premises plundered and partly destroyed, their persons were injured, and they with difficulty escaped with their lives. Being British subjects, (as in duty bound) they referred the matter to the British authorities, who demanded for them redress and obtained it. This opposition was not against them because of their *missionary* character, for they had not yet commenced preaching, but because they were *foreigners*. For the procedure of the British au-

thorities they were not responsible. But we do not hesitate to give the opinion that that procedure was most judicious. The matter was referred to the Imperial Government, but the local authorities sent up a report, from beginning to end full of falsehood, with which the government was satisfied. The only way to get justice was to send a British official to the place to examine into the facts, and by a show of force to demand redress. The right of the British authorities thus to act does not hinge on the question, Were the sufferers *missionaries*? but on the question, Shall *British subjects*, acting in accordance with the law of the land, be protected?

In the Formosa affair missionaries were also involved. But they were not, as the Duke of Somerset would have us believe, the only parties; or, as the Earl of Clarendon represents, the chief parties concerned. In the departmental city of Taiwan missionaries had not been allowed to establish themselves. The former British Consul, for some reason, was unwilling to insist on missionaries obtaining their treaty rights in this respect. Only foreign merchants might reside in that city. The missionaries must reside at Takao. There they opened a chapel and medical dispensary, also another at a neighboring town. This last was plundered and destroyed, some of the Chinese helpers were seized, one of them was brutally murdered, and the native Christians were compelled to flee, some of them with difficulty escaping with their lives.

These things were more than connived at by the local authorities. Surely they were sufficient to lead the British Consul to demand redress. But these were not the chief things for which he did demand redress. A large amount of property belonging to one of the foreign mercantile establishments had been seized and confiscated; the comprador of the establishment had been imprisoned, and his house plundered; a member of one of the foreign firms had been stabbed, and the would-be assassin was allowed to go at liberty; a member of another firm had been marked out for assassination by the magistrate and a reward offered for his head, but by his skill and bravery he had saved his life; the merchants residing at Taiwan had been compelled for safety to flee to Takao; and

the foreign community at Takao had again and again been threatened with violence. The British Consul had received insult upon insult ; the authorities refused to acknowledge him as Consul, and at last when he had made an appointment to visit the district magistrate, bands of armed men (said to amount in all to about 200) were placed in ambush along the road to cut off him and his party. Such was the state of things—really a state of war on the part of the Chinese—when the Consul referred the matter to the naval authorities. For this reference he is censured by his government, and the government makes apology to the Chinese !

If there be anything in the conduct of the Formosa affair demanding the censure of the home government, it does seem most surely that it is not the proceeding of the Consul, Mr. Gibson. The reprisal he recommended—namely, the seizure and holding of Anping until satisfaction was made for such outrages, and security obtained for the persons and property of British subjects—need not necessarily have been followed by bloodshed. The responsibility of bloodshed rests on the naval officer. He supposed, as seemed to him on good evidence, that an effort was about to be made to retake the fort. Perhaps in this he was mistaken.

Let it be noted that the decision of the home government, in the Formosa matter, by the acknowledgement of the Earl of Clarendon, *was come to before the Foreign Office had received its despatches from China on the subject.* Only the admiralty had received despatches from the naval officers—the only parties responsible for the bloodshed—and the home government thereupon praises the naval officer and reproves the Consul ! If this decision be not reversed, when the facts become known, then has the character of the British nation changed marvelously.

Since the Formosa affair there has been trouble at Swatow, in which serious fighting has taken place between some of the British naval forces and certain Chinese villages. But, as neither missionaries nor merchants were involved in this, we need not notice it further at present.

In this connection we may mention that, during the whole

of this year, there have been reports very widely circulated throughout the whole of this region (Amoy) that the Chinese government is about to drive all foreigners out of China. These reports, it is said, come from the mandarin offices. They have caused very great excitement among the people. At the time of writing this excitement is somewhat allayed.

From the above facts we find that there *are* frequent manifestations of hostility to foreigners, and occasionally serious complications leading to the very verge of war. What are the causes of these things? Is this hostility excited by the effort to introduce Christianity; and is the development of trade thus hindered by the missionary work? Or has this hostility been excited by trade; and is trade thus responsible for hindering the evangelization of China? Or is this hostility entirely owing to other causes? These are important questions. It seems to us that it will not be difficult to find correct answers to them, but they will be very different from the answers which we have found so readily given in England.

To say nothing of the causes of hostility wrought by the conduct of foreign traders and buccaneers throughout the whole East, during the previous three centuries—ever since the discovery of the passage around the Cape of Good Hope—Great Britain has already had two wars with China during the present generation. Let us see whether *they* were in any respect the result of missionary work.

It is believed that it was in great measure owing to the opposition of the Chinese government to the importation of opium from India that the embassy of Lord Amherst to Peking in 1816 was not admitted into the presence of the Emperor. Severe laws afterwards promulgated, prohibiting the importation of opium, temporarily destroyed the traffic. This caused such great dissatisfaction that armed vessels were sent to Canton in 1831 and 1834 to intimidate the Chinese government, but without effect. All that could be done was to protect the contraband trade, and allow the smugglers to carry it on by means of armed ships. In 1838 the Chinese government made the use of opium a capital crime, and sent a strong military force to Canton, and compelled the foreign merchants

to deliver up their stock of opium, valued at about \$20,000,000, and destroyed it. *War followed.* Was this to be charged against missionaries? or was it only the Earl of Clarendon's "*wake of trade?*"

The Chinese government had been haughty, and demanded from foreign nations the acknowledgement of a supremacy which no independent nation could give. Of course they violated some of the principles of international law. Perhaps by these principles the British government was justified in declaring war. On this subject we pronounce no opinion. But what did the Chinese know of international law? They believed the war, on their part, to be one for self-defense and self-preservation, and of course a righteous war. They had seen a most pernicious drug forced into the country by foreign traders, through (to say the least) the connivance of foreign nations. In spite of all their efforts the importation of this drug increased at a fearful rate, working poverty, immorality, disease and death among the people. Their view of the subject is well set forth in a paper prepared for the Queen of England, in 1839, by the Imperial Commissioner and the high authorities of the two Kwang provinces. The paper contains the Chinese idea of the proper subjection of all nations to the supremacy of China. We make a few extracts from it bearing on our present subject:

"That in the ways of heaven no partiality exists, and no sanction is allowed to the injury of others for the advantage of one's self—that in men's natural desires there is not any great diversity (for where is he who does not abhor death and seek life?)—these are universally acknowledged principles. And your honorable nation, though beyond the wide ocean, at a distance of 20,000 miles, acknowledges the same ways of heaven, and the same human nature, and has the like perception of the distinctions between life and death, benefit and injury."

"There is a depraved and barbarous people, who having manufactured opium for smoking, bring it hither for sale, and seduce and lead astray the simple folk to the destruction of their persons, and the draining of their resources. Formerly the smokers thereof were few, but of late, from each to other the practice has spread its contagion, and daily do its baneful effects more deeply pervade the central source—its rich, fruitful and flourishing population. It is not to be denied that the simple folk, inasmuch as they indulge their appetite at the expense of their lives, are indeed themselves the authors of their miseries; and why then should they be pitied? Yet, in the universal empire under the sway of the great and pure dynasty, it is of essential import, for the right direction of men's minds, that their customs and manners should be formed to correctness. How

can it be borne that the living souls that dwell within these seas should be left wilfully to take a deadly poison! Hence it is that those who deal in opium, or who inhale its fumes, within this land, are all to be subjected to severest punishment, and that a perpetual interdict is to be placed on the practice so extensively prevailing. We have reflected that this poisonous article is the clandestine manufacture of artful schemers and depraved people of various tribes under the domination of your honorable nation. Doubtless you, the honorable sovereign of that nation, have not commanded the manufacture and sale of it. . . . And we have heard that in your honorable nation the people are not permitted to inhale the drug. . . . It is clearly from a knowledge of its injurious effects on man that you have directed severe prohibitions against it."

"Though not making use of it one's self, to venture, nevertheless, on the manufacture and sale of it, and with it to seduce the simple folk of this land, is to seek one's livelihood by the exposure of others to death, to seek one's own advantage by other men's injury. And such acts are bitterly abhorrent to the nature of man—are utterly opposed to the ways of heaven."

"We would now, then, concert with your honorable sovereignty means to bring to a perpetual end this opium, so hurtful to mankind: we in this land forbidding the use of it—and you in the nations under your dominion forbidding its manufacture. As regards what has been already made, we would have your honorable nation issue mandates for the collection thereof, that the whole may be cast into the depths of the sea. We would thus prevent the longer existence between these heavens and this earth of any portion of the hurtful thing. Not only then will the people of this land be relieved from its pernicious influence, but the people of your honorable nation, too, (for, as they make, how know we that they do not also smoke it?) will, when the manufacture is indeed forbidden, be likewise relieved from the danger of its use. Will not the result of this be the enjoyment by each of a felicitous condition of peace? For your honorable nation's sense of duty being thus devout, shows a clear apprehension of celestial principles, and the supreme heavens will ward off from you all calamities. It is also in perfect accordance with human nature, and must surely meet the approbation of sages."*

What an appeal from a *heathen* to a *Christian* nation! The Duke of Somerset has great difficulty in answering the imaginary argument against Christianity put into the mouth of a disciple of Confucius, drawn from the diverse sects among Christians, but we think his Grace might find greater difficulty to answer the real arguments of the heathen Chinese against the immorality of the most important branch of Christian trade with China.

With such an opinion concerning the war, when they were beaten in it and compelled to pay for the opium destroyed, is it strange that their feelings of hostility should become more deeply seated?

* *Chinese Rep.* Vol. viii, pp. 9-11.

After the war the British Plenipotentiary exerted himself to get the trade in opium legalized. But the Chinese persistently refused. The Emperor would not consent to receive a revenue from the miseries of his subjects. The trade brought too much revenue to the British Government in India, and too much profit to the merchants, to be given up. "Receiving ships," well armed, were stationed off the various cities along the coast at the mouths of the harbors, from which the drug could be smuggled into the cities and into the country around. At the five open ports, where consuls resided, an imaginary line to mark the limits of the port was so drawn that the opium ships might lie beyond it, and thus be said to be beyond the Consul's jurisdiction. Where the taste for opium had not been formed, and consequently where there was no demand for it, the drug would be sent on shore by Christian men from Christian ships, sailing along the coast, to debauch the taste, form an appetite and create a market! It is too horrible to be believed, but it is true. By such means the traffic, though contraband, continually increased. In the mean time that abominable slave trade—the coolie traffic—grew up. Doubtless the most of those who emigrated, went voluntary, but they knew not the horrors which awaited such multitudes of them. Many, also, were decoyed and kidnapped. Is it strange that the hatred to foreigners sank deeper and still deeper into the Chinese breast? that it showed itself occasionally in acts of violence? that certain stipulations of a treaty, which the Chinese regarded as forced upon them, were not carried out; and that another war was the result of all this?

Such were the causes of the second war with China. The immediate occasion of it was the seizure by the Chinese authorities at Canton, in 1856, of a *lorcha*, manned by Chinamen, and said to have been engaged in smuggling, but which carried the British flag. According to treaty arrangements this seizure should have been made through the British Consulate. In itself considered it was a small affair on which to declare war. But war was inevitable, and probably it was better both for foreign and Chinese interests that it came then. We would not, under all the circumstances, pronounce

the war, on the part of Great Britain, unrighteous. But in the Chinese mind it was unrighteous, and in no sense was it the result of missionary work. It was still Earl Clarendon's "*wake of trade.*"

After this war, an effort was again made to legalize the opium traffic, and this time with practical success. The Chinese government, more moral than its Christian antagonists, still refused to mention opium among the allowed articles of import, but consented to the importation of "*foreign medicine.*" *Foreign medicine!* this now is the great article of commerce brought to China in foreign ships. Some of the opprobrium of the traffic is thus removed. Men can engage in it without being called smugglers. But the drug is still working its deadly havoc among the people. China is a "sick man," and Christian nations are the physicians drugging him to death!

In favor of the opium traffic there is nothing to be said, except that there is money to be made by it. It is because of this profit that arguments are put forth in its favor, sometimes so plausible as even to convince those who have no personal interest in the trade, and thus arrange them among its advocates. By the same means we have seen even good men led to advocate African slavery and the slave trade.

As regards the coolie traffic something might be said in its favor in the abstract. It might be so conducted as to be a blessing to the coolies themselves. Perhaps in some instances it has been so conducted. Good men have engaged in it with this view. But it is only evil in the eyes of the masses of the Chinese, and the evils connected with it have indeed been enormous. To guard against these the traffic has been legalized under severe conditions, so severe that the trade will probably soon be utterly destroyed thereby. We had hoped that it was already destroyed in China proper. But within the last two months two large cargoes of coolies have been cleared even from the port of Amoy for Havana. Report, among the Chinese, says that after the emigrants on the last of these ships had been passed by the native authorities, and the ship received her clearance, several Chinese were decoyed

and taken on board. This report, whether true or not, shows the kind of *wake* this trade leaves behind.

This last war has taught the Chinese to respect the power of foreign nations, but is it in the nature of things to imagine that it has removed any of their enmity?

Now look at the Earl of Clarendon's advice to missionaries: "They will do well to follow in the wake of trade (!) when the people have learned to see in it material advantage to themselves." Thus "they will find the people prepared to receive and listen to their instructions," otherwise "their proffered instructions" will probably "be rejected, and their persons exposed to indignity and even danger."

The Chinese who have found in foreign trade material advantage sufficient to overcome the sense of injury and humiliation, which they conceive to have been brought on China by foreign nations, are, compared with the masses of the people, but as a "drop in the bucket." Great multitudes obtain their livelihood from foreigners, but this does not necessarily remove their hostility. Are the friends and neighbors of the great multitudes who have been carried away in coolie ships (of whom so few return), and the friends and neighbors of them who have become addicted to the use of the opium pipe, likely to look with complacency on foreign trade? Are even the vast multitudes of the victims of opium, who would be wretched in the extreme if the supply was cut off, likely to regard with favor that trade which has been the means of leading them into a vice over which they mourn, but which they have not strength to overcome? If missionaries have to wait until trade has prepared the people to receive the gospel, the day for the conversion of China will never come.

Probably there is not a missionary of experience in China who will not bear testimony that the greatest obstacle he finds in his way is this very "*wake of trade*." The Duke of Somerset, in his diatribe against Christian missions, says: "Suppose a Chinaman asks what effect this new religion has upon the people, and goes to Shanghai to see, what does he behold? Naval and civil officers who are acquainted with all the chief ports in Europe, America and Asia, inform me, that, though

sea-port towns are not usually very moral places, *there is no such sink of iniquity as Shanghai.*" Does not the Duke know that, of the ports of China, Shanghai is one of those where *trade* has made its biggest *wake*? But we trust that the language of his Grace on this subject also "*is rather too strong.*" Still it is too true, that, in the foreign communities of these cities, immorality is often open and unblushing. Paul says of the heathen in his day, "it is a shame even to speak of those things which are done of them in secret." Alas! alas! it is a shame to speak of some of the things which are done by men, who came from Christian lands—in *public*.

Among the foreign merchants there are Christian men, who live Christian lives before the heathen; and in the character of the foreign communities generally in China there is much that is praiseworthy. We doubt whether anywhere can be found a class of men more gentlemanly, more strict to their notions of honor, more liberal, more kind, more accommodating, than the merchants of China. Missionaries are not the men to disparage them in these respects. But it is a fact that the laws of God, especially the 4th and 7th commandments, are too sadly and too *publicly* violated. The heathen notice these facts. They know that they are inconsistent with the precepts of Christianity, and, as regards the last, they know that it is a deplorable violation of the laws of society.

The places where the missionaries meet with the least success are those where are the most foreigners. Worse still, the influence of the example of these nominal Christians (all foreigners from Europe and America call themselves Christians) is such, that these are the places where the native churches have the most cases of discipline for immoral conduct. The places where missionaries find the most encouragement are the towns and villages further inland, where trade has not left so great a *wake*.

It is not a fact that the Chinese are more hostile to missionaries than to other foreigners. There was no such difficulty in obtaining toleration for Christianity as in obtaining privileges for trade. It is even said that foreign governments did not authorize their ministers to *insist* on the toleration of

Christianity, and that the clauses in the treaties granting toleration were inserted at the instance of the Chinese commissioners, who stated that the Emperor, recognizing the moral and benevolent character of Christianity, would cheerfully provide for its toleration.*

In the open ports where missions and trade have long been established, even the heathen Chinese make a distinction among foreigners favorable to missionaries. They know that missionaries preach against immorality, and that their conduct in this respect corresponds to their preaching. That which they can best understand concerning Christianity, is its excellent system of morals, and this they heartily approve. They esteem their own system good, and doubtless think it is better for them not to change. They know also that missionaries are opposed to the opium and coolie traffics. Foreigners know all these things too. This, together with certain characteristics of the preaching of missionaries when they preach to their own countrymen, which the heathen Chinese can not yet understand—for missionaries preach to their countrymen in China the same doctrines, with all their awful sanctions, which their fellow ministers of the gospel preach in Europe and America—is the reason why so many foreigners are opposed to missionaries, and speak of them as ignorant, and narrow-minded. The very things, then, which render missionaries unacceptable to many of their countrymen, make a favorable impression on the well-disposed heathen.

Notwithstanding all this, even at the open ports, it is impossible for the heathen Chinese to forget that Christianity is the religion of the nations which they have so long regarded as enemies; and that the teachers thereof are fellow countrymen of those whose business they look upon as injurious to their people. Hence the most common objections against Christianity, made to the missionaries by the heathen, are implied in questions like the following: "Why do you bring opium?" "Why do your people kidnap Chinamen?" "Why don't you go and preach to your own countrymen?"

* Chinese Rec. Vol II, page 24.

When missionaries go to a new place—"seek to lead the way in opening up new locations"—it is true that they are liable to have, as the Earl of Clarendon remarks, "their proffered instruction rejected, and their persons exposed to indignity and even danger"—for they have to contend with all the stories, true and false, which have gone before them against foreigners. Such was the case at Yang-chow. Who will say how much of the opposition met with there was the result of foreign trade? *Probably the whole of it.* The time had not yet come for the preaching of the gospel to excite opposition, as it had not yet been preached. As regards Formosa, traders were there long before missionaries, and missionaries were only keeping in their "wake." It is not true, then, that Christianity blocks the way of legitimate trade, but it is true that illegitimate trade, and all immorality practised by nominal Christians, raises high bars against the progress of Christianity.

Christianity—at least Protestant Christianity—opens the way for true progress of all kinds. Surely there is no need, in this age of the world, to stop to prove this proposition. But there is a proposition somewhat allied to this, affecting foreign interests in China, on which a few words may be said. Christianity is now doing more than any other cause to remove the hostility of the Chinese to foreigners. A man may become wealthy through foreign trade, or through employment by foreigners: this does not necessarily remove his hostility to foreigners themselves. But when a man becomes a true Christian, though he will yet oppose whatever is evil in the trade and character of foreigners, his hostility to foreigners *as such* necessarily ceases. We have already noticed the influence exerted on the minds of the friends and neighbors of the multitudes who have been debauched by the opium traffic, and of the most of those who have emigrated or been carried away in coolie ships. Let us compare with this the influence exerted on the minds of the friends and neighbors of those who become Christians. In the first instance the impression is altogether unfavorable. The converts are supposed to have become renegade Chinese, and friends or dupes of the hated foreigner. Usually persecution ensues—sometimes very violent—but in time

the character of the Christians forces on their neighbors and friends the acknowledgment that Christianity is good in its influence. This is not mere theory. Facts without number, if demanded, can be produced, showing how that the character of Christians has been the means of leading those who have been their violent persecutors, themselves to embrace Christianity; and has led whole communities, which at first reviled, in the end to speak well of the Christian religion. Legitimate trade and intercourse with upright foreigners, engaged in trade or in any other pursuit or profession, is exerting a similar influence, but not so powerful.

These are facts, and they are reasonable in themselves. Strange that it should often be so difficult to convince men of intelligence and experience, and even piety, to believe them? They seem to think that human nature, especially in heathen lands, is so warped mentally, and so corrupt morally, that the truth and purity of the gospel will necessarily excite violent disturbance. They are afraid of the results of the preaching of it. But they will connive at the promulgation of many errors, and at the practice of immorality, without any such anxiety. Now, human nature anywhere *is* bad enough, but even among the heathen the moral sense is not entirely obliterated, and in China, where so good a moral system has been current for thousands of years, *theoretically* permeating the whole nation, reasoning from a moral standpoint has immense influence; and besides this, there is a just God who rules, whether men acknowledge him or not. Look at the case of India. How the British government in India feared the result of missionary work, and how tender it was toward the prejudices of the heathen—heathenizing itself in order to conciliate the people! *The Indian Mutiny*, which shocked the whole civilized world, followed. Was that attributable to an effort to introduce Christianity? No; but it proved that there is an avenging God on the throne. We may learn a similar lesson in the history of African slavery in the United States. Even the majority of the Christian men of the land, fully convinced of the evil of slavery, were afraid to have the truth preached in favor of emancipation because of imaginary consequences.

The war followed, proving that the same avenging God reigns there also.

From such events—and the history of the world is full of them—we should learn never to be afraid of the consequences of advocating truth and performing duty ; and Christian governments should learn not to be so much afraid of the dissemination of Christianity. It is not their place directly to engage in this dissemination, but if they imagine that, by discountenancing it, they shall thereby benefit either their own people or the Chinese, they make a grievous mistake.

As to the question : “ Is China to be converted through the upper classes ? ” it would be reasonable to give some weight to the teaching of the Lord Jesus, the author of Christianity. According to his doctrine, the crowning evidence of the divine origin of Christianity is, “ the *poor* have the gospel preached to them.” So also in reference especially to the conversion of the *heathen*, it would be reasonable to give some weight to the teachings of the “ apostle to the heathen.” One verse from his first Epistle to the Corinthians (i, 26) will be sufficient to set forth his views on the subject. A free translation of it, in language exactly adapted to a nation like China, would read thus : “ You see, in reference to your conversion, brethren, that not many of the *literati*, not many of the ruling class, not many of the high-born, are converted.” With this agrees the whole New Testament, and the whole history of the progress of Christianity throughout the world. It has been well remarked, by a great Christian statesman, that Christianity is the great leveler. It does not begin at the top and level down, but it begins at the bottom and levels up. It is to be feared that those who give the advice that missionaries should confine their labors to the upper classes do not read with much profit Church history, nor study as much as they ought the New Testament. How then can missionaries, even though they expose themselves to the charge of having “ zeal which excludes discretion,” be expected to take their advice on this subject, any more than the advice to strive to keep within “ the *wake of trade* ? ”

One word in reference to the charge brought against mis-

sionaries in China, that they are too ready to apply to their respective consuls for protection in their propagandism, and desire to propagate Christianity by the sword. The first part of this charge is exaggerated, and the last part is altogether gratuitous. The missionaries and the native Christians usually *bear much*, before the matter is taken to the Consul. But in case of serious persecution, (and, as regards the native Christians when redress has been refused them by their own authorities) is it not the right, and the *duty*, of the missionary to go to his consul? The treaties are the highest law of the land. Are the parts referring to the toleration of Christianity to be a dead letter? Better cut them out all together. Whatever may be said of the treaties in general, most surely these parts were not forced on the Chinese government. Are not the provisions good in themselves? and are not the missionary and the native Christian to have the benefit of laws made expressly for them? Often, if the missionary could go directly to the native authorities he would get redress without troubling the consul. But by the treaties (and we think wisely) he is forbidden this course, and is directed to address the native authorities only through the consul.

But application to the consul is not by any means an appeal for propagandism by the sword. The consul is a civil magistrate. Whether he, after failing to obtain redress from the local authorities, shall refer the matter to Peking or to the naval officer, depends on the magnitude and urgency of the case, and on the instructions given him by his government. The missionary has no responsibility in the matter. If, in the opinion of the consul, the case be of sufficient urgency for immediate reference to the naval power, even then to say that it manifests a desire on the part of the missionary to propagate his religion by the sword, proves more enmity against Christian missions than love for accuracy of statement.

It is right that the British government should deprecate the prospect of war with China, whether brought on by officials, traders, or missionaries. The time was when it was too ready to enter into war—not for the sake of propagand-

ism, but for the sake of pecuniary gain to itself and people, irrespective of the injury caused thereby to China. Missionaries are not the men to complain of a change of policy in this respect. They come to China, not for their own, but for China's benefit. But the disapprobation of the course adopted by the British officials in the Yang-chow affair, and the severe censure of the course pursued in the Formosa matter, look as if the policy of the British government was changing into the opposite extreme. This is not the course to take to avoid war with China. The due medium is the proper course.

In order to a wise diplomacy there should be a regard to the character of the people with whom it is conducted. Whether China desires progress, as was the opinion of the late Mr. Burlingame, admits of grave doubts. At least his representations are not borne out by the spirit manifested in this part of China where we reside (Amoy). It seemed to be impossible for a long time past to obtain from the native authorities the benefits guaranteed by treaty to foreigners. But since the Formosa difficulty has been settled all this has changed. Many matters have been redressed which for a long time had been entirely neglected by the native officials. For this, we conceive, the thanks of all foreigners are due to Mr. Gibson, and he will receive them, though for a time he may remain under the censure of his government. We earnestly hope that the course of his government will not undo that which he has so well done.

Even though the Central government of China has the desire for progress, vast numbers of the officials (to say the least) have little sympathy therewith, and the *literati*, who really shape the public opinion throughout the whole country, are bitterly opposed to it. Their golden age is *back not forward*. Again, truth is by no means as sacred in China as in western nations. However willing western diplomatists might be to sacrifice truth in order to gain their points, they can not afford to expose themselves to the danger of detection in falsehood. In China detection in falsehood is no great dishonor. If one has shown thereby sufficient skill to gain what is considered a good point, it is rather meritorious. Hence in the

despatches of the officials truth is continually sacrificed. All consuls in China, we suppose, will bear this testimony. The same is the case in the reports of local authorities to their superiors. See the official documents in the Yang-chow affair. The Chinese reports were full of bare-faced falsehoods, and, in this respect, they were by no means extraordinary.

Now, with such limited power as the Central government has over the distant parts of the empire, and with such imperfect means of getting accurate information in any particular case of dispute, it is very difficult for that government to do as well for foreign interests as it may be disposed to do. If the Mandarins in the distant parts of the empire could be sure that they had nothing to fear from foreign powers in their immediate neighborhood, they would often run the risk of letting the matter be referred to Peking. They would be able to make and send up plausible misstatements of facts, and, even if the matter finally go against them, they would still have the benefit of delay (by which the object sought by them would often be gained), and in the meantime they might be moved to some other place far distant from the point of trouble. This, too, is not theory but fact, with abundant illustrations at hand if demanded.

Because of the above facts, consuls at the distant ports should be entrusted with large discretionary powers, with the understanding that they should be held to strict accountability, if they used these powers beyond what the importance of the case demanded, and the provisions of the treaty justified. There would be little danger, then, of their overstepping the line of duty. Such a policy would be less liable to lead to implications which must end in war, than to take from the consuls such discretionary power, and compel them in the first instance to refer *every matter* to Peking. What is needed in dealing with China is a *decided but righteous policy*. *We should ask nothing but what is plainly right in itself, and this should be asked with firmness. There should be a like readiness to grant that which China has a right to ask of us.* With such a policy there would be no need of war.

ART. VII.—THE GROUND AND NATURE OF CHRISTIAN GIVING.

By REV. R. B. THURSTON, Stamford, Conn.

THE subject of Christian benevolence is not exhausted. It is not always treated with words of wisdom. Its practical applications are sometimes misstated. A narrow, even though a pious judgment, frequently disregards its compass, sweeping as it does across the regions of secular enterprise and political economy, as well as the domains of evangelical faith and the millennial glory.

A few facts are worthy of note here, as showing, in a financial aspect, the importance of our theme. In periods of twenty years the contributions of our country to foreign missions have advanced from 0 to \$100,000, \$1,000,000, \$3,000,000, and \$5,000,000, annually. According to a summary published in Nov. last, of the incomes of the British and American religious societies, the aggregate raised in the preceding year for missions, publications, and church erections, was about \$15,000,000. To this amount add the contributions of bodies not acknowledged as evangelical, and of other countries, and the sum must exceed a score of millions. Still further, signs of the times, of the most portentous character, indicate that the rapid increase of donations to religious purposes must go on for an indefinite period; and the race must be swift, or the doctrines of the cross, which evangelical men hold dear, and the free and sacred institutions whose first corner-stone in America was Plymouth Rock, will be overwhelmed. The gifts, then, of the churches and congregations, which will be solicited under the pleas of Christian benevolence, are, financially speaking, of imposing magnitude; the civil and moral interests which are comprehended are vast and magnificent; and the issues involved are tremendous.

It is therefore evident, that, for the highest secular as well as for religious reasons, the ground and nature of Christian giving should be thoroughly understood and cordially accepted by the Church. If it is not, her members will not be trained as men adequate to their office and the demands of the age.

Our subject is, indeed, vitally connected with great questions of the times and of the world.

The ground of Christian giving is the revealed and authoritative will of God. The Creator is the Supreme Proprietor of all things we call ours. "The earth is the Lord's, and the fullness thereof, the world and they that dwell therein; for he hath founded it." "He hath made us: we are his people and the sheep of his pasture"—subject to his ownership as the feeble flock to us.

In the exercise of his own supremacy he gave to man in Eden "dominion," or the right to use, possess, and enjoy the earth, its productions, and the inferior creatures—in a word, property and the right of holding it. "Given" is the word repeatedly used in the Scriptures to express the fact.*

But, under the primeval and universal grant, God has ordained limitations and purposes concerning the acquisition and use of property. He who laid the foundation as the Divine Architect, also drew the plan of the temple of human life. His word establishes the following ends of the institution of dominion. First, it is for natural support: "To you it shall be for meat." Secondly, it is for increase: "He giveth power to get wealth." "Parents ought to lay up for their children." The Bible also recognizes and justifies, in due measure, the improvement and embellishment of life, which are promoted by wealth. Thirdly, it is for the support of civil society and government: "For this cause pay ye tribute also; for they [that is, the magistrates] are God's ministers, attending continually upon this very thing." Fourthly, it is for charity to the poor: "The poor shall never cease out of the land; therefore I command thee, saying, 'thou shalt open thy hand wide unto thy brother, to thy poor, and to thy needy, in thy land.'" "Give to him that asketh thee." Fifthly, it is for religious objects. The principle and summary of many texts are contained in the words: "Honor the Lord with thy substance, and with the first fruits of all thy

*In this connection, Blackstone's Commentaries, and First Things, by Dr. Gardner Spring, may be consulted.

increase." The last two of these divine purposes concerning property are included in the phrase, Christian giving.

In the Old Testament the law of religious gifts constitutes a body of positive precepts. There is the system of tithes, supplemented with the provision for free-will offerings. The actual requirements of the Mosaic statutes for religious and charitable uses exceeded 23 per cent. of incomes.

But it may be said, that in the New Testament those arithmetical regulations of the older economy are abrogated. In a certain formal sense of the letter it is true; in the spirit it is not true. "*Lex stat dum ratio manet.*" The principles of the precise statutes which defined obligations under the former dispensation, are in their nature universal and unchangeable; the reasons for them are perpetual; and those statutes are by Christ transfigured into the law of love. "Do we, therefore, make void the law? Nay, we establish the law!" The "bondage" of obedience to strict precepts becomes the freedom of a Christian exercise. "Love is the fulfilling of the law;" and because it is the freedom of an inspiration, it does more than precept. On the side of giving it is unbounded. When the emergency requires, it can consecrate the whole of the great possessions which the young ruler withheld. The Christian spirit is higher, broader, more generous, more self-denying and more achieving, than the old preceptive obedience.

"A child is under tutors and governors;" but when he becomes a true man, he is a law unto himself; and in the free excellency of manhood he does greater and nobler things than the child. The old law trained the saints as children. Under the new economy believers are required to grow into perfect men in Christ.

It is to be observed, also, that the five Scriptural uses of property, which have been specified, are not successive, but parallel obligations. The trustee of the Creator's endowment is not instructed that he may use his possessions for himself alone, up to the measure of avaricious desire, or besides paying only compulsory dues to the State, while withholding from charity and religion till he can make bestowment liter-

ally "without feeling it." The very law and intent of God is that he shall feel it; and the moral ends to be secured require the same. The obligation of practical benevolence and piety is laid side by side with the privilege of dominion. It is synchronous and proportionate. The earthly blessing is sanctified by the spirit which makes of it a devout consecration. Jacob in his poverty asking for "bread to eat and raiment to put on," by his pillow of stone makes the vow, "I will surely give the tenth unto thee."

Cases of extreme want, no doubt, bring exceptions; and this is according to a Christian common-sense. The first thing after creating a world, or producing a life, is to support it, and afterwards to govern it. Bread must be before alms or worship; and the divine institutes follow this order; but covetousness must take no advantage and clamor for no indulgence. Charity and religion follow very closely after scanty possessions. The widow's three mites were blessed.

Thus the Scriptures teach that Christian giving is ordained among the uses and ends of property by comprehensive and divine legislation, which should govern all men, everywhere. That legislation comes to its highest form of expression in the New Testament law of love, and in the Spirit of Christ. Such is the ground of giving in charity, and giving for the purposes of religion.

The nature of Christian giving now becomes manifest in three elements which follow:

I. Christian Giving is the visible sign and act of allegiance to God in his sovereignty over the present world. This is the first and even the highest element of its nature. Let our thoughts rise to it by a process of illustration which follows the Bible method. The proprietor of a great estate receives rents from his tenantry; the monarch on the throne of empire levies tribute on his subjects. They acknowledge by payments the equity of such relations, and discharge duties of allegiance. God presents himself as the Supreme Proprietor of the earth and the Ruler of men; and he lays on all the corresponding obligations. Christ in his parables makes this fact as vivid as the transactions of the secular world. Life

and possessions are held according to the tenure of a sacred trust in stewardship. God demands literal returns to himself of that earthly estate which he has committed to us for the support and culture of the present life. He would "receive the fruits of the vineyard," and the revenue of kings. A grateful heart for his goodness is not all he requires. By a system of formal legislation, and by the life of his Son, he exacts that which between men is equitable consideration for values received, and for benefits of government; and when the enjoined obligations are fulfilled, their gratitude and homage are expressed in offerings which mark a practical allegiance in the life that now is.

Let it not be said that this is disguising and degrading the high spiritual relations of men to God by veiling them in forms and phrases of human business. It is enough to reply, that the pen of inspiration chooses this vehicle for conveying to us just conceptions, and training us to righteous actions. The principle and power of our divine relations are not degraded; but the human spirit and action are exalted. The duties become definite and inevitable. They are not in the high above, or the depth beneath, remote, obscure, unsanctioned: "The word is nigh thee:" "God is at hand." Allegiance to him, like love, is "indeed and in truth." "Honor the Lord with thy substance," are words of meaning.

We are persuaded that objection can arise only where very partial views are entertained of God's government of the world, or where covetousness is reluctant to "bring all the tithes into the store-house." This is strengthened when we glance at the reverse side. The men who withhold the tithes are explicitly charged with robbing God. When the revenue of the Great King is refused, a high duty of allegiance is not performed. Some of the strongest bonds by which in this world men can be bound to the Creator are severed, and the sin in his sight is aggravated.

As the highest element in the nature of Christian giving is the expression of fealty to God, corresponding with his claims, it follows that there may be giving, acceptable to him in the best sense, which does not directly relieve necessities.

or otherwise promote human welfare. Giving as the act of allegiance to him is quite distinguishable from charity to the poor, and from bestowments for religious privileges or personal culture in grace. The distinction is not one of mental apprehension only ; it becomes practical. The story of the woman of Bethany is a fit illustration. The alabaster box of very precious ointment, which might have been sold for much and given to the poor, was devoted to nobler use in the anointing of the Friend and Saviour of the poor. Judas, who objected, is still the type of the covetous and worldly mind ; and unhappily, he is followed even now by persons of a pious but narrow judgment. There are devout men who need yet to learn that our best things may and should be devoted to God. If disinterested worship is the highest act of a moral being, then property may be consecrated in worship which might have been expended in other use ; and that is its highest end which contributes directly to the divine glory. It does not reach the full breadth and elevation of Christian offerings to limit them within the circumference of our nature. Reverence and love make consecration to God, even with seeming forgetfulness of meat, and drink, and habitation, and mental culture, and of moral darkness.

For example : The building of costly churches is often severely reprehended on the ground that the money so bestowed is needed for the purposes of humanity or missions. But if good men to whom God has intrusted large wealth, are sincerely moved to erect a magnificent edifice to his honor, who has the right to arraign them ? They express the spirit of the evangelical prophet, in beautifying the place of the Lord's sanctuary and making the place of his feet glorious. Why do not objectors expurgate Isaiah ? Besides, the reasons fail. The true gift to God is no mercenary transaction ; it does not necessarily increase the subsequent expense of ordinances ; it is not a display of pride ; and it is an unwarrantable apprehension that it will diminish charities to the poor, or missionary contributions.

Giving, as the act of allegiance to Jehovah for his sole honor, is the expression of a principle of universal, unalterable

authority and power. Notwithstanding the sins and woes of the present, it anticipates the millennial times, when the earth shall be full of the knowledge of God, when the poor shall become opulent, when such offerings, as the means of moral preservation, will be in proportion to the wealth of nations, blessed in Christ, and temples of beauty beyond comparison will be consecrated in his name. As the spires of churches tower above the dwellings of men, and point the eye to heaven, so does that principle now raise us above the plain of ordinary conceptions, and lift our hearts to him who bends over our lowly homes the brightness of his firmament, and filleth all things with his glory.

II. Christian Giving in its nature is the recognition, in affection and in act, of the poor and of the unevangelized, as fellow heirs of the natural bounty and saving grace of God. These great divisions of men do not differ from others in original rights, endowments, privileges, and responsibilities, but in circumstances, and in relations such, that their dependence on the one side is the measure of corresponding obligations on the other side. "The rich and the poor meet together; the Lord is the Maker of them all." They are children of the same Father, and by his command to be loved and assisted by men of opulence and godliness, as brothers of the same family.

In the division of property under governments and social laws, the rights of labor and of ownership, as well as of faith, must indeed be respected; folly and crime justly forfeit a large share of the possessions and enjoyments which should be honestly and piously earned; and by providential calamities many may be reduced to a grapple with death in the extremity of destitution; but not for such causes are the poor to be abandoned. The Scriptures abundantly teach that in giving the world to the children of men, rewarding the diligent and virtuous with riches, and blessing the meek with the inheritance of the earth, God does not intend that the unfortunate, or even the idle and the vile, shall be forsaken in their misery. Brothers must not be given over by brothers to the skeleton fiend of famine, or of fever. The Father has not utterly disinherited one of the great family of man, while

the breath of life he breathes remains ; and he makes those who have, the almoners of his will to those who have not.

In a certain limited extent the State performs the service. Receiving revenue from the nation, it provides something for the impoverished wrecks of humanity, cast ashore on the hard coasts of life. God in his kingdom ordains the same use of a portion of the tribute due to him from the great rich world ; he appoints those who render it his agents for the distribution ; and with a law more comprehensive and vital than that of society, with a fatherly tenderness, he teaches men to call the poor brethren, and to warm their hearts with sympathy, while supplying the necessities of the body. The sentiments of natural humanity should bend upward to meet the divine love, like the seven-hued bow of promise, swelling to meet the blue of heaven ; but when those sentiments fail, the statutes of the Sovereign bind the subjects of the universal kingdom. They who are entrusted with its treasures must receive them with the attending responsibilities ; so that Christian giving, in its relation to the poor, becomes an exercise of humanity, which mingles into the fidelity of allegiance to God.

It is true, charity to the poor is not tribute rendered directly to him ; but we discharge an obligation to the Supreme Spirit, whose ownership comprehends the silver and the gold, in mine and coffer alike, and the cattle on a thousand hills, when we give to the objects which he presents in the economy of his kingdom. It is important to observe that he accepts what is thus contributed as offered to himself : " He that giveth to the poor lendeth to the Lord." In the day when he shall come in his glory, Christ will say of the gift and service of charity, " Ye have done it unto me."

But few words need to be added in regard to the unevangelized. While all that has been said of charities reaching the wants of the body is true, how is that giving confirmed which sustains the great religious enterprises of the age. The spirit of allegiance must burn in order to conquer the world for Christ. The Christian spirit is brother and sister to the heathen poor, though rich in the wealth of the Orient. As the deepest poverty is of the soul, so the highest love is for

the soul. The widest sweep of Christian benevolence is that which, taking Calvary for its center, seeks to save the world. The ministering to the saints of the Redeemer's kingdom expands into the unlimited work of proclaiming redemption. The Church in fealty to Jehovah finds that one of the primary obligations is to "go into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature."

§ III. Christian Giving is in its nature an indispensable culture and discipline of right affections toward God and men. The importance of preserving a heart right with God, there are none to deny ; but in regard to the means, multitudes are negligent or mistaken. There are prevalent sentiments and practices—the examples often appear in churches—which imply that affections and actions are in different realms, between which there is little communication; that the love of God and of men required by the law is a passive state of the soul, rather than an active principle of conduct; that piety is some spiritual characteristic burned upon us in the furnace of religious experience, like beautiful colors on costly vases: not a fountain of waters in the wilderness of this world, by faith springing up into everlasting life.

All this is equally unphilosophical and unscriptural. Exercise is indispensable to the growth and existence of right affections. Who acknowledges a friendship which never does a friendly thing ? Who is deceived, except in religion, by words when the spirit is not revealed in actions ? So speaks the apostle : "Faith without works is dead, being alone."

We are, then, to consider the reacting effect upon the character and heart, of giving property for the specific ends enjoined by the Christian rules. Now observe that the first and normal effect of getting and accumulating is selfishness. Men enter into business, from the severest manual occupations to the most eminent commercial or professional pursuits, for a living, for competence, for wealth. Primarily the object is a personal one. The purpose is to make the most money ; and the chosen way is pursued six lawful days in seven ; so that almost the whole of mature life is comprehended in this one word—business. Acquisition is aimed at, and acquisitive-

ness is steadily cultivated ; but acquisitiveness is the prime minister of selfishness, and selfishness is the essence of sin. Let men be left to the natural drift of business, in itself considered, unaffected by motives and influences external to their own interests, and all the great powers of their being would revolve around self, and do homage to self as a god. They could no more glorify God in heaven than the worshipers of the golden image set up in the plains of Dura. "All the rivers run into the sea:" all the currents of human feeling and action must flow to their sea ; and "covetousness, which is idolatry," is the fathomless ocean to which all the natural streams of business are sweeping ; and the image set upon all its islands and coasts is self. To sink in that ocean is to die to love—to "drown the soul in destruction and perdition."

How does God prevent the ruin ? He gives to those who would become sordid slaves of business and riches, dependent families. By the magic of love he puts them almost into the power of helpless, irresistible solicitors, with whom their gains must be shared. They live and labor then for objects out of themselves. They are members also of a greater community. The State surrounds them with its grander interests, lays tribute on all their possessions and increase, and without the spell of natural ties demands a self-subduing patriotism. Above all, and around all, the Creator ordains the claims of his own kingdom. While giving his sanction and blessing upon the uses of property for important temporal ends, he is leading the heirs of his bounty over the wide fields of charity and up the heights of religion. He makes the whole of life, from the cradle to the grave, a pathway of generous affections. He changes the very spirit of all earthly occupations, from a service of self to a labor of love, and a sacrifice of piety. Giving is made a vital principle in the economy of the world, and in the constitution of society. Human life is transfigured, and all things earthly contribute to the glory of God.

If it were not thus, God could not reign over such a world as this. The command, "Seek first the kingdom of God," would be bitter irony, for adamantine facts in its constitution would make such seeking impossible.

We see thus the force of scriptural warnings and condemnations of the avaricious spirit. "The love of money is the root of all evil." "Ye can not serve God and mammon." It is of the nature of a moral impossibility that one should be a true Christian, or should be actuated by the love of God, who does not manifest the spirit in the acts of Christian giving. "Whoso hath this world's goods, and seeth his brother have need, and shutteth up his bowels of compassion for him, how dwelleth the love of God in him?" How can we believe that the true riches will be committed to those who "have not been faithful in the unrighteous mammon?" If the cry of a brother's want and entreaty does not move them, where is the evidence that they obey the voice of the Father?

On the other hand, equally clear, broad and strong are the exhortations which pass into promises. "Charge them that are rich in this world, . . . that they do good, that they be rich in good works, ready to distribute, willing to communicate; laying up in store for themselves a good foundation against the time to come, that they may lay hold on eternal life." And the more emphatic words of our Saviour: "I say unto you, Make to yourselves friends of the mammon of unrighteousness, that when ye fail they may receive you into everlasting habitations." Of transcendant importance, then, is the culture and discipline of right affections by Christian giving. This makes it "more blessed to give than to receive."

If we had the light of such passages only, we should believe that the key of the heavenly gates is put into our feeble, earthly hands. But we do not overlook the office of the Spirit. "The truth is double." The love which triumphs in Christian giving is itself the fruit of the Spirit. The Spirit works in man to will and to do, in harmony with the principles of moral action, and along the lines of the divine commands. No less indispensable than divine grace, therefore, is this element in the nature of Christian giving—the culture and discipline of right affections in the use of property. Salvation is still by grace; and so are the works which prove it; but the scheme of that salvation is no arbitrary device, breaking down the true order of being where affections go forth in

actions, and discharging a moral agent from his offices toward men and toward God.

Most persons—most Christians even—fail to appreciate the mighty power of property, and the uses made of it upon the character. What can be compared with it in respect to the numbers engaged, the time occupied, the means employed, the effects produced. Questions of property can dissolve the bonds of brotherhood between families, and determine peace or war between states. Money is said to rule the world. Its power has been mainly antagonistic to the kingdom of God. He requires that it shall be made tributary. The time is coming when the wealth of the world must pay homage to the Cross, or the Cross will fall prostrate before the passions of avarice, pride and self-indulgence. Christian giving is the means which God has ordained for the victory of faith and love. In other words, the discipline of the affections by giving, is the divine method of deliverance from the moral perils of opulence.

Practical applications of the subject stretch forth every way, like the branches of a tree; and every one of them bears fruit; but dismissing them without discussion, we conclude with one or two general considerations.

The principle of Christian Giving is in perfect harmony with all sound principles of political economy; for they also are of God; and it should never be pressed by good men into seeming contradiction. It will never hinder any enterprise required by the true welfare of man. It will open broader and deeper channels in which great volumes of money will flow; but the wise benevolence will expand and exalt every great interest of human society.

Let the law of Christian Giving be cordially fulfilled by all the professed disciples of Jesus, and it will swell the offerings of the church like the revenues of kingdoms. The humiliations of Zion will pass away, and the dawn of her triumphs will appear. Let the wealth of Christian nations be thus subsidized for the service of God, and the salvation of the world, and the millennial ages will advance swiftly, as the flowery spring when our northern hemisphere turns to the sun. The desert will rejoice and the wilderness blossom as the rose.

ART. VIII.—A NEW ANALYSIS IN FUNDAMENTAL MORALS.*

By EDWARD J. HAMILTON, Hanover College, Ind.

THE author of the following article, while reading a theological book several years ago, saw, or thought he saw, some confusion of thought in its ethical statements, and was himself also perplexed with difficulties to which he had not been able to find any satisfactory solution. Impressed with the importance of clear views on fundamental morals, he determined to seek for himself an understanding of them. This, on reflection, seemed to him more likely to be obtained by an independent and methodical course of ratiocination than from the perusal of the works of eminent authors. Not indeed because he undervalued that assistance which we derive from the labors of our predecessors, and without which progress in philosophy would be impossible; but because in a course of educational and ministerial study he had already become somewhat acquainted with the various systems of ethics; and he was afraid that further reading, as his mind was then situated, might result only in greater perplexity and bewilderment. Notwithstanding the prepossessions of early training, he had not been able to rest satisfied with that cautious system, of which Dr. McCosh, of Princeton, may now be regarded as the representative and defender, and which holds that our specific perception of right and wrong in different kinds of duty are simple and ultimate intuitions; and at the same time he had been unable to content himself with any of those analytical systems which eminent New England thinkers have advocated, and of which one of the latest and the best has been recently expounded by the president of Williams College. He entered, therefore, on a course of thoughtful investigation, which, after a slow yet gradual progress, has enabled him to answer his inquiries in a manner somewhat satisfactory to himself.

*The Law of Love, and Love as a Law; or, Moral Science, Theoretical and Practical. By MARK HOPKINS, D. D., LL.D., President of Williams College. New York: Charles Scribner & Co., 1869.

The Intuitions of the Mind Inductively Investigated. By Rev. JAMES McCOSH, LL.D. Carter & Brothers.

In these circumstances he inclines to submit his views to the judgment of others, that he may be either confirmed or corrected, as his success or his failure may require, and that the cause of truth may be served by the interchange of sincere convictions. Before proceeding further, however, it may be well to indicate the method of investigation which he adopted. The correctness of results in analytic speculation depends chiefly on method. If one's plan be wrong he has little claim on our attention, however talented he may be. On the other hand, a painstaking man of moderate ability will commonly accomplish something if he pursue the right method.

PLAN OF PROCEDURE.

1. Theoretical morals, or that part of philosophy which seeks to explain the phenomena of moral life, like every other department of science, takes a certain kind and amount of knowledge for granted. Philosophy does not give facts, or the first knowledge of them, but endeavors to explain those of which we are already informed. The science of ethics takes cognizance of those thoughts, feelings and actions which, arising from the distinctions of moral right and wrong, constitute the phenomena of moral life; and it must be pursued by a study of these phenomena as they already exist. It has therefore both the advantages and difficulties incident to all kinds of psychological study. Its phenomenal facts are familiar to the consciousness of every intelligent and thoughtful man; yet the reflex exercise of the intellect necessary to explain these has been found difficult. This is particularly the case with the intellectual phenomena—the ideas, beliefs, and practical judgments of morality; so much so indeed, that the whole controversy hitherto has been regarding the nature and origin of our moral ideas. Philosophers have found comparatively little difficulty concerning emotions, impulses, tendencies and actions, considered as springing from these practical ideas. Our feelings in morals seem to follow the general laws of our emotional and motive nature, so that their nature corresponds to that of our moral perceptions and beliefs, and must be studied in the light of these. The particular consideration of

them, therefore, may be deferred till after the investigation of the intellectual phenomena. It is true, indeed, that rational life furnishes the most important objects of moral thought, and some phases of moral life become the objects of our consideration in other phases: as, for example, when one's moral conduct may become the object of our approbation or disapprobation, praise or blame. Hence our study of moral ideas is conditioned on the knowledge of rational life in general, and in some cases also on that of the more primary forms of moral life. Yet this best confirms what we have said that the difficulties in ethical philosophy lie in an understanding of the ideas and objects about which moral life is exercised. Let us therefore attend to them.

2. The many questions that have been raised in ethics, all, we think, depend on two primary questions; first, "*What essentially are those things or objects of thought of which rightness and wrongness are predicated?*" and second, "*What are that rightness and that wrongness?*" By rightness, as used here and throughout this article, we mean that peculiar quality of an action or end which morally attracts and binds us to it; for there is an inferior rightness, of which we shall have little occasion to speak, and which is simply consistency with or non-opposition to the foregoing. This belongs to that which, in the more emphatic sense, is neither right nor wrong. Now, that most ethical controversies may be resolved more or less directly into the questions above stated, would not, we believe, be difficult of proof; but into this we need not enter. For these questions are in themselves absolutely fundamental in morals, and therefore previous to all others. In any case, if our discourse be of something as having a certain character, we can discern nothing rightly if we do not understand the nature of that something, and of that character; so, if our discourse be of the matter of the moral law as right, we should determine first what this matter and what that rightness are. And in philosophical discourse we should seek to know in what these things ultimately and essentially consist; otherwise, philosophically speaking, we should not know "what we were talk-

ing about." Moreover, as wrongness is in some way the correlative of rightness, it may simplify the discussion to consider the nature of rightness before that of wrongness. Indeed, this wrongness seems to be simply the quality of inconsistency with or opposedness to what is right; and, if this be so, an understanding of rightness will give us immediately the understanding of wrongness also. In like manner, as the obligatoriness of what is right confessedly depends on its rightness, and is an essential or necessary quality of it as being right, it may be wise to leave the discussion of the former idea till after that of the latter.

We have to determine, therefore, what ultimate duty is—or what is the essential matter of the moral law;—and then what that rightness is which we predicate of this duty. But if any one should object to our use of the term "duty," in this connection, to signify "whatsoever may be said to be morally right;" inasmuch as that term has an appropriate meaning of its own, different from this, we sustain the objection and plead only necessity. Our ordinary English does not seem to furnish us with any more convenient word. But in using the term we shall endeavor to avoid misapprehensions.

3. Having then these two points for study, the question meets us: "Which of them shall we study first?" This is a matter of some importance, and one, perhaps, which has not been sufficiently regarded. If rightness, as common speech affirms, be the natural and necessary predicate of something, we certainly should seek an understanding of the essence of the subject, in order to an understanding of the essence of the predicate. For nothing assists more to the understanding of an idea than the understanding of its natural and necessary *locus*. This holds equally whether the idea of rightness be ultimate and insoluble, as many hold, or whether it be definable; and also whether it be an inseparable attribute of duty or whether it be identical with duty, that is, the essential and formal quality of which duty is simply the concrete thing. For our minds proceed from the concrete to the abstract, and from the object to its attribute.

4. Even here, however, we may assert that our idea of moral rightness possesses a distinctive existence of its own, and can not, therefore, be identified with any other of our common practical or motive ideas. It is the office of philosophy to explain, not to explain away, the ideas of common sense; or, if an idea be ultimate, then philosophy should so explicate its locus and relations as to show that it is ultimate; but it is equally beyond the power and the province of the speculative reason to deny the correctness of the ideas of the practical reason or to deprive them of any vital element.

5. Holding, therefore, to the existence of duty, *i. e.* of a something of which rightness is predicable, and believing that this duty, that duty, and all duties are morally right and obligatory in a true and distinctive sense, our first inquiry is, "Wherein lies the essence of duty?" This question of course should not be dogmatically answered, but, if possible, in some way by which one may gradually gain the intellectual assent of himself and others. The present seems to be a case in which we should closely follow that critical process of analysis and generalization, which, carefully eliminating and rejecting non-essential elements, arrives finally at the essence itself. In beginning this ascending process of generalization there is no need to start from individual instances; we may use those classifications which the practical reason has already made for the uses of life, at least so far as these coördinate with one another. Thus we may speak of the duties of honesty, benevolence, chastity, veracity, loyalty, reverence, and so forth, referring to individual cases only for exemplification.

6. It is also of little consequence for our present purpose whether we use terms immediately descriptive of morally good or right actions, alone; or whether interchangeably with these, and with a sort of carelessness, as it were, we use the names of the virtues corresponding to these right actions. For honesty, veracity, and so forth, are only those active dispositions which severally aim at and result in different classes of actions, which relate to properly truth, and so on; and the classification of the virtues and of their actions must be the same. By this we do not mean that the classification of our

immanent potential virtuous dispositions and that of their actual exercises, is the same, though that is true ; we say that the classification of these dispositions, whether in potency or in act, must be the same as that of the duties or right actions which they have in view and desire to accomplish. We believe, too, that those who have generalized duty or treated of the moral law, have often found it convenient, perhaps necessary, to employ the names of virtues in lieu of describing the actions which are aimed at by them and proceed from them. This freedom of nomenclature, however, must be used with the caution that in all cases of duty we should distinguish between the right action aimed at, and the exercise of our disposition to perform it because right. So, also, we should ascertain carefully whether the term employed in speaking of a duty, belongs properly to the right action or to the virtuous disposition which aims at it. "Moral beneficence," and "the duty of doing good," will furnish a simple illustration of this remark. But our need of critical discernment in the use of language will especially appear in our study of the right exercises of our natural affections and dispositions. For in morals these exercises considered *per se* are called actions, because they are activities aimed at and governed by certain virtuous purposes or dispositions which also mingle with them ; and it is of importance to distinguish them from these regulative purposes.

But whatever may be our use of terms it will illumine our argument to remember that our present design is to analyze and generalize duty, or *right things*, so as to find their essence ; and not, directly, the consideration of virtuous dispositions.

PREPARATORY ANALYSIS.

We shall now, without any enumeration of virtues or right actions, which each one may make for himself, give that generalization which we first formed, and which, though imperfect and not far removed from that of ordinary thought, is perhaps somewhat more philosophical. All duties, we think, may be roughly classified into those of *Moral Goodness*, *Moral*

Esteem, Regulative Righteousness, and Causative Righteousness.

1. In the first class we place all those dutiful affections and efforts whose aim is sensibly and directly fixed on the good welfare or happiness of sentient beings. It includes all forms of dutiful beneficence and benevolence, and the general duty of love toward God and man. For if love be that affection by which we desire and rejoice in the good of beings, we must include love to God in this goodness, although, of course, that love can not be said so much to seek an increase of the ineffable Divine blessedness as to desire and rejoice in its greatness and permanency. We must also beg here for that further extension of the term goodness, by which it may include virtuous prudence or a becoming regard for one's own welfare. And if any object to this wide philosophical use of the expression Goodness, or Moral Goodness, we can only express regret that no other term is at hand sufficiently comprehensive to meet the difficulty.

2. In the virtue or duty of Moral Esteem we include all that special regard, whether practical or affectional, which we feel obligated to exercise towards beings, in view of their moral character. For example, we recognize it as right and dutiful to love and serve God, not only as a being capable of happiness, but also as an infinitely holy being, and we feel the propriety of the precept that we should do good to all men, but especially to those who are of the household of faith. Other things being equal, we ought to give the preference to a good man, and this, too, simply because of his goodness. This law of moral esteem may also call us, or at least permit us, to withdraw all regard from any who may be wholly and hopelessly set on evil. We certainly are under no obligation to love devils. If this be so, this law operates so as to limit, as well as to enlarge, the law of Moral Goodness.

3. The third division of duty, which we have styled Regulative Righteousness, consists in the observance of all the moral laws of life, as being in themselves right and obligatory. Of course where any law or mode of action is immediately recognized as promotive of good, and is followed on that account,

such conduct would come under the head of *Moral Goodness* rather than of *Regulative Righteousness*. But we apprehend that many practical rules of life and conduct are observed without any perception or sense of good immediately to result from them, and simply from the conviction that they are right and obligatory. Such laws are those which concern life, liberty, property, and the subordination and adjustment of interests ; and those of honesty, orderly conduct, chastity, veracity, submission to proper authority, obedience to parents, to rulers, and to God, and of the faithful discharge of all responsibilities.

We may also add to the above the comprehensive duty of cherishing and regulating various natural dispositions whose tendencies fall in with the aims of moral goodness and righteousness, and whose general workings, therefore, are agreeable with, and, as it were, akin to, duty. This might be called affectional *Regulative Righteousness*.

4. The concluding division of virtue we have named *Causative Righteousness*, meaning thereby that form of virtue which aims at the causing or promoting of virtue either in ourselves or in others. All virtue, it is true, aims at causation ; that is, at the bringing about certain results ; but this alone aims at the causation of virtue, and so, in the absence of a better name, we employ this one. Whatever any one may do with the intention of stimulating and strengthening his own virtue, whether it be simple consideration of what is right, or whether it be more methodical self-cultivation ; and whatever he may do by word or deed, by the use of means, by personal efforts, or by the employment of agencies, to maintain and advance righteousness and goodness among men, may be included under causative duty.

5. The animus or disposition of *Causative Virtue* assumes two forms, namely, the hatred of sin, and the love of righteousness (or of holiness) ; and the most remarkable development of *Causative Virtue* is that duty in which we seek to repress sin and promote virtue by means of rewards and punishments. This may be styled *Rectoral Righteousness* or duty ; not indeed that this is the only virtue proper for a ruler, or

that it is exclusively exercised by men in official stations; but because its more striking exemplifications are to be found in formal governments. It is to be distinguished from the virtue of Moral Esteem, the essential aim of which is, not the maintenance of the law and the promotion of virtue by means of rewards and punishments, but only a certain regulation of our regards and conduct toward others. It is also widely separated from all other kinds of Causative Righteousness by the peculiar circumstances of its operation, the peculiar means which it employs, and the peculiar feelings with which it is accompanied.

Such is a brief sketch of our first generalization of duty, omitting some difficulties and objections through which we came to it. Having tested it in various ways, and among the rest by comparison with those of others: e. g., of Cicero among the ancients, and of Whewell among the moderns, we found it differently constructed from theirs, as was to be expected, yet sufficiently comprehensive to include every presentable case. All duty seemed to belong either to some one of the foregoing classes, or to a combination of more than one. We felt satisfied with the comprehensiveness of our transcript of Nature's workings, and with the correctness of it, so far as it went.

ADDITIONAL METHOD.

The object, however, of the foregoing classification was simply to bring the whole subject of duty succinctly before the mind, in a way that might facilitate further analysis and generalization. We felt that the ultimate was yet distant. The question arose, "In what way shall we proceed further?" In answer we could think only of that rule which belongs to philosophy no less than to rhetoric, viz.: that we should consider first that part of any subject the knowledge of which does not involve the knowledge of the other parts. Now, of the four divisions of duty, Moral Goodness, Moral Esteem, Regulative Righteousness, and Causative Righteousness, including in this last as its most distinguished element Rectoral Righteousness, it is evident that the second and fourth involve a consideration of the other two. The study of them

therefore should be deferred. Of the other two, Moral Goodness seems to claim first attention on account of the apparent oneness of its aim. This suggests that, if either be more ultimate than the other, it can not be Regulative Righteousness. Neither of these forms of virtue, however, has the activities or exercises of the other for the objects of its own activity ; and hence, if they are related, as they must be, if the matter of the Moral Law has some supreme unity, one would suppose them probably to be coördinate developments from the same root, or that the one is in some way a development of the other. In any case their analysis may be expected mutually to assist one another. Such in fact was our experience. An analysis of Moral Goodness into beneficence as a duty and benevolence as a duty, the former of these being not at all a mere expression or manifestation of the latter, was suggested by an analysis and generalization of the various rules of Regulative Righteousness. However, for simplicity, we shall proceed as if the analysis of Moral Goodness had been an independent operation.

MORAL GOODNESS.

The distinction now made, into beneficence as a duty, and benevolence as a duty, is one perhaps seldom noticed, yet it is given even by the Practical Reason. In common language we speak both of *the duty of doing good* and of *the duty of loving*. We ought to do good to others, and we ought to love them : and these things are distinct in their nature. In other words, Moral Goodness as a virtue has two forms : one part of it consists in an inward moral respect for the welfare and happiness of beings, resulting in practical consideration and effort for them ; and another part consists in determinately cherishing love, or affection properly so called, for beings. The objective laws which we obey in these exercises of duty are, (a) that we ought to do good to beings simply because this doing is right, and (b) that we ought to love beings—to cherish toward them that natural affection which seeks their good and rejoices in it—simply because it is right in us to cherish this affection.

2. This distinction is so natural to the Practical Reason, that we might conceive of a being capable of the one kind of duty and incapable of the other. We might imagine an intellectual being devoid of all passions and affections whatever, save the one sense of right and of moral obligation. Whether or not, owing to the nature of a rational spirit or some other cause, such a being is an impossibility, yet we may imagine him, that is, we may think of him as having only the practical development of our moral nature; just as we might think of one whose only moving principle would be a sense of self-interest. Such a one, if placed in the midst of ordinary rational beings, could not cherish any virtuous affections, or discharge duty so far as it lies in love, pity, and the cognate tendencies; but he could and would desire to perform every practical duty, and he would have satisfaction and enjoyment in the performance of it. His life would be beneficent and useful to all, especially to the good. He would be loyal, truthful, honest and upright in all things, and he would have satisfaction in the feeling that he had done and was doing what is right. He would also seek to have others discharge their duty, and he would rejoice in their righteousness, and be indignant at their neglect or transgression of the moral law.

Now let us suppose that the Creator gave to this singularly constituted being various desires and appetites, such as the love of knowledge, of possessions, of physical enjoyments, and so forth, having in them no necessary moral quality. After this addition to his nature, our imaginary ethical being would employ his powers, so far as was consistent with duty, in gratifying these propensities; and so, also, he would have a source of satisfaction distinct from and additional to the performance of what is right. He would also, of course, regulate and moderate these propensities, so as to keep them subordinate to the principle of duty. Let us further suppose that the Creator added yet other natural affections, whose general tendency should be a striving for the same ends for which this being, from a simple sense of right and duty, is already striving for. The question now arises, whether this person, having the power of cherishing and guiding his affections, and

finding a general correspondence of aim and operation, either possible or actual, between his perception and sense of duty and these peculiar affections, would not of necessity feel it his duty to cherish and exercise them in a manner consentaneous with the tendencies and aims of practive goodness, that is, of the virtuous disposition which aims at doing good to beings simply because this doing is right? We think that he would, and that he would feel bound to do so, not merely with reference to what practical assistance his affections might give him in his endeavors to do good, but quite as much for other reasons, also, which we shall specify hereafter. And his benevolence, thus promoted and exercised, would no longer be simply a natural but also a virtuous affection.

PRACTICE MORAL GOODNESS.

The foregoing analysis of Moral Goodness, though not emphasized in common discourse, forces itself upon us if we would distinguish things which, though so intimately related and so practically united as to form a complex whole, are yet essentially different. For that virtuous disposition which we have called Moral Goodness is plainly double; and it separately aims at and manifests itself in two different classes of actions, the practical and the affectional. The query now arises, "How shall we express this distinction in unequivocal language?" Perhaps for this purpose we might say *Moral Beneficence* and *Moral Benevolence*, provided we should eliminate the idea of affection, properly so called, from beneficence, and should think of it only as a strong controlling sense of the rightness and duty of doing good. But this would modify the ordinary idea of the word. Or we might say *Rational Moral Goodness*, and *Affectional Moral Goodness*. Here, however, we would need to emphasize the adjective *Rational*, for every moral act is rational; and rational moral goodness would be distinguished in this respect from the affectional only as having its motive power or tendency purely and exclusively from the Moral Reason. It is simply a sense of right; and on this account also it seems to be of a calmer and more steady nature than even dutiful affection. Possibly the terms Prac-

tive Moral Goodness, and Commotive Moral Goodness, would more exactly express our meaning than those now mentioned, the former being that which seeks the right doing of good for its own sake; and the latter being that which consists in the determinate exercise of benevolence or love towards its proper objects. Each of these, considered purely as a virtue or active moral principle, mingles in life with the actions at which it aims, the one with the practical actions of doing good, the other with the affectional actions of benevolence. But it is to be noticed that our common thought and language do not distinguish from one another the virtue and the duty of affectional goodness so clearly as they do those of practical goodness. They rather regard both as constituting one complex exercise of mind which may be regarded in one light as being virtuous and in another as right and dutiful. The reason of this mode of thought, which is applied not only to benevolence but also to all the virtues and duties of natural disposition, is, that the purely ethic aim and the natural feeling which it regulates mingle together as motive tendencies and form a unity, whereas in Practive Goodness there is only one motive tendency, that is, the purely ethic; and this is contrasted easily with the practical action at which it aims. Not only so, but it is also more important in daily morals to express the distinction between the practical action and the motive proper to it, than to express that between two motive tendencies, the moral and the natural, necessarily connected and blended in a virtuous life. In the present case, however, we might speak of Practive Moral Goodness and of Commotive Moral Goodness as the two forms of the virtue of Goodness, and of Practical and Affectional Moral Goodness as the two forms of its right actions or duties. But this does not seem necessary.

COMMOTIVE MORAL GOODNESS.

We remark again regarding these two kinds of Goodness, that the Commotive or Affectional seems subordinate to the Practive, metaphysically; or, speaking with more particularity, as to the mode of its development. This may be shown

as follows: The affection of love or benevolence seeks the good or happiness of this or that being or set of beings without any regard to rightness or wrongness; but Practive Moral Goodness seeks that happiness according to the law of rightness, the perception sense and observance of which law are its very essence. And, as a secondary application of this law to natural Benevolence makes it the virtue of moral Love, we argue the dependence of affectional on rational or practive goodness. For to love aright is to exercise our affections in proper degree and toward proper objects. If any should object here that this places the virtuousness of loving not immediately in love, but in the cherishing and exercising of love out of and according to a sense of its rightness, (when it may be right) we reply that such is certainly the case. There is no virtue in any natural affection or desire *per se*; it becomes virtuous only when determinately exercised, and its virtuousness depends on its determinateness. This indeed suggested the term Commotive for Affectional Virtue, because it is essentially a determinate moving of ourselves, as having the powers of natural affection, in a manner consensaneous with the aims and dispositions of Practive Virtue. Nor do we think it can be denied that man has thus a faculty of determining the direction and degree of his affections within the range of duty. We do not say that he has power to originate within himself primary virtue or practive moral goodness, but granting the existence and the supremacy of this virtue in his spiritual life, we believe that he has the power to control his affections so as to harmonize them in their workings with the aims of that practive goodness. There seems, therefore, a consistent sense in which man can love God if he will; in other words, if he be fully established in the primary mind of duty toward his Maker.

THE LAW OF MORAL GOODNESS.

1. If, now, Practive Moral Goodness consists in the *ex animo* observance of the law of doing good to beings, and if Commotive Moral Goodness seems partially explainable as observing this law in a way of its own, that is, as cherishing affec-

tion consentaneously with it, we may reasonably suppose that a full understanding of the law of Practive Goodness will throw light on both these forms of virtue. This law has already been giving as follows, "We ought to do good to beings." The same idea is expressed more fully in saying, "It is right for us, and obligatory upon us, to labor for the good of beings." Now plainly the emphatic word here is *good*. The labor, or the doing, (which is simply labor employed so as to effect its end) would be something indifferent, were it not a laboring for, or a doing of, good. Clearly the whole moral force of the law lies in the end which it sets before us, and which it calls us to pursue as being right. Therefore to understand the law of practive goodness it is needful to understand the nature of that good, which, as a right end, it calls upon us to pursue. For it is noticeable that men speak of right ends, no less than of right actions.

2. Now, it is evident that Practive Goodness does not lead us to seek any private, or personal, or particular good or interest, as such; for if, in any case, we should aim at private good, or some single interest, to the neglect of good or interests in general, we might find ourselves doing more harm than good; or at least we might be guilty of leaving good undone. Either of these results would be contrary to the aims of Virtue. Practive Moral Goodness seeks that good which, all things being considered, will be, not merely a good, but also all the good of which the case admits; which good can be viewed either as a whole, or in its parts as related to the whole. To express this, the generic aim of moral goodness, we can think of nothing better than the phrase "*absolute good*," or "*the absolutely good*," using these words as nearly as possible in their common signification. By "*a good*," as men use the term, we understand anything which invariably or essentially is productive of happiness, and so may be said causally or conditionally to contain it; by "*good*" the same idea in the form of a general notion: and by "*absolute good*," or "*the absolutely good*," we would mean the total of good possible to be realized in any case—that is, in any conjunction or correlation of agencies and circumstances involv-

ing and affecting interests—or any element of that total considered as a part of it. This latter, perhaps, is that form of the notion in which it presents itself most frequently to us. We think of the prosecution of some interest, of the attainment of some particular good, involved in a case, both as good and as falling in with the total of good possible in the case, and so as being in itself unexceptionably and absolutely good. And we need scarcely add that we do this, not with any mathematical exactness of thought, which indeed does not belong to the sphere of moral life, but with a probable and practical judgment.

3. Absolute good is such not because without conditions or limitations, for all good of which we can have any experience is conditioned and limited, but because it is without any save necessary limitations. It has no limitations as to the number of its sources or its own specific forms, or as to its time, degree, or duration, or as to its distribution among beings, save those which are imposed either by the nature of the case, or by the law of its own fullness and completeness. In short, it is as absolute as good can be.

In dutiful goodness we do not seek the good of the body, neglecting that of the soul, nor the good of ourselves, ignoring that of others, nor the good of any one class or community to the exclusion of the rest of mankind; nor the converse of these things. Every interest of every kind is weighed and allowed for. Moral Goodness follows the impartial, and, as it were, impersonal dictates of Reason as to what is truly good; and in doing so it labors for (and attains) the absolutely good, that good which is or makes up the total of good possible in any case, every interest involved having received its proper consideration. Moreover, in any case where the best possible result may have been already attained, either wholly or in part, Moral Goodness so far forth rejoices in what has been attained, and desires its continuance.

4. If any one here should object that many cases would present practical difficulties when we should come to determine in them the absolutely good, including, of course, the best re-

sult and the best means, we would reply that our present effort is simply to show that a considerable part of virtue is what we have explained Moral Goodness to be; that indeed, it seems a moral axiom that, in every case, we should seek all the good of which the totality of the case admits; and that, if this be so, any difficulty in the practical application of the principle should not be held to invalidate the principle itself. But as a matter of fact, we believe the Practical Reason generally finds itself adequate to the solution of cases of personal duty; and we think, also, that the Speculative Reason, following some proper method, can reach a satisfactory understanding of difficult cases.

5. The explanation now given of the aim of practive moral goodness suggests an explanation of that difference which men naturally recognize as existing between this virtue and every form of benevolence or love. For if, as is plain, both these dispositions aim at good, the one at absolute, the other at the good of this or that being or set of beings, one might expect them to be very similar as modes of spiritual motivity. But, on the contrary, we make marked discrimination between our disposition to do good simply because that is right and dutiful, and our love for one or more beings. It may be said that, in the first case, we aim only at what is right as such, and not at good. This, however, is not the case. As a matter of fact, in Practive Goodness, we always aim at good as being good and as being right; and hence, while one might object to the expression that we aim at good for its own sake, yet we do aim at it as such; and the wonder is that, aiming at it as such, we do not also invariably desire it for its own sake *with a feeling akin to benevolence*. The wonder is that Love or Benevolence (which is confessedly the immediate object of the aim of Commotive Goodness), does not become an invariable and necessary part of our experience in Practive Goodness. For it seems clear that Practive Goodness, or virtuous Benevolence, especially if it be practised on some very grand scale, and with only distant results in view—as in the case of the late lamented Peabody—does not necessarily include love or affection, properly so called, within its experience.

This possible separation of love from that principled virtue which seeks the good of beings, may possibly be accounted for by distinguishing between those motivities of our nature whose origin is from the exercise of Reason, and those whose origin is from our more immediate and direct cognitions. The former, though spiritual tendencies as truly as the latter, are yet not commonly spoken of as such, but as active "principles" of conduct ; for example, we speak of the principle of self-interest: while the latter, even though accompanied, guided and regulated by exercises of the Reason, retain their original character as affections, inclinations, sympathies, and so forth; and they are more emotional and impulsive than the former.

Now it is clear that the perception of absolute good is an exercise of that comparing and judging faculty by which man is distinguished above the beasts. The simple notion of good is a product of the Reason in analyzing and generalizing the essential and invariable causes and means of happiness ; and the knowledge of absolute good is as yet further conditioned on a consideration of the interests in any case, as involving different kinds and degrees of good, and of their proper treatment so as to reach the best total result. Hence, where a case might present any complication, it is clear that the result, mentally speaking, would be distant—it would be something abstract, as it were, and so, though earnestly desired by the Moral Reason, it would not excite the affections. For Benevolence, as to its first origin and essential nature, does not seem to be a rational tendency. Even brutes, which are without reason, and which seek happiness, not under the idea of good, but under various specific forms of gratification, have yet affection for their fellows, desiring them to participate in their particular comforts and pleasures. Kindness seems to be a sort of natural sympathy between sentient beings whenever they are able to have immediate knowledge of each other's experience and wants; and, though in man it may be more or less regulated by an admixture of Reason, and ought always to be so regulated, it is ever conditioned on an immediate perception of its object, or at least on a perception which, if

mediate, is yet full, direct, and distinct. Whether or not this interposed condition is to be considered an imperfection of our humanity, it seems to assert itself as a fact. We can not love through abstractions, even though they have existence, that is, even though they be existing things or qualities viewed abstractly. But good is an abstraction, in the contemplation of which our minds are often necessarily withdrawn from the contemplation of those living personalities in whom alone it can be realized, and who alone, as capable of receiving good, of enjoying happiness, are the proper objects of benevolence. Absolute good is an abstraction which tends even more than the foregoing to remove our minds from love. And yet further, Practive Goodness, if we may so speak, sometimes seems to aim neither at good, nor at absolute good, but at *absoluteness of good*. By this we mean that in some cases the generic character of the end as good, though an essential, is not the prominent element of our thought, our attention being chiefly occupied by the distinctive and differential character of the good as absolute. In such a case, especially, as this last affection seems impossible—for the mind has no life-like representative image before it of sentient beings as suffering or enjoying—it has only the logical notion of good, and even that in an averted position. But the rational or practive tendency still acts with freedom and energy.

Having now spoken of Practive Goodness, let us next consider Regulative Righteousness: for additional remarks concerning Commotive or Affectional Goodness may be advantageously deferred till we come to that Affectional Regulative Righteousness to which it seems intimately related.

REGULATIVE RIGHTEOUSNESS.

Regulative Righteousness is that general department of Virtue which aims at the observance of right rules for the sake of their rightness. Goodness guides life by giving us aims, and this Righteousness regulates life by giving us rules. But, as already said, these two may be expected in their analysis mutually to illustrate each other; and our first question is, "Do the aims of moral Goodness in any way assist us to

understand the rules of Regulative Righteousness?" Using this thought however only as suggestive, let us proceed independently of it.

1. And, first, we remark that although there is no exercise of love, or benevolence, or affection, properly so called, in the conscientious observance of these right rules, each of them seem to have within itself, as an essential element, some reference to *good*. They concern either our property, or our security, or peace, or our freedom, or our contracts, or our families and homes, or our knowledge of fact and truth, or our relations of mutual understanding and reliance; and in short every public and private interest. The only law which at first examination has any appearance of having an existence independent of its relations to good, is that of veracity. Further reflection, however, shows that knowledge and truth constitute one of the most fundamental and invariable interests of men. But it must be allowed that our interest in the maintenance of truth is not always so apparent and obtrusive as some other interests—those, for example, in our property, our labor, or our freedom—and may therefore be more readily lost sight of.

2. This leads to a second remark. Every law of righteousness not only relates to good, but seems also to have for its end to defend or maintain absolute good. It arises from the fact that there are certain constantly recurring or general cases in life, in which the experience and Practical Reason of men approve of a certain course of conduct as, absolutely speaking, the best. Hence the absurdity, "Shall we do evil that good may come?" which might be rendered, "Shall we violate some good, approved as absolute by our Moral Reason, and therefore a right end and obligatory on our observance, that we may advance some private or particular interest?" In short, Regulative Righteousness may be said to be founded on a peculiar application of that law of practive Moral Goodness, which we have already expounded.

JUSTICE.

This Regulative Righteousness is what men generally have in mind when they speak of justice or of righteousness, with-

out any qualifying adjective ; and it is a limited development of the law of Practive Goodness.

1. There is indeed a general Righteousness—a "*justitia tota*"—which may be considered to include every form of practive virtue or duty, not only the more protective and conservative but also the more positive and progressive. The requirements and regulations of this righteousness are the applications of the primary law of moral goodness, the law of absoluteness of good ; and they are suggested to reason on a survey more or less extended of the constitution and condition of the natural and of the spiritual universe. They limit each other according to their importance, and are all subordinate to the primal law. For mankind, from their knowledge of things, recognize more or less correctly the requirements of absoluteness of good, which power of recognition, within an accustomed sphere of life, becomes an intuitional habit of Reason, and is sometimes called the Moral Sense. The generalization of these requirements results in the laws of Righteousness.

2. The present nature of man, however, and the uses of earthly life, necessitate a great distinction between those duties, on the one hand, which immediately and constantly press upon the experience and the conscience, because evil or loss would manifestly ensue from the neglect of them or from conduct contrary to them, and those duties, on the other hand, the observance of which leads directly to a clear increase of good or happiness. When Justice rises out of the former sphere of activity, it is not commonly called Justice but the virtue or duty of Beneficence. Ordinary Justice, essentially, is defensive and conservative Righteousness, and is chiefly the negative application of that law which requires us to seek absoluteness of good. For while the law says, positively, "*Have regard for interests absolutely considered ; do good and remove evil,*" it says also negatively, "*Do not cause or permit harm or loss to interests absolutely considered, by doing or by not doing ;*" and this ever is the main animus of Justice. Were we asked to define this justice in common language, we should say, "Justice is duty so far as duty con-

sists in the recognition, defense, and conservation of rightful interests, so far as they may be dependent on our power ; and it includes also the promotion and recuperation of rightful interests so far as this is necessarily connected with the foregoing." By rightful interests we mean those which consist with good viewed absolutely, and which therefore are comprehended in it. These interests, *so far as they may be regarded by justice*, together with whatever may be necessary to their enjoyment, are commonly called one's "rights," or one's "true rights." Such are life, liberty, wages, stipulated services, the possession of property, and so forth, with regard to those to whom these things rightfully or justly belong.

3. Justice, in the broad sense now given (for the word sometimes may have other shades of meaning), has ever been recognized among men as an important phase of moral life, and has also been distinguished from the virtues of Beneficence and Benevolence. The ancients, indeed, not only made this distinction, but gave Justice the place of honor over all other virtues. We have already explained the difference between Justice or Righteousness and Practive Goodness or Beneficence ; it remains that we should account for the fact that, while Justice aims at good, Benevolence is yet no necessary part of its experience. Beyond question such is the case. Even the best of men do not exercise benevolence in telling the truth on the witness stand, or in paying taxes to the civil government ; nor indeed generally in telling truth or paying debts. Nor is there any love in the virtues of chastity, submission to proper authority, and orderly conduct ; all of which are important forms of righteousness. We account for this separation of Justice and Benevolence in two ways. First : we have already seen that Practive Goodness appears not to be accompanied with love in those instances in which its end is discerned only through complicated and abstract thinking. This perception, either from habit or from natural penetration, may be easy for the Practical Reason ; nevertheless it has not the power to excite affection. The same remark will hold more emphatically of Justice. What is occasional with Practive Goodness seems general with

Regulative Righteousness. The formation of the various rules of righteousness, each of which is a conservator of many and sometimes of diverse interests, is an exhibition of great wisdom ; but, on this very account, in using any one of them, we have only a general notion of its end as being good. Oftentimes, too, owing to the conflict of some particular interest with the requirements of absolute good, our minds are more occupied with the absoluteness of the good than with the good which the rule has in view. All this seems to prevent us from the contemplation and the love of those living personalities whom our action may ultimately effect.

The foregoing appears to be one cause by reason of which Righteousness is not usually—as is, and ought to be, the case with Moral Beneficence—sensibly accompanied with benevolent affection. But we remark, further, that a natural affection or inclination seems to need a *positive aim in order to its development*. This is afforded in the case of Practive Goodness ; but the idea of defending and conserving interests, which is the positive side of Justice, and that of refraining from the injury of interests, which is its negative side, are both, and especially the latter, very negative ideas. They are completely negative in the sense of being non-progressive. At the same time we may hold that the idea of guarding one's self and others against unlawful harm or loss, and even that of refraining from causing such harm or loss, are more positive ideas than that of doing nothing at all in the premises ; and that Justice (so long as necessary perplexity, anxiety, and effort regarding the right, do not occupy the mind to the exclusion of other feelings) may and should be accompanied with the exercise of rational good-will.

4. Possibly the term Justice, though often used, as now, for the notion of ordinary Righteousness, expresses more frequently in men's daily language a somewhat narrower conception. To give this we might say that Justice, in the strict sense, is Righteousness (as we have defined it) considered as dealing with *personalized* interests. For interests are viewed in two ways ; and some interests may be viewed in either of

these ways. They may be regarded as belonging to some definitely known or conceived person or class of persons (most interests perhaps are always so regarded); or they may be thought of simply as being interests, that is, without any such definite reference. Justice appears to deal with interests under the former conception, while Righteousness regards them without using it. A "*jus*," in the strict sense, seems to be the rightful interest of one or more definitely conceived of persons; an "*injuria*" is a doing, or a not-doing, inconsistent with or destructive of such an interest. Possibly the aims of Righteousness can all be conceived of under the terms of this defined Justice—that is, as the "rights" and "wrongs" of individuals and of societies. But we seem able to think of *what is right* and of *what is wrong*, that is, of the aims and aversions of Righteousness, without thinking of them as *jus* and *injuria*; which indicates that Righteousness is the more generalized conception.

5. We have now analysed the virtues of Practive Goodness and Regulative Righteousness, and found them essentially similar. Both of them essentially are a regard for what is absolutely good as being morally right and obligatory; but they are different developments of this regard, the one positive, the other negative. Hereafter, when we may have occasion to speak of both these forms of virtue as forming one class, we shall call them, in relation to their manifestations, *practive virtue*, inasmuch as they aim at practical or executive actions; and, in their relation to other forms of moral excellence, we shall call them *primary virtue*, as they seem the simplest and most original developments of that excellence.

There is, indeed, a yet more primary form of virtue, which, as we have seen, is simply a desire for the absolutely good as being something right to desire, that is, as being a right end, even when we can do nothing towards it; and this we might call primal or essential virtue; but it will suffice for our present purposes to speak of practive virtue as primary.

These remarks bring us to the further consideration of that form of virtue which may be considered secondary, namely, the Commotive or Affectional.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

ART. IX.—RECENT GERMAN WORKS.

The Unity of the Religions in Connection with the Migrations of Antiquity and the Mysteries. (Die Einheit der Religionen in zusammenhange mit den Völkerwanderungen der Urzeit und der Geheimlehre) von EAKST VON BUNSEN. I Band. The purpose of our author is to compare the religions of the nations, and in the variety seek the unity. This is done by a careful examination of the traditional migrations of the nations, and the mysteries of the religions. The present volume treats of the historical religions before Christ; the second volume, soon to follow, will treat of the Christian and Mohammedan religions. "At the beginning of history the region of the Oxus was inhabited by two races of men; the white Arians and the dark Turanians. The Adamites, or red brown race, arose in course of time by a mixture of the other two. Thus the origin of man and religion was dual, and this dualism runs through the history in distinct castes or classes of men. In early times two streams of people flowed from the Himalaja—the Iranians and the Indians; these in Mesopotamia were distinguished as Assyrians and Babylonians. Abraham was of a mixed race, combining the two elements. The pure Iranian tradition of Monotheism was represented by Melchisedek, rather than Abraham. This dualism continued throughout the history of Israel. The Kenites or Rechabites on the one side, the Hebrews on the other. Under David the Iranians or Rechabites gained the supremacy. The two lines of priests represent the two parties, the one inclined to Babylon, the other to Egypt. The *Jehovist* was Iranian, the *Elohist* Indian or Hebrew. This dualism continued in the Samaritans and Jews, and again in the Pharisees and Sadducees."

The mission of Israel was to declare the Unity of religions. This unity consists in the spirituality of God, and the religion of the conscience as the spirit of God in the heart.

This principle of Catholicity never prevailed under the Jewish system, but was reserved for Christianity. The author ignores the supernatural entirely in his discussions.

His scheme is: 1. Eden. 2. From Eden to Shinar. 3. From Shinar to Canaan. 4. History of the People of Canaan. 5. The Kenites or Rechabites. 6. The Elohist and Jehovist. 7. Job and Melchisedek. 8. The Castes in Israel. 9. Aaronites. 10. Parties in Israel. 11. Psalms of the Kenites. 12. Sacrifices. 13. Prophecy. 14. The Mysteries. 15. Apocrypha before the Exile. 16. Historical Review. 17. Captivity of 70 years. 18. Origin of the Purim Feast. 19. Samaritans and Jews. 20. Position of Parties. 21. Messianic Hopes. 22. Heathenism and Judaism. It is an instructive book, full of strange theories, and without sufficient reverence for the Word of God.

Rothe's Dogmatics. Edited by DAN. SCHENKEL. Rothe is universally recognized as one of the master minds of the present century. This posthumous work will be welcomed by his many admirers. Schenkel found the MS. in complete order, and has no doubt given it faithfully to the public. Rothe having already published his prolegomena in the well-known "Zur Dogmatik," Schenkel gives us the system alone. Rothe derives Dogmatics

from the consciousness, which therefore divides itself into two parts: I. The Consciousness of Sin. II. The Consciousness of Grace. The present volume gives Part I. The remainder is to appear in the course of the year.

The contents of the present volume: I. Theology. 1. The Existence of God. 2. The Being of God, or the Trinity. 3. Attributes of God. 4. Works of God—Creation, Providence, and Angels. II. Anthropology. III. Hamatology (Doctrine of Sin).

Rothe's system is a speculative one, and not by any means scriptural. He denies that the Scriptures teach the church doctrine of the Trinity, which is irreconcilable with the Unity of God, and in conflict with his Attributes. He admits a trinity of modality thus: 1. The Divine Being. 2. The Divine Ego or Personality. 3. The Divine Nature; but denies that there is a Trinity of Persons. He denies also the original perfection of humanity; and, while he admits the hereditary nature of sin, he denies that it is in consequence of the fall of one man from a state in which he had no disposition to evil.

Biblical Eschatology. By ALBERT KAHLE. 1st Division: Eschatology of the Old Testament. The author, in this work, takes up in detail each passage of the Old Testament Scripture, and the Apocryphal books, that give any indication of views respecting a future state. He has no organic system of treating the subject, which is a great defect in the work; yet taking up each book and passage in detail, he gives us an exhaustive treatise which is really valuable.

The author agrees with Saalschutz in his results, that the belief in an eternal life existed among the Jews from the earliest time, yet not in a constant, advancing development of the original germinal ideas; but the belief was originally held in childish simplicity without reflection, then under the influence of the law was pressed into the background, as was the doctrine of justification by faith, but that finally, under the conflicts in the experience of the prophets and psalmists, it emerged once more into greater clearness and certainty.

Das Prophetenthum des Alten Bundes. Von Dr. KIPER. A really valuable book is this, a welcome addition to the department of Old Testament Theology, written in an evangelical spirit, with an apt appreciation of the organic system of prophecy, which he traces from its earliest origin to its fulfilment in New Testament times. 1. Prophecy in general. 2. The Prophets of Ancient Times. 3. The Canonical Prophets before the Exile, with an appendix showing the authenticity of the 2nd part of Isaiah, in the use made of it by subsequent prophets, especially by Jeremiah. 4. The Canonical Prophets of the Exile. 5. The Canonical Prophets after the Exile. 6. The Fulfilment of the Prophetic Word, (a) the Historical Fulfilment, (b) the Evangelical Time of Salvation, (c) New Testament Eschatology.

The Naumburg Diet of Princes, 1541. (Der Naumburger Fürstentag. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Lutherthums und des Melanchthonsimus nach den Quellen des Königl. Hauptstaats archive zu Dresden.) We have here an important and interesting contribution to the history of the Reformation. German Protestantism has been one constant struggle between the Lutheran and Melancthonian elements, the one represented by the Augs-

burg Confession (invariata) in its original form, the other by the same Confession (variata) in its later modified form. This conflict still wages between the strict Lutherans and the Unionists. Our author contends that the Naumburg Diet did not decide the terms of subscription, leaving this matter to a subsequent council of theologians. However, the sentiment of the Diet was strongly Lutheran, even to the threatened exclusion of the Melancthonian Frederick of the Palatinate, but that they did not pronounce officially upon the matter. The Diet failed of its object of uniting the Protestants in one solid body, owing to the dissensions among the theologians, and the abrupt departure of the Duke of Saxony from the Diet.

History of the Realm of God under the Old Covenant. E. M. HENGSTENBERG. (Geschichte des Reiches Gottes unter dem Alten Bunde.) A posthumous work of the distinguished professor who died so recently in Berlin. His treatment of the subject is simple, popular, and biblical. He divides the history into two periods: (I) From Abraham to Moses. (II) From Moses to Christ. The present volume contains a short Introduction, and the First Period. He subdivides simply, (1) The Condition of the Human Race at the time of the calling of Abraham. (2) History of Abraham. (3) Isaac. (4) Jacob. (5) Joseph. (6) Remarks upon the Constitution, Customs and Culture of the Times. (7) The Religious Knowledge of the Patriarchs. (8) The External Worship of God among the Patriarchs.

Contributions to a Correct Estimation of the Gospels and Gospel History. (Beiträge zur richtigen Würdigung des Evangelien und des evangelischen Geschichte, von DR. KARL WIESELER.) A really valuable book—a necessary supplement to the author's main work, rendered necessary by the more recent literature, which the author examines, though generally reaching the results previously attained. As a kind of introduction he gives a literary criticism of the gospels and their contents. The Mark hypothesis, and then: I. The Necessity of an Investigation of the Life of Jesus and the Gospel History, as to Time and Place, some dates from the Life of the Baptist. II. The Census at the Time of the Birth of Jesus, in connection with Jewish History and the Roman Jewish System of Taxation. It is a great pity here that the author had not the work of Zumpt for consultation before publishing. He cites Prof. Curtius in Leipsic as assenting to his peculiar translation of Luke ii, 2. III. Jesus and the Tax-levy (Matt. xvii, 24). IV. The Journey of Jesus (Luke ix, 51, seq. and its parallel in the other Gospels). V. The Genealogical Tables of Jesus and the Gospel of Mark. VI. The Time of Jesus' Birth and the Visit of the Magi. VII. Chronological fundamental facts of the Life of Jesus according to the Four Gospels. VIII. The Chronological and Historical Facts that determine the Time of the public appearance of the Baptist (Luke iii). 1. The 15th year of Tiberias. 2. Lysanias Tetrach of Abilene. 3. Annas President of the great Sanhedrim. IX. The Day of Jesus' Death and its far-reaching importance with reference to a criticism of the Gospel. X. Agreement of Luke xxiv, 44 with Acts i, seq. XI. The Jewish Year at the Time of Jesus. XII. The Date of the entrance of Festus in his office.

Biblical Commentary upon the Book of Daniel. (Biblischer Commentar über das Alt. Test. von Keil and Delitzsch Der Prophet Daniel, von KEIL.) The Com-

mentaries on the Old Testament come forth rapidly from the pen of Keil, while Delitzsch seems to hang back. This is to be regretted, for those of Delitzsch are by far the most valuable part of the series. Of the eleven vols. already published Delitzsch has issued but three. However, Keil's Commentaries are not to be despised, for they are the fruit of great learning, and breathe a pure, evangelical spirit. He is firm on the traditional side in his interpretations, and this, his stand-point, must be estimated in the study of his works. He maintains the traditional views respecting the Book of Daniel; contends strongly for its authenticity—that it was written during the exile period, and that the four monarchies represent the Babylonian, Medo-Persian, Greek and Roman.

The Theology of the Old Testament. The Revealed Religion in its Stages of Development, before Christ. (*Alttestamentliche Theologie. Die Offenbarungs-religion auf ihrer vorchristlichen Entwickelungsstufe*, von HERMANN SHULTZ.) A long expected and welcome work, a complete system in 2 vols. of the theology of the Old Testament. The stand-point is a critical one, yet with an excellent religious spirit. The author devotes 85 pages to the Introduction, in which he states his principle. Biblical Theology includes religion and ethics, as well as dogmatics—it is a part of Historical Theology. His scheme is: I. The Mosaic Theology. II. The Prophetic Theology. III. The Levitical Period. The first period extends to the decline of the divided realms, c. 800 B. C.; including the time of David and Solomon. The second includes the exile and all the great prophets, except Daniel. The third from the return to Jerusalem until the close of the Canon. The Apocryphal books do not belong to the department—can only be used indirectly.

In each Period he treats, (A) of the Fundamental Religious Facts of this Period, the Development of the Religious History, the Religious Character, Forms, etc. (B) The Religious and Moral Views of this Period. (1) The Presupposition of Redemption, God and the World. Man and Sin. (2) Redemption as Present. (4) Redemption as Future.

It is seldom that a more interesting, instructive and useful book than this appears.

The Theology of Zinzendorf. Vol. I. His original Sound Doctrine, 1723-'42. (*Zinzendorf Theologie dargestellt*, von HERM. PLITT. I. Band. Die ursprüngliche gesunde Lehre Zinzendorfs, 1723-1742.) This is an important work—long promised—which we hope to see soon completed. Zinzendorf is an important historical character, not only in his relation to German theology as the father of the United Brethren but for his influence through them upon Schleiermacher, the father of modern German theology, and Wesley, the father of Methodism. Salvation through the blood of Jesus was the vital principle of his theology, and it is that of Methodism. It is an important addition to the department of symbolics, which greatly needs a development in our own country—namely, the presentation of the theology of certain confessions, or creeds, or of the fathers of individual churches. Our author treats of Zinzendorf's theology in periods. 1. His earlier writings, 1723-'27. 2. His Theology in its bloom, 1727-'42. 3. His Theology in its sound form. The author proposes in the next volume to present the unsound form of his later theology.

ART. X.—CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE.
CHURCH HISTORY AND THEOLOGY.

Documenta Mag. Johannis Hus Vitam, doctrinam, Causam in Constantiensi Concilio actam et Controversias de religione in Bohemia Annis 1403—1418 motas illustrantia quæ partim adhuc inedita partim mendose Vulgata, nunc ex ipsis fontibus hausta edidit FRANCISCUS PALACKY, Regni Bohemiæ Historiographus. Pragæ, 1869. Sumptibus Frederici Tempsky. 8vo, pp. 768. It is certainly a remarkable fact, both on literary and religious grounds, that the memory of the Bohemian reformer, John Huss, has, after nearly five centuries of misrepresentation or neglect, received a complete and triumphant vindication. It is scarcely less noteworthy, that the work of vindication has been performed almost contemporaneously, and without any previous mutual communication or conference, in two widely separated lands; in his native country by a Bohemian, and in this country by an American. Palacky's History of Bohemia, the latest volumes of which have but recently appeared, was scarcely known abroad, and indeed only the first portions had been issued, when the task of tracing the career of Huss was commenced by the American biographer, Dr. Gillett. Each pursued his own independent course of investigation, and yet while each has brought forward facts unknown to the other, the conclusions reached by both are substantially the same.

The Bohemian historian has devoted his life to a noble task, and his *Documenta Mag. Johannis Hus*, recently issued, is in some respects a most valuable supplement to his history of Bohemia. That history, doing for his own country what Bancroft has undertaken to do for ours, is a monument of patriotic devotion and of patient toil. With most pains-taking research, the author has explored every accessible source for materials to elucidate the times and subjects of which he writes. He has produced a work not only valuable to the native Bohemian, but throwing new light on the history of the German empire. That history, indeed, on some important points, needs to be rewritten to bring it into harmony with the statements and representations which Palacky rests upon incontrovertible evidence.

But in the preface to this new work—the *Documenta*—the historian opens his heart to us. He states frankly what he never dared to state, and scarcely to hint, before. He confesses that from his very childhood it had been his delight to investigate the great movement identified with the name of the reformer. Whatever related to Huss had for him a peculiar charm. But for a time the means of investigation were only to a limited extent within his reach. For two centuries efforts had been made designedly to destroy or pervert whatever historic or documentary testimony could throw light on the character and career of the reformer. But in 1823, Palacky took up his residence at Prague. He immediately devoted himself to his chosen task, searching out and copying such documents as he could discover in ancient archives or family records. Some memorable discoveries were made. No nook or corner of Bohemia, or even of Germany or Austria, which gave promise of rewarding his search, was left unexplored, and repeatedly his labors were crowned with satisfying success.

In 1820 he was appointed by the Bohemian assembly (conventus) historiographer of Bohemia. This appointment opened to him of course the national archives, and over mediæval documents as well as those of later centuries, he pored with the zeal of a historical student and the pride of a patriotic Bohemian. Volume after volume of his history was issued, and in 1851—the very year in which Gillett states in his “Life and Times of John Huss,” he commenced his task—Palacky began the preparation of his edition of Hussite memorials. His progress in this work was arrested by the fact that Constantius Höfler, professor at Prague, was known to be engaged in a similar project. This work, “Historians of the Hussite Movement in Bohemia,” appeared in 1856, but it did not meet the views or perhaps the anticipations of Palacky. He reviewed it in a volume published in 1868, exposing its faults and the strong prejudices under which Höfler labored. He charges him with a studied attempt to present Huss and Hussite affairs in an invidious light, distorting every thing which pertained to the reformer. He pronounces his work defective, as well as in some respects superfluous and impertinent, prepared with little order or system, and destitute of such annotations as an editor should have been careful to insert for purposes of elucidation. The present work is designed to accomplish what Höfler should have at least attempted, and it furnishes the evidence upon which a sound judgment of the spirit and career of Huss must be based.

In the four parts, into which the work is divided, the letters of Huss occupy of course, from their importance, the first place. The charges against him as well as his replies, compose the second part. The third is devoted to the narrative of Peter the notary, and the fourth embraces contemporary letters and records throwing light on the Hussite movement. Several letters of Huss, never published before, have been recovered by Palacky, and these, accompanied with a Latin translation, are given in the Bohemian language. Those which have been heretofore published, have been revised and corrected, the translation made more perfect, and missing sentences have been supplied.

To each letter or document a note is appended indicating the source whence it was derived. Much of the material Palacky has copied from original manuscripts, with his own hand, and he has been engaged more or less in this work for nearly half a century (1823–68).

Among other things which he has recovered is a Catechism which he ascribes to Huss. The evidence upon which he bases his conclusion appears to be ample. The doctrine, the language even in some instances, and the general scope, are all in accordance with kindred features of the undisputed writings of Huss. It must have been drawn up in the early part of the fifteenth century, and the fact that no reference is made to the *ultraque* controversy would indicate a date anterior to 1415.

It may be said, that so far as the Reformer is individually concerned, ample materials for his biography are to be found in this volume. Palacky has even gathered from the writings of Huss those passages in which he refers to himself personally, some of which are sufficiently striking, and in an auto-biographical form more than usually impressive. He speaks, for in-

stance, of his temptations, and his easily besetting sins, of the ludicrous traversities of sacred rites, peculiar to the age, which he had witnessed as a boy, of the fear to speak out the truth boldly, by which he had once been restrained, and of other incidents illustrative of the difficulties with which he had been forced to contend.

The materials contained in this volume of Documenta have been carefully compiled and edited, and their chronological arrangement gives to them additional value. This arrangement has been determined by the sagacity and discrimination of Palacky, and it may truly be said that no man living is better qualified for the task which he has here attempted and achieved. The annals of literature furnish scarcely a parallel to the enthusiasm with which for nearly fifty years he has devoted himself to a pursuit at once inspiring and self-rewarding, the effort to elucidate the career and vindicate the memory of one of the earliest and purest of our modern martyrs. While he was pursuing the study of his country's history, he was ever awake to the discovery of anything which might bring out the career of Huss into clearer light. Year after year has he patiently toiled to secure the amplest and most reliable documents, copying from old manuscripts and dusty parchments, for a long period, perhaps with little expectation that he would be allowed to publish them in the Bohemian capital and vindicate on his native soil the man whom Rome had braided as a heretic. But he has now attained his object, and five centuries, to a year, from the birth of the Bohemian reformer, the hand of a devoted and admiring countryman, the historian of Bohemia, the foremost of her native writers, chisels afresh the letters of his monument, and rubs off, with the moss of time, the aspersions which malice had affixed to his name.

The amount of matter absolutely new which is embodied in this volume is not large, and the most important points not already presented to American readers in "The Life and Times of John Huss," might easily be incorporated in that invaluable work, or embodied in an appendix. We trust that this will be done, so that in the next edition we may be able to reap the benefit of the labors of the noble Palacky. The five centuries nearly which have passed away since Huss entered upon his public career have not sufficed to obscure his fame, and there is a certain satisfaction—as in a just Providential retribution—that the man who was once pronounced infamous as a heretic is restored, after this long interval, to the stainless reputation to which he is so well entitled.

The Writings of Cyprian. Vol II. The Writings of Methodius, &c.

The thirteenth and fourteenth volumes of T. & T. Clark's Ante-Nicene Library have been issued in this country, by Messrs. Scribner, Welford & Co. The second volume of Cyprian's writings contains, beside treatises indisputably his, several which have been attributed to him, as well as the writings of Novatian, the Octavius of Minucius Felix, etc. The topics discussed are various—Exhortation to Martyrdom, Advantage of Patience, Testimonies against the Jews, Baptism of Heretics, Re-Baptism, Public Shows, Glory of Martyrdom, The Trinity, &c.

The volume containing the writings of Methodius, includes also those that remain of Alexander of Lycopolis, Peter of Alexandria, Alexander of

Alexandria, Clement of Rome, and fragments from other writers of the third century.

No general church history can present so clear and vivid a picture of the state of religious opinion in the early centuries, as may be derived from these volumes. The good and evil, the pure and corrupt or corrupting elements, are here seen fermenting together. The rebuke of "Public Shows" reveals the intensity of that abhorrence with which heathen rites were regarded, and its language of denunciation and rebuke is scathingly eloquent. We are brought face to face with the abominations of a Paganism shameless in its indulgencies, and desperate in its contempt of morals and religion. There are other treatises in which the sympathies of the Christian reader accompany the writer, and he feels how stern must have been the conflict which Christianity was compelled to wage against the abuses and crimes of the age, sheltered under the venerable usages of a decaying empire.

But strangely enough, and yet in consistency with the blended features of the Christianity of the early centuries, there are diverse elements which indicate that the leaven of corruption had begun to work. A writer like Isaac Taylor in his "Ancient Christianity," can easily gather up the evidences of a perverted taste and an encroaching superstition—enough to abate any excessive admiration of the early Christian fathers. The contrast which their writings present to those of the Apostolic age is sufficiently striking. We are reminded of Milton's graphic rather than elegant description of them as the miscellaneous collection gathered by "Old Father Time" with his "huge drag-net." A passionate zeal and admiration for martyrdom, an exaggerated estimate of asceticism forshadowing the doctrines of the Roman church concerning celibacy, illustrations sometimes bordering upon indecency, if not actually over-lapping it, as well as excessive regard for ritualistic observances, are to be met with, cropping out here and there, and indicating already the drift of the church toward the fate which awaited it.

The neat and attractive style in which all the volumes of this series are issued is worthy of commendation. To the student of Church History or the History of Doctrine, this Ante-Nicene Library will be invaluable.

The Pope and Council. By JANUS. London: Rivingtons. New York: Scribner, Welford & Co. 12mo. pp. 425. There is something almost sublime in the persevering audacity with which the theory of the Papal System has been pressed forward through successive centuries. Like some of the old cathedrals of Europe, built by the labor of successive generations and even left incomplete for centuries, this system has been constructed under the eye of such hierachical architects as Gregory VII., each successively contributing to its progress, until now all that is needed is to surmount the massive pile of canon law and hierachical order with the dogma of Papal infallibility.

The authors of "The Pope and the Council" enable us to discern the plan of the structure, as originally devised, and to see the logical and consistent realization of it in the characteristic institutions of the Papacy. The rude and troubled as well as barbarous period which followed the

overthrow of the Roman empire, was favorable to the ambition of the Popes. The necessity of a system of ecclesiastical law was felt in many quarters, and the task of compiling it from a great variety of sources naturally fell into the hands of those who were disposed to work in the interest of Rome. Fictions, scarce plausibly deceptive, could be made to pass as genuine documents, and what the interest of Rome demanded was not like to be wanting. Hence one forgery succeeded another, till whole strata of lies had become solidified, and formed the base on which the impious claims of the Papacy to universal, paramount, and supernatural authority reposed.

Thus the *Liber Pontificalis*, with its fables and fictions that outrage history, was composed, and Apostolic Succession was glorified. Then about the middle of the 8th century, the famous Donation of Constantine was concocted at Rome, and it passed current as the authentic title deed by which the Papacy laid claim to temporal power, although the forgery betrayed its Roman authorship in every line, and burst like a bubble when punctured by Laurentius Valla before the days of the Reformation. In the middle of the 9th century, the Pseudo-Isidorian forgery was palmed upon the world, and this was followed speedily by kindred forgeries tending in the same direction, until Gratian's *Decretum*, in the middle of the 12th century, gave systematic and permanent form to the various canons and decisions by which the Papal system was buttressed up and sustained. All that now remained to be done was to carry out the principles already laid down, to give them a dogmatic basis or a historical developement. To this work Aquinas and his successors contributed their logic, while behind all, the ambition of the Papal court, undying while generations perished around it, was pressing into full practical application the principles they had laid down or defended. "The whole decretal legislation, from 1159 to 1320, is built upon the foundation of Gratian." "The theologians borrowed theory texts and proofs alike from these compilations." "And about 1570 the Roman correctors of the *Decretum*, appointed by three popes, said the work was intrusted to them, that the authority of this most useful and weighty Codex might not be weakened. So high stood the character of this work, saturated through and through as it is with deceit and error and forgeries, which, like a great wedge driven into the fabric of the church, gradually loosened, disjointed and disintegrated the whole of its ancient order, not, indeed, without putting another, and, in its way, very strong constitution in its place."

We are thus enabled to see how appeals to Rome were fostered, and what means of gainful simony were placed at her command. Local church freedom was extinguished. Synods were of no account. All other authority was made to give way before the Papal decrees. When these could be purchased by the richest aspirant, scarce a semblance of ecclesiastical justice or order remained. Some of the most noted leaders of the church—canonized at a later period—have vied with one another in terms of reprobation applied to the court of Rome. Excommunication and interdict, interpreted in the light of Canon law, and assuming to themselves supernatural terrors,

were wielded as political engines, or prostituted to the service of Papal greed. Whole families, cities and states were outlawed; the inquisition was devised, and it entered upon a work of cruelty so savage that humanity shudders at its recital; mendicant monks, the Papal militia, swarmed over Europe, intruding into every sphere, usurping the rights of the local clergy and kindling the flames of bigotry. Crusading zeal was enlisted under the Papal banner and fought its battles, until the consummate and unblushing corruption of the Roman Court provoked that reaction which found expression in the general councils of the first half of the fifteenth century. These councils denied expressly the dogma of Papal infallibility, assuming it to themselves as representatives of the universal (Catholic) church.

But aware of the danger threatened by the decisions of such councils, the succeeding Popes took good care not to convoke them too often, but to keep the eyes of the world directed to themselves as the central authority. The question—the *noli me tangere*, as it has been called, of the Popes—has however resolutely persisted in thrusting itself upon the attention of all the Canonists of the Roman church. There can be no peaceful conclusion till it is once and forever settled—and, in the view of many devoted heart and soul to the papacy, it never can be settled—till the dogma of Papal infallibility is located in the place prepared for it by more than ten generations of Popes, working in accordance with the genius of the system, of which they are rather the exponents than the incarnation.

It may seem a vain protest to offer, now that the last stone of the fabric is ready to be put in position, and the steady progress that has been going forward for a thousand years must needs be arrested, that the voice of reason and Scripture, so long disdained, may be heard. But if vain, so far as the proceedings of the Council are concerned, it can not be altogether vain in holding up to view the long line of antecedent decisions and measures by which fitting precedents for the introduction of the new dogma are furnished. Rarely, if ever before, has such a chapter of church history been written, so comprehensive, so searching, so rich in expositions of infamy, fraud, and every evil work, and if the Council at Rome should build itself no monument by its decisions, it will be welcome to such service as this memorable record of iniquity may afford.

The Presbyterian Historical Almanac, for 1868. By JOSEPH M. WILSON. Vol. X. This work is so well known to our readers, and we trust so well appreciated by them, that commendation were superfluous. It has become indispensable to all who would keep themselves thoroughly informed in regard to the condition and progress of the great Presbyterian Family. Here we have a compendium of the proceedings and statistics of twenty-one branches of it in the United States, Canada, Great Britain and Australia; numerous biographical sketches, among them Dr. Krebs and Dr. Little, so highly esteemed; and a powerful plea in favor of *mansees* by the editor. Mr. Wilson deserves not only thanks but practical encouragement, for there is not such another ecclesiastical almanac in the world.

Pater Mundi; or Modern Science testifying to the Heavenly Father. By Rev. E. F. BURR, D. D. Boston: Nichols & Noyes. 12mo. pp. 294. A new work by the author of *Eccæ Cælum* is sure to attract more than usual atten-

tion, nor will expectation be disappointed. Dr. Burr is an original and independent thinker, and he writes in a style of singular freshness and rhetorical beauty. The present volume consists of a series of lectures delivered to the senior classes of Amherst College, and repeated before the scientific department of Yale. Another volume is to follow.

The book is a timely one. Though addressed to a popular audience, it sacrifices nothing to effect, and is wholly free from the superficiality which is usually found in the attempts to reduce the conclusions of science to the level of a popular audience. It discusses with masterly ability the testimonies of modern science to the wisdom and goodness of God, and defends Theism and Christianity from the attacks of infidel science in a bold and critical spirit worthy of all praise. It is as profoundly religious as it is thoroughly scientific; while it cheerfully accepts the results of the freest investigations, it ably argues that there is nothing in one of them to shake the Christian's faith, but much to confirm it. The work can not fail to have an important influence on Natural Theology, bringing it into harmony with the progress of science and speculative philosophy, and arming it with a new power of demonstration.

The Metaphysics of Ethics. By IMMANUEL KANT. Translated by J. W. SEMPLE. New edition, with an Introduction by Rev. HENRY CALDERWOOD, LL. D., Prof. of Moral Philosophy, University of Edinburgh. Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark. New York, Scribner, Welford & Co. 12mo. pp. 307. This work was not published by Kant in the form in which the translator presents it to English readers. The first part, *Ground-work of the Metaphysics of Ethics*, was published in 1785. The second part, on the *Will*, is a part of the *Critique of Practical Reason* published in 1788. The last part, the *Metaphysical Elements of the Doctrine of Virtue*, was published in 1797. As a consequence there is some repetition of arguments, and a lack of unity.

The tone of Kant's ethical writings is of the loftiest kind. One may consistently accept in large measure his ethical system, and at the same time reject his speculative philosophy. The general character of his Moral Philosophy may be inferred from such statements as these: "A good will is the only thing which is absolutely and altogether good. Nothing is dutifully done which is not done under a regard to duty. The moral law is a categorical imperative, leaving no option to the will. The moral law has no exceptions. The moral law makes self-esteem dependent on morality; it elevates our worth as intelligences, and yet derogates infinitely from self-conceit, inevitably humbling every man." The fundamental positions of his Moral Philosophy may be stated in these three propositions: 1. Goodness of Will is the only absolute good on earth. 2. Practical Reason, as the revealer of moral law, is the governor of will to constitute it good. 3. Will is eminently free in order to goodness. From these positions it will be seen that, with Kant, freedom of will is the grand essential for morality. High value belongs to a treatise which so rigidly maintains the impossibility of a science of morals on a Utilitarian basis.

BIBLICAL LITERATURE.

Professor Hitchcock's New Work. A New and Complete Analysis of the Holy Bible: or the whole of the Old and New Testament arranged according to sub-

jects in twenty-seven books. On the basis of MATTHEW TALBOT, as improved with indexes, tables, and other valuable matter by NATHANIEL WEST, D. D. Illustrated with steel-plate Engravings and Maps. Together with *Cruden's Concordance to the Holy Scriptures*, as revised by JOHN EADIE, D. D. Revised and edited by Rev. ROSWELL D. HIRCHCOCK, D. D., Professor of Church History in the Union Theological Seminary. New York: A. J. Johnson, 1870. 4to. pp. 1,200.

"This Analysis of the Bible," says the Author in the Preface, "is essentially a new work throughout, and yet would not have been attempted but for the older work out of which it has grown. . . . With all the excellencies of TALBOT'S Analysis, it had serious defects. Its apparatus for study was extremely meagre. There were only two brief Indexes: one, of the Books and Chapters in their order; the other, an Alphabetical Index of the same. The method of the Book was by no means logical, either in its general plan or in the working out of the plan in detail. It likewise betrayed at many points an ignorance of the true sense of Scripture. . . . Dr. WEST rendered a two-fold service; first, he looked up the twelve verses which had been inadvertently omitted by Talbot; so as to be able to say with confidence that of the 31,173 verses of the Bible not one was wanting; he also added a consulting apparatus, consisting of nine Tables and Indexes, which cost him an immense amount of labor, and enhanced greatly the practical value of the work. In what respects and to what extent the present Analysis differs from its predecessors may be seen by any one who will take the trouble to make the comparison. It is something more than Talbot and West revised. The work has been entirely recast. Instead of thirty books there are twenty-seven, and the whole method of the work, so far as seems desirable, is different. . . . The Indexes are, of course, all new. . . . The editor has done his best to prepare a work which shall be of real service to all students and readers of God's Word."

The first thing that strikes one on opening this volume, and reading no further than the table of contents, is the logical arrangement of its matter. The twenty-seven books into which the Bible is divided, are as follows:

i Scripture.	x Genealogies and Cata-	xix War.
ii God.	logues.	xx Fallen Man.
iii Jesus Christ.	xi The Hebrews.	xxi Man Redeemed.
iv Idolatry and Superstition.	xii Other Nations.	xxii Sacred Seasons.
v Works of God.	xiii The Outward Man.	xxiii Sacred Places.
vi Miracles.	xiv External Nature.	xxiv Sacred Persons and Of-
vii Mediums and Methods of	xv Industrial Employments	fices.
Revelation.	and Products.	xxv Sacred Rites and Forms.
viii Duties to God.	xvi The Family.	xxvi Trials and Persecutions.
ix Angels, Good and Evil.	xvii Masters and Servants.	xxvii Eschatology.
	xviii Civil and Social Life.	

The unity, symmetry, and completeness of this classification is obvious. The work begins very appropriately with the introduction explanatory, telling us what the Bible has to say of itself—its writers, the method of its promulgation, its characteristics, and the blessings which it imparts (Bk. i.). Then follow the three grand divisions: First, *God*—false views of him, his revelation of himself by the natural and the supernatural, our duties to him, his servants—the angels (Bks. ii-ix). Second, *Man*—in general, and as divided into races; then, physically, domestically, civilly, and as the subject of God's grace in Christ (Bks. x-xxi). Third, *The Church*—or the union of God and man—its seasons, ceremonies and officers, and its antagonisms (Bks. xxii-xxvi). The whole naturally concludes with Eschatology, or the teaching of Scripture respecting the great hereafter—the Millennium, the Intermediate State, the Second Coming of Christ, the Resurrection of the Body, the Last Judgment, the Abode of the Lost, and the Home of the Ransomed. But the logical beauty

of the general plan appears also in the analysis of each separate Book, the several sections and sub-sections of which are as methodically arranged as are the twenty-seven Books themselves. For example, in Book xii, chapter 8th, the Conversion of the Gentiles, we have the following topics:—the divine covenant, the promise made to Abraham, general predictions, particular nations referred to (1. Egypt and Assyria, 2. the Chinese, 3. several other nations), Jewish contempt for the Gentiles, Christ's parables illustrating the call of the Gentiles (1. the Last Supper, 2. the Wicked Husbandman, 3. the Marriage of the King's Son). Gospel carried to the Samaritans, the Ethiopian eunuch baptized, St. Paul (1. his early life, 2. his conversion, 3. his commission, 4. the disciples at first afraid of him, 5. are persuaded to receive him, 6. accept him as an Apostle to the Gentiles, 7. he magnifies his office). Cornelius, the Roman Centurion (1. Sends for Peter, 2. Peter's vision, 3. Peter goes, 4. his reception), attitude of the church in Jerusalem (1. Peter questioned, 2. his course approved), the Gentile Church in Antioch (1. its beginning, 2. Paul brought from Tarsus, 3. returns with Barnabas from Jerusalem), etc. to the journey of St. Paul to Rome, and his last words, that Jews and Gentiles had been made one in Christ.

The historical method, however, in which many of the subjects are treated, is the most valuable feature of the work. The history of the Hebrews, for example, makes a book by itself, which presents successively, their origin and call, their sojourn in Egypt, their Exodus, their journey in the wilderness, their conquest of Canaan, their polity—theocratic, tribal, agrarian and municipal—the period of the Judges, the united kingdom under the respective reigns of Saul, Ish-bosheth, David and Solomon, the kingdom of Israel and its nine dynasties, the kingdom of Judah and its twenty rulers from Rehoboam to Zedekiah, the captivity in Babylon, and that in Persia after Cyrus, the restoration—in prospect, and its realization after the Edict of Cyrus including the course of the Persian government, the rebuilding and dedication of the Temple, the mission of Ezra, and the administration of Nehemiah; the whole concluding with the prediction of the destruction of Jerusalem, and the subsequent relation of Judaism to Christianity. We do not remember to have read or heard of the volume in which the scriptural history of the Jews is unfolded with more clearness, completeness, and method. To the student of the Bible such a manual is indispensable.

In the interesting department of archæology, the labors of the author deserve especial notice. What was the nature of the Pre-Mosaic servitude? Were servants in the time of Abraham, properly slaves? Was the Hebrew bondage a slavery, in the modern sense of the term? How far was the pursuit and recovery of fugitive bond-servants allowed? All these questions, and many more of the same character, are answered in the book on Masters and Servants. What was the Military strength of the Hebrews? Had they any standing army? What was the nature of their armour—offensive and defensive? their strategy and tactics? their fortresses and sieges? their conquests and the disposition of the spoils? their negotiations and alliances? The Book on war furnishes the answers. And yet the author has not written a commentary. The headings of the various chapters, sections, and subsections are so skillfully worded as to exhibit the state of the case at a glance. The study requisite to the writing of a commentary upon the entire Bible appears—not in its processes, but in its results.

The reader will also find here a compend of dogmatic theology. Every leading doctrine of Scripture, e. g. inspiration, the trinity, the Divine unity, self-existence, spirituality, eternity, omnipresence, immortality, omniscience, omnipotence, etc., is first analyzed, and then supported by the proof-texts, which are quoted in full. In the appendix are added, A Pronouncing and Interpreting Dictionary of Scripture Proper Names; Tables of Scripture Measures, Weights and Coins, and A History of the Bible: also A Dictionary of Religious Denominations, Sects, Parties, and Associations, which the author has compiled from the most recent sources, and which, in its accuracy, conciseness, and completeness, is the very best manual of the kind.

To those who have heard him in the lecture room, this volume will suggest the careful scholarship, and the strength and facility of expression for which the author is distinguished. It will also be fruitful in pleasant memories of seminary life. On every page, both in the general plan and in the working out of the plan in its subordinate parts, an original, independent force creates and constructs. The Bible is fashioned into a commentary upon itself—spiritual things being compared with spiritual, and the great truths of Scripture explained, not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth. In the preacher's study, beside his dictionaries, grammars, and verbal concordances, this *topical concordance* will take its place, in no respects inferior to those recognized helps to the interpretation of the word of God.

The Life of our Lord. By REV. WILLIAM HANNA, D.D., LL.D. Six Vols. 12mo. Vol. I. *The Earlier Years.* pp. 490. Vol. II. *The Ministry in Galilee,* pp. 360. Robert Carter & Bros. Dr. Hanna is eminently qualified for the important task he has here undertaken, and, judging from these two volumes, the public will not be disappointed at the execution of the work. If it does not sparkle with the brilliance of Pressense's or possess the romantic features of Rénan's, it has merits of a superior quality. The chief aim of the author is "to unfold the Sacred Individuality of Christ, in its unique glory, as that is seen in the successive incidents of his human life." It is a series of brief expositions of the main incidents of Christ's life, rather than a formal and connected narrative of it. There is so little parade of learning in the work; so simple and unpretending is the whole cast of it, that there is danger that the reader will not perceive the rare scholarship and depth of critical knowledge which there is in it. Dr. Hanna takes all the facts furnished by the four evangelists, and giving to each its proper significance, constructs a complete and harmonious whole. His insight into the very heart of questions is rare; and his practice of dealing more with the events themselves than with the records by which they reach us, is certainly to be commended. Just here, it seems to us, is the great defect, the weak point, in very much that has been written on the subject. The exceeding grace of the style will charm the reader, while the thoroughly evangelical spirit which pervades the work, will commend it to all Christian readers. With the exception of Dean Stanley, we know no writer whose description of sacred scenes and localities is more picturesque and impressive. No one who had not visited the spots and studied them with infinite care, and with a poet's eye and a Christian's heart, could have thus described the scenery of Nazareth, the road from Bethany to Jerusalem, the shores of Lake Tiberias, and Jacob's Well.

Notes on the Gospel of Matthew. By NATHANIEL MARSHMAN WILLIAMS. Gould & Lincoln. 12mo. pp. 333. In form these notes differ but little from "Barnes," "Jacobus," and others. The execution is scholarly. The notes are chiefly explanatory; yet the practical and doctrinal are not wanting. The illustrative part of the work is fuller than is usual. This gospel is explained independently of the others, or nearly so, but this we think is a defect. The author has availed himself of the results of the latest biblical scholarship, and the work we doubt not will be highly acceptable to his own denomination (Baptist) whose peculiar views on the subject of the Christian ordinances it inculcates.

The Mahommedan Commentary on the Holy Bible. By SYUD AHMAD. Parts 1 and 2. Ghazee-pore, 1862 and 1865. London, Trübner & Co. The present publication is certainly a phenomenon in the literary history of our century; most remarkable on account of its author, its tendency, and learned, nay scholarlike execution. A descendant of Mohammed explaining the Bible in a European language! Thanks to the light of tolerance which will, we hope, ultimately inspire the followers of all religions and sects, Syud Ahmad has undertaken the great problem of explaining the Bible to his countrymen and co-religionists, from a Mohammedan point of view; of pointing out all the parallels between the Koran and Bible; and at the same time furthering a correct understanding of Islām, regarding which many wrong notions, not to say gross ignorance, are prevalent among the educated masses of Europe. He has not been deterred by the intricacies of biblical researches, nor by the difficulty of acquiring the Hebrew language. Thus his book contains a vast mass of information, gathered from all the best available sources. The first volume contains an introduction, divided into ten discourses, and two appendices, regarding revelation in general, the Scriptures revealed by different prophets, etc. In this, of course, the author is guided by the principal idea of Islām, viz. that in the relations vouchsafed to the prophets, from Adam down to Mohammed, there is one continuous progression; that Tōrā, Gospel, and Koran rest all on the same state of divine manifestation; and that each prophet was sent according to the exigencies and conditions of his period. The second volume contains a commentary on the Genesis, chap. I.-xl. The Text is given in Hebrew, and a literal translation in Hindustani is subjoined, to which corresponding passages of the Koran and Sunna are added.

Smith's Dictionary of the Bible. Part XXIII. Hurd & Houghton. This great work is progressing satisfactorily. The American editors are doing their work with thoroughness and good judgment. It will, when completed, be by far the most valuable work of the kind extant. The present number brings it down to the word Priest, and the 2576th page. The publishers sustain its superior typographical finish.

The Words of the Apostles expounded by RUDOLF STIER, D. D. Translated from the second German edition by G. H. VENABLES. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. New York: Scribner, Welford & Co. 8vo. pp. 517. "The Words of the Lord Jesus," by the same author has made him extensively and favorably known to our readers. The first edition of this work was published

more than thirty years ago; still the author finds but little to alter in it to adapt it to the present era.

In some respects these expositions of Scripture are superior to any thing we know of, as aids to a real and exact understanding of the teaching of the Holy Ghost. So much attention has been given to the development of the historical and philological matter as to lead to a surprising neglect, often, of the oral element of Christ's words and of the apostolic testimony, and their real practical purport. Criticism may establish the letter by killing the spirit. It is not the outward bark but the kernel that giveth life. The historical element is needful, but the words of the *Holy Ghost*, speaking through the apostles, as well as by the mouth of prophets, are of paramount interest. The childlike belief of the author in the inspiration of the Scriptures is refreshing in this day of skepticism and trimming; not less grateful is his desire to convey, in a highly instructive form, the pregnant meaning of the divinely-living words of the Spirit as utterance was given them in the Old Testament and the New, forming but one divine whole revelation.

The Prophecies of the Prophet Ezekiel elucidated. By E. W. HENGSTENBERG, D. D., Professor of Theology, Berlin. Translated by A. C. MURPHY and J. G. MURPHY, LL. D. T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh. Published in this country by Scribner, Welford & Co. A popular Commentary on the Prophecy of Ezekiel, which combines the merits of critical scholarship and a devout spirit, commends itself to the notice of many who have felt the need of a work of this kind. The qualities necessary for the preparation of such a work as this are by no means often combined. We may not agree with Hengstenberg in all his interpretations, but he manifests a thorough acquaintance with the scope and times of the prophecy, and elucidates them in an admirable manner as he passes along. His evangelical sympathies likewise are manifest, and the student will be edified as well as instructed. The text of the prophecy is inserted in the commentary, and for the sake of the English reader the criticisms on the Hebrew words—which are very brief—are thrown into foot-notes, that need not necessarily interrupt the perusal of the volume.

Miracles, Past and Present. By WILLIAM MOUNTFORD. Fields, Osgood & Co. 12mo. pp. 512. The author affirms that the "Supernatural has engaged his attention, as a student, during many years." We fear however to little purpose. He certainly has added nothing to the argument in favor of miracles. He believes in miracles, but then his definition of a miracle makes it no miracle at all. Instead of being a suspension of the law of nature or something above it, it is a spiritual phenomenon, an extraordinary "sign and wonder." Miracles are not "material occurrences" "as theologians and the spirit of the age contend, but manifestations of a spiritual world, and spiritual agents and forces," with "laws also capable of intertwining and inosculating with some of the laws of man's nature and of the material world." Hence Spiritualism has, in his belief, its miracles as really as Christianity. And he brings an argument from its phenomena to strengthen his general argument. He contends that Spiritualism evidences "a sphere of life about us altogether different from this of nature, and for which science has no methods nor instruments, and for which, there-

fore, it should not have one word of denial, or even of doubt." In the "Church of the Future" he believes we shall have a revival of Pentecostal miracles—signs and wonders wrought by spiritual forces—and this book is written to help on that day. It seems a pity that a work written with considerable ability and with evident good purpose, should possess no value whatever to the friends of Christianity.

Expository Thoughts on the Gospels. By the Rev. J. C. RYLE. *St. John.* Vol. II. 12mo. pp. 382. Carter & Bros. Mr. Ryle is justly popular as a writer among all evangelical Christians. His opinions are positive, his thoughts clear, and his style direct and translucent. He does not aim to be critical so much as practical in his expositions of Scripture, and yet he does not pass over the really difficult parts, and his critical knowledge of the Scriptures is large and accurate. This is the 4th volume on the Gospels. Another will complete John.

Essays on the Supernatural Origin of Christianity, with special reference to the Theories of Rénan, Strauss, and the Tübingen School. By GEORGE P. FISHER, D. D. C. Scribner & Co. New and enlarged edition. 8vo. pp. 620. We are glad to see a new edition of this very able and timely work, reviewing the latest literature on the subject, and, by means of a new introduction and supplementary notes, adding much fresh and important matter bearing upon the subject. We have already commended the volume, as one of the best vindications of the genuineness and credibility of the New Testament against the attacks of modern skepticism which our country has produced, and in its new form its value is materially increased.

HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY.

The History of Rome. By THEODORE MOMMSEN. Translated with the author's sanction and additions. By the Rev. WILLIAM P. DICKSON, D. D. Charles Scribner & Co. Vol. II. The Second Volume of MommSEN's Rome, carries us through one of the most dramatic portions of Roman history. The Carthaginian wars, including the achievements of Scipio, the Conquest of Sicily, the expedition of Hannibal, and the battle of Cannæ are embraced in it. But the author, not limiting his view to the external relations of Rome, devotes nearly the half of the concluding part of his volume to the domestic interests of the state, taking up successively the subjects of government, the conflict of the *plebs* and patricians, the management of land and capital, faith and manners, literature and art. Niebuhr's theories are not specifically referred to, but they have evidently been well considered, and MommSEN proves himself an independent and enthusiastic investigator. His work will be regarded as a standard history.

It is especially attractive, considering its German origin, for the simplicity and ease of its style; and it has been admirably translated. Of its merits in this respect we can afford full evidence by extracts, valuable in themselves, independent of their connections. Our readers will appreciate the following paragraphs which we select from the latter part of the volume. The funeral of a distinguished citizen is thus described:

"It was a singular procession, at which the citizens were invited to be present, by the summons of the public crier: 'Yonder warrior is dead: whoever can, let him come to escort Lucius Amilius; he is borne forth from his

house.' It was opened by bands of wailing women, musicians and dancers; one of the latter was dressed out and furnished with a mask in imitation of the deceased, and by gestures, doubtless, and action, recalled once more to the multitude the appearance of the well known man. Then followed the most magnificent and peculiar part of the solemnity—the procession of ancestors—before which all the rest of the pageant so faded in comparison, that men of rank of the true Roman type enjoined their heirs to restrict the funeral pomp to that procession alone. We have already mentioned that the face-masks of those ancestors who had filled the curule æditeship or any higher ordinary magistracy, wrought on wax and painted,—modeled as far as possible after life, but not wanting even for the earlier ages up to and beyond the time of the kings—were wont to be placed in wooden niches along the walls of the family hall, and were regarded as the chief ornament of the house. When a death occurred in the family, suitable persons, chiefly actors, were dressed up with these face-masks and the corresponding official costume, to take part in the funeral ceremony, so that the ancestors—each in the principal dress worn by him in his life-time, the triumphator in his gold-embroidered, the censor in his purple, and the consul in his purple-broidered robe, with their history and the other insignia of office—all in chariots, gave the final escort to the dead. On the bier, overspread with massive purple and gold-embroidered coverlets and fine linen cloths, lay the deceased himself, likewise in the full costume of the highest office which he had filled, and surrounded by the armour of the enemies whom he had slain, and by the chaplets which in jest or in earnest he had won. Behind the bier came the mourners, all dressed in black and without ornament, the sons of the deceased with their heads veiled, the daughters without veils, the relations and clansmen, the friends, the clients and freedmen. Thus the procession passed on to the Forum. There the corpse was placed in an erect position; the ancestors descended from their chariots and seated themselves in the curule chairs; and the son or nearest gentile kinsman of the deceased ascended the rostra, in order to announce to the assembled multitude in simple recital, the names and deeds of each of the men sitting in a circle around him, and, last of all, those of him who had recently died.

This may be called a barbarous custom, and a nation of artistic feelings would certainly not have tolerated the continuance of this odd resurrection of the dead down to an epoch of fully developed civilization; but even Greeks, who were very dispassionate and but little disposed to reverence, such as Pölybius, acknowledged the imposing effect produced by the naïve pomp of this funeral ceremony. It was a conception essentially in keeping with the grave solemnity, the uniform movement, and the proud dignity of Roman life, that departed generations should continue to walk, as it were, corporeally among the living, and that, when a burgess, weary of labors and of honors, was gathered to his fathers, these fathers themselves should appear in the Forum to receive him among their number."—P. 369, '70.

History of England, from the Fall of Wolsey to the defeat of the Spanish Armada. By JAMES ANTHONY FROUDE. Vols. XI. XII. pp. xx, 702. xiii, 658. The completion of this great History is an event in the literary world. Disappointment is very generally expressed that the author did not carry out his original purpose and bring the history down to the death of Elizabeth, instead of closing it with the defeat of the Spanish Armada. Still this was a fitting period at which to close it, for that event completed the establishment of England's power as a Protestant Kingdom.

One of the leading features of these volumes is the brilliant and intensely interesting sketch of the closing period of Mary Stuart's career, and of her execution, and a summary of the character and policy of her rival, Queen Elizabeth. But we need not particularize, as we feel sure that the most of our readers will possess themselves of all the volumes of this extraordinary history—extraordinary

for its freshness, originality, and power of description, in a field so hackneyed and preoccupied.

Messrs. Scribner & Co. are entitled to no little praise for the promptness and fine style (equal to the English edition at much less cost) in which they have reproduced this standard history. And doubly so for the reason that, in addition to this "Library" edition, now complete, they are also rapidly issuing a "Popular" one, in clear, fair type, on good paper, and neatly bound, for the very low price of \$1.25 a volume, or \$15.00 for the entire work. They have published vols. V-VIII, since our last issue, and will soon have this edition likewise complete.

The History of Civilization. By AMOS DEAN, LL.D. In seven vols. Vols. VI, VII. Albany: Joel Munsell. 8vo, pp. 539, 631. These volumes complete this able History. The subjects embraced in them are the following: European Society, Elements of Philosophy in Modern Europe, European Art. The last embraces *Objective Arts* (a) Architecture, (b) Sculpture, (c) Painting. *Subjective Arts* (a) Music, (b) Poetry, (c) Eloquence. *Mixed Arts* (a) The Drama, (b) The Military Art.

Our readers will be peculiarly interested in the author's analysis and comprehensive history of the various systems of European Philosophy, which have exerted so great an influence on modern civilization. He aims here not at the critical, but simply the historical. He had evidently studied these philosophies carefully, and comprehended their essential elements and bearings on the progress of speculative thought and human society in general.

We have taken occasion, more than once, to commend this History, while passing through the press; and now that it is completed, we wish to renew and emphasize our approval. It is a credit to the lamented author; a credit to the historical scholarship of our country; and, we may add, a credit to the taste and enterprise of the publishing fraternity. While it can not be pronounced a brilliant, or a profoundly original production, it deserves, and we believe will take rank, as a learned, thoughtful, scholarly, candid, and comprehensive History of Civilization. It is certainly worthy a place not only in every public, but in every well-furnished library.

The Dissenting World.. An Autobiography. By REV. BREWIN GRANT. Third edition. London and Sheffield: 1869. 12mo. pp. 382. This book is sent us by the author with a polite note. It is a strange sort of a book, and one in which the public in this country can feel no sort of interest. The author is evidently a man of considerable talent, but of inordinate conceit, and overflowing with a polemic spirit. "A Congregational minister of twenty-five years' standing," he has been, according to his own showing, "a thorn in the flesh" to his brethren—an Ishmaelite; now battling furiously with Free Thinkers, and then with intense bitterness leading on an attack against the heresies, real or conceived, in his own communion. From his own account it would seem that he has been unfairly and harshly dealt with by the Congregational Union, which dropped his name from the roll of accredited ministers—a virtual ministerial deposition—without notice or form of trial of any kind. Such a procedure, we apprehend, is unheard of in this country. But then, we have not heard *the other side*, and therefore suspend judgment.

Memoirs of the Rev. Wm. C. Burns, M. A., Missionary to China from the English, Presbyterian Church. By REV. ISLAY BURNS, D. D., Professor of Theology, Free Church College, Glasgow. Robert Carter & Brothers. 12 mo. pp. 590. The record of modern missions commemorates many a name worthy of the highest honor. But among them all there are few so illustrious for usefulness, and devoted and successful service, as that of Rev. Wm. C. Burns, late missionary to China. Repeatedly does his life and its varied features and experiences remind us of Henry Martin. From the moment when—withdrawing from another sphere which was very promising—he gave himself to the work of preparation for the ministry, he threw his whole soul into the cause of Christ. His early years of service are associated with two honored names—those of McCheyne and James Hamilton—a kindred spirit to the first, and challenging the admiration and esteem of the last.

His first essays in the ministry were as an Evangelist. In form and activity he rivalled Whitefield. No danger could terrify and no difficulty dishearten him. In different parts of Scotland, as well as Ireland, he repeatedly exposed his life to hazard in endeavoring to reach the neglected classes with the Gospel. His labors were eminently blessed. Wherever he went throngs gathered to hear him. Hundreds and probably thousands, were converted under his sermons. The effects of his words were so powerful that repeatedly some of his hearers screamed aloud during his sermons. His visit to Canada, at about the time when the Free Church of Scotland began its distinct existence, was rendered memorable by the impressions made and the results which followed.

The apostolic power of his spirit led him to devote himself to the cause of foreign missions, and China was his chosen field. In 1846, when about thirty years of age, he left his native land to engage with unrelenting zeal in a twenty years' task of varied but trying experience. None can fail to admire the spirit in which he prosecuted his work; his career was truly heroic. He shrank from no duty. He counted it an honor to stand in the front and bear the shock of opposition. Ease, or comfort, or fame, he seems never to have regarded. Too early he fell at his post, leaving behind him memories that canonize his name beyond all earthly honors.

His Memoirs, drawn up by his brother, are an inspiring and animating volume. They will command a place by the side of those of the Brainerds and the Carys, and others who have illustrated the Apostleship of the modern church. The book is written in good taste and in a genial style, and the publishers have issued it in attractive dress.

Life of James Hamilton, D. D., F. L. S. By WILLIAM ARNOT. Edinburgh: Carter & Brothers. 12mo. pp. 600. For such a man as Rev. Dr. JAMES HAMILTON, we demand no common writer as a biographer. "The Mount of Olives," "Life in Earnest," "The Royal Preacher," and "Our Christian Classics," come up fresh to the memory, with the instruction and delight they have afforded, at the mention of his name. We could not bear the thought, that one who has bound us by the spell of his eloquent, earnest, and we must add, rich and musical words, should be portrayed by a common-place hand. Happily, he has found a biographer worthy of the task.

The reader of Dr. Hamilton's works will not be disappointed or repelled by this memoir.

Hamilton was a native of Scotland, the son of a Presbyterian minister. Even in childhood his literary tastes were strong, and they were freely indulged. At a very early age he entered upon his university course. Diligent and persevering, he made rapid progress. At the commencement of 1833, when he was but eighteen years of age, he records his reading during the previous year. It embraced 39 duodecimos, 18 octavos and one quarto. Even as a youth, his mind was richly stored with solid learning. Serious from early years, his eye was almost from the first fixed upon the ministry. He was soon called to Roxburgh Church, Edinburgh, but only to remain there for a few months. In 1841 he removed to London to take charge of the Church in Regent Square, with which his name was thenceforth to be so largely identified.

From this point his course is eminently a public one. He lived and acted his part before the eyes of the world. Ever diligent in duty, he was eminently useful and attractive as a writer. A peculiar charm invests his pages. It may not be easy to define it, but it is deeply felt by every intelligent reader. Something of an explanation doubtless will be found in this biography. Here we see the man. We discern his spirit. We catch something of the spirit of his fervid energy. Such a man as is here portrayed could not but have been impressive.

Dr. Arnot has done his work well. He has allowed Hamilton, as far as possible, to tell his own story, but what he has added is pertinent, and worthy of the fame of one who, if less popular than Hamilton, has not less of substance and force in his writings. We can heartily commend this volume, produced in handsome style, as well calculated to put new life into the soul of the jaded pastor, and to instruct readers of every class.

PRACTICAL RELIGION.

Music-Hall Sermons. By WILLIAM H. H. MURRAY. Fields, Osgood & Co. 12mo. pp. 276. The twelve Sermons here given to the public were preached by the Pastor of Park Street Church, Boston, to large audiences gathered in Music-Hall, and "are now given to the public in the precise form in which they were delivered." They were shaped with special reference to such an audience as would likely convene in such a place. There is nothing in the selection of topics, however, with one or two exceptions, specially appropriate, and the general method of treating them has nothing particularly new or striking in it. They are, for the most part, plain, sensible, practical, earnest gospel sermons, presented in a style to attract and impress. Occasionally there is an extravagance of statement, the use of ambitious rhetoric, and a lack of true humility and self-forgetfulness in the preacher, which mar the satisfaction with which we read the book. But even with these defects the volume is adapted to do good.

Light and Truth; or Bible Thoughts and Themes. The Acts and the Larger Epistles. By HORATIUS BONAR, D. D. Robert Carter & Bros. 16mo. pp. 414.

The Spirit of Life; or Scripture Testimony to the Divine Person and

Work of the Holy Ghost. By E. H. BICKERSTETH. Same publishers. 12mo. pp. 192.

We can not have too many of such works as these. While there is nothing new or striking in either of them, they are both instinct with the evangelical spirit and thoroughly scriptural. Both authors are too well known and appreciated to need commendation. Dr. Bonar's work consists of a series of brief expositions—83 in all—on various passages of Acts, Romans, and Corinthians. The themes are varied, and the whole are aglow with that fervid piety and high-toned spirituality which endear his writings to the truly religious.

The other book—the basis of which is a chapter from a previous work, "The Rock of Ages"—is simply a scriptural presentation of the orthodox doctrine regarding the Holy Spirit. It is an admirable summary of the evidences of his Personality, Godhead, and manifold operations in the economy of Redemption.

The Pursuit of Holiness: a Sequel to Thoughts on Personal Religion. By EDWARD MEYRICK GOULBURN, D. D. D. Appleton & Co. 12mo. pp. xxix, 261. The Dean of Norwich is among the best of our devotional writers. His "Thoughts on Personal Religion" have been blessed to many, and have endeared his name to not a few; and this sequel to it is designed "to carry the reader somewhat further onward in the spiritual life." It is meant to be "a book of devotion;" "it is offered simply as a help in the spiritual life—accept it as such." And sure we are that his readers will bless God for it, and gratefully respond to the sentiment, so characteristic of the book: "And oh! dear soul, created in God's Image, ransomed with his blood, whom it has been my desire to serve and help by these instructions, if they shall at any time approve themselves to thee as serviceable and helpful, forget not in thy prayers him who needs such service and help even more than thyself."

Fables of Infidelity, and Facts of Faith. By ROBERT PATTERSON. Cincinnati: Western Tract Society. New York: Carter & Bros. 12mo. In this series of Tracts Dr. Patterson shows with great clearness and force the absurdity of Atheism, Pantheism and Rationalism. There is great skill as well as ability evinced in the discussion. The war is carried into the enemy's camp. Infidelity is subjected to a searching analysis and its evidences proved to be utterly wanting. They are "Tracts for the Times," and should have a general circulation.

Removing Mountains: Life Lessons from the Gospels. By JOHN S. HART. Carter & Brothers. 16mo. pp. 306. Dr. Hart is one of our best practical religious writers. He never writes without a purpose. His style is simple and finished; his thoughts fresh and sensible; his aim practical; and his spirit earnest and evangelical. From the rich field of the gospel narrative—"ever old, yet ever new"—he has gleaned this "little sheaf," and here lays it "at the feet of the Master."

The Dance of Modern Society. By W. C. WILKINSON. The almost universal favor with which this little work has been received by the religious press is evidence of its unusual merit. There is a freshness and vigor in the

mode of treating the subject that cannot fail to arrest the reader's attention and favorably impress him, if it does not convince him. Of all that has been written on this perplexing question, we have met with nothing so much to our mind as this. It ought to find its way into every religious family in the land.

SCIENCE.

Sketches of Creation By ALEXANDER WINCHELL, LL. D. With Illustrations. Harper & Brothers. 12mo. pp. 459. Prof. Winchell of the University of Michigan and Director of the State Geological Survey, presents in this compact volume some of the grand conclusions of the sciences in reference to the natural history of the earth. It is a highly useful work, especially to the large class of intelligent persons who do not find it convenient to resort to formal scientific treatises, but who, nevertheless, feel an interest in the developments of recent science, and would be glad to be put in a position to take a panoramic survey of its grand generalizations. The work will also be found useful as an aid in review, giving, as it does, a bird's-eye view of the entire field of science.

The author does not belong to the school of modern skeptics. The phenomena of the universe inspire his soul with emotions of religious reverence and worship. They proclaim an Infinite Intelligence. Like Socrates and Plato, and Kepler and Newton, and Paley and Buckland, and a host of others, he delights to "Look through Nature up to Nature's God." He makes no formal attempt to set forth the relations of science to the system of Christian faith, and yet in effect he does. "The elucidation of the great problems of philosophic or speculative theology is indeed, the highest function of science. . . . It is not for its facts, but for the significance of the facts, that science is valuable. To accumulate the data of science is good; to interpret them is the noblest prerogative of a thinking being. Science interpreted is theology. Science prosecuted to its conclusions leads to God." Noble words! Even in a philosophical sense how far more rational they seem than do the babblings of Darwin and his school!

The Wonders of Pompeii. By MARC MONNIER. Translated from the original French.

The Sun. By AMÉDÉE GUILLEMIN. From the French by A. L. Phipson. With 58 Illustrations.

These interesting volumes form the 7th and 8th in the "Illustrated Library of Wonders," which Messrs. Scribner & Co. are bringing out, and they amply sustain the interest and popular scientific value of those which have gone before. The former gives us in popular form a reliable, accurate, and condensed description of the exhumed city, embracing the latest discoveries, and whatever is of interest pertaining to the subject. The illustrations are very fine, and greatly help to the understanding of it.

The volume on *The Sun* is one of intense interest. The subject itself is one full of wonder and instruction, and the author is master of the science of the brilliant theme, at least all that is known of it, and he discourses upon it enthusiastically and learnedly, and yet in language so simple and intelligible as to be easily understood by a person of ordinary intelligence. The

number and superior character of the *illustrations* in this "Library," form not the least of the "wonders" connected with it.

Annual of Scientific Discovery for 1870. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 12mo. pp. 354. This year-book of facts in science and art is prompt in making its appearance and is crowded as usual with matters of interest to every intelligent person. The record this year embraces two events which, for significance, have never been paralleled in the material progress of the world—the completion of the Pacific Railway, and the opening of the Suez Canal.

GENERAL LITERATURE.

The Andes and the Amazon: or, Across the Continent of South America. By JAMES ORTON, Professor of Natural History in Vassar College. With a new map of equatorial America and numerous illustrations. Harper & Bros. 8vo. Prof. Orton, under the auspices of the Smithsonian Institute, headed an expedition across the Continent of South America. They ascended the western slope of the Andes to Quito; thence they descended the eastern slope on foot, until they reached the Napo, one of the great tributaries of the Amazon. Down this river they paddled in a canoe for five hundred miles to the Amazon, which they followed for two thousand miles to its mouth. But little was known of this immense region before. This book is therefore valuable for its geographical knowledge, while at the same time it is readable as a spirited record of travel. It is quite likely also to have an influence in developing the agricultural resources of portions of South America, and in opening new avenues to commerce. The author is evidently a disciple of Darwin, and yet we note that some of his statements conflict with the theories of that school in regard to the effect of mixed races. He denies that they are invariably deteriorated. The Cholos of Quito, he says, are a mixed race, the offspring of whites and negroes, and far superior to their progenitors in enterprise and intelligence. Darwin asserts that half breeds seldom have a good expression of countenance, but Prof. Orton says that "Quito, where there is every imaginable mixture of Indian and Spaniard, is wonderfully free from ugly features." And, again: "Our observations do not support the opinion that the result of amalgamation is a vague compound, lacking character and expression. The moral part is perhaps deteriorated; but in tact and enterprise they often excel their progenitors."

The book is liberally illustrated, and adds another to the highly valuable works of travel and exploration, which constitute one of the specialties of this enterprising house.

Principles of a System of Philosophy. By AUSTIN BIERBOWER, A. M. Carlton & Lanahan. 12mo. pp. 250. A somewhat ambitious attempt to "reconcile the more difficult questions of metaphysics and religion with themselves, and with the sciences and common sense." There is more boldness and vigor of thought in the treatise, however, than conclusive logic. It is written from the Arminian standpoint of theology, but yet, on the subject of decrees, it admits more than that system allows. Appreciating the difficulty which Arminian writers obviously feel in admitting God's foreknowledge and yet rejecting the doctrine of decrees, the author seeks to avoid it by denying God's complete foreknowledge. He argues there may be things which even God can not know, and this is no more derogatory to his infinity than it is to assert that some necessary laws limit his omnipotence. He can only know what is know-able; and the free

will of his creatures may limit his power of knowledge. It is no more absurd than the distinction made by Dr. Adam Clark, that God chose to foreknow certain things, and certain things not to foreknow.

Among my Books. By JAMES RUSSELL LOWELL, A.M. Boston: Fields, Osgood & Co. 12mo. pp. 380. These thoughtful and elaborate essays have already found admirers among the readers of the *North American Review*. They are six in number, on the following subjects: Dryden—Witchcraft—Shakespeare Once More—New-England Two Centuries Ago—Lessing—Rousseau and the Sentimentalists. The essays on the three poets named embody no little acute, appreciative and sound criticism, and deserve to rank among the best efforts of the author. The one on Witchcraft is a candid and sensible paper, though containing nothing really new. In *New-England Two Centuries Ago*, he pays a just tribute to her founders, and vindicates Puritanism from many of the charges brought against it. Instance what he says in regard to witchcraft. "About their treatment of witches, too, there has been a great deal of ignorant babble. Puritanism had nothing whatever to do with it. They acted under a delusion, which, with an exception here and there (and those mainly medical men, like Wierus and Webster), darkened the understanding of all Christendom." His estimate of Rousseau is certainly high—higher we think than he deserves—and yet while paying a lofty tribute to his genius, it does not overlook or spare the essential faults of his moral nature.

The Life of Mary Russell Mitford; told by Herself in Letters to her Friends. Edited by the REV. A. G. K. L'ESTRANGE. 2 vols. pp. xii., 378; vii., 365. Harper & Brothers. We have not read a more racy and piquant work of the kind in a long while. There is not a dull page in it. Both on personal and literary grounds it is full of interest. Miss Mitford's character was a rare one—rare for its self-sacrificing spirit, and filial devotion, and all true womanly virtues. Her life, in some respect a sad one, was one of intense energy, industry, kindness and sympathy. Her mind was remarkable for its versatility, vivacity, and cheerfulness. Her letters and diary cover a period of over half a century. She knew nearly all the eminent men and women of her times and corresponded with not a few of them. She records her views of passing events and manners, her criticisms on celebrities and on her friends, with great freedom and simplicity, and often in a most amusing way. She was a born letter-writer, and we commend the volumes as amusing, clever, and informing.

The Holy Grail and other Poems. By ALFRED TENNYSON. Fields, Osgood & Co. 12mo. pp. 202.

The Poetical Works of Alfred Tennyson. Harper & Brothers. 8vo. pp. 232.

Tennyson's eagerly expected poem has at length made its appearance, but critics are hardly agreed as to its comparative merits. It completes "The Idyls of the King," "a poem," says an eminent critic, "unequalled, in its great, finished, and happy design, since the time of Milton. Its brilliancy of execution often fades; its wings droop earthward here and there; but in its harmonious and fulfilled design, in its fortunate and faultless scheme and arrangement, it has no equal since 'Paradise Lost.'" Certainly the legends of King Arthur and his Knights of the Round Table, have here been woven into a romance of exquisite beauty and immortalized.

The Holy Grail is the name given to the cup that Christ used, at the Last Supper, which, as the legend has it, was brought by Joseph of Arimathea to Glastonbury, working a cure for all the diseased who touched it; but when sin had come to abound, it was caught away to heaven, and only the purest saintship and the bravest knightly virtue could gain a view of it. These idylls relate how the Knights of Arthur went in quest of it, as well as deal with the genealogy, experience and death of the King, with various episodes that are full of interest.

A rival edition, embracing the complete works of Tennyson, the new poem and all, in two editions--a paper one selling for 50 cents, and a neatly bound one for \$1.50--was promptly issued by the Messrs. Harper & Brothers of this city; so that the continued rivalry of these great houses is a public benefit.

Health by Good Living. By W. W. HALL, M. D., Editor of "Hall's Journal of Health," &c. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 12mo. pp. 277. Dr. Hall himself thus states the object of his work: "This book is to show how high health can be maintained, and common diseases cured by 'good living,' which means eating with a relish the best food prepared in the best manner. The best food includes meats, fish, poultry, wild game, fruits, and the grains which make bread. The best cookery preserves the natural tastes and juices. As there can be no 'good living' without a good appetite, how to get this great blessing without money and without price necessarily, is pointed out, and, it is hoped, in very clear and plain terms."

We are far from indorsing all Dr. Hall's views. He is too much of an enthusiast and a hobbyist (for a man can be a hobbyist in his line as well as in others) to be a safe guide. Still he may be read with profit, if read with care and discrimination. There are many admirable hints and wise suggestions in the book. But we advise our readers to theorize but little on the subject of health; careful observation, and a close, patient study of the laws of health as they apply to their own case, will do more for them than all the nostrums of quackery, or the philosophies of the schools.

The Changed Cross; Margaret Brown; and *Coming*. Illustrated. A. D. F. Randolph & Co. Small 4to. It is not often that we have author and publisher in one, as in this case. The three poems are all exquisite in their way, and deserve the rich dress and artistic finish which they have received. Aside from the poetic merit, the spiritual instruction which they impart is decided. We know of no finer theme for a practical sermon on Christian Resignation, or on Faith in God under adverse providences, than is suggested by "The Changed Cross."

Mrs. Jerminham's Journal. C. Scribner & Co. 16mo. pp. 145. An English story in rhyme, which foreign critics speak favorably of. It is in the form of an autobiography, in which a young and inconsiderate wife, hastily married to an elderly and very serious man, portrays her married experience. Her fondness for admiration and social pleasures, and her great imprudences, alienated her husband's affection, and well nigh ruined her reputation and peace of mind for life; but repentance, after a most bitter experience, restored the unhappy wife to her home and husband, and she

now learns to love him, and develops into a true woman, devoted to home affection, and made happy in the sphere of domestic life. There is a peculiar charm in the way the simple story is told. The moral too is good, and too obvious to need pointing out.

Old Horse Gray. By EDWARD HOPPER. Hurd & Houghton. If there is not much poetry in this little volume, there is good sense, and sound sentiment, and a moral, for "Old Horse Gray" stands for the good Pastor of "The Parish of Grumbleton," which resolved to get rid of him simply on account of his age, and to settle a young man in his place. He had served them faithfully all his life, and now they decided to turn him off and leave him to pick up a scanty living on the highway or starve to death. But retribution overtakes them, while Providence provides a much better place for the faithful minister.

Journal of a Visit to Egypt. Constantinople, the Crimea, Greece, &c., in the suite of the Prince and Princess of Wales. By the Hon. Mrs. WILLIAM GREY. Harper & Bros. 12mo. pp. 200. This journal was written without the remotest idea of publication. It is a simple record of sight-seeing and travel-incidents such as any clever woman might have written. Much of it is exceeding commonplace, we had almost said childish, as well. Nothing could have led to its publication had it not been connected with the visit of a Prince and Princess to the East. The most interesting item in it is the description of visits made by the royal party to the harems of the Sultan and Viceroy, and several other distinguished personages, and of a dinner with "La Grande Princesse"—the mother of the Viceroy—at Cairo.

Conjugal Sins against the Laws of Life and Health. By A. K. GARDNER, M. D. 12mo. pp. 240. Dr. Gardner dedicates his book to the "Clergy of the United States, who by example and instruction have the power to arrest the rapid extinction of the native American people." He was moved to it, he says, from a desire "to support by professional statements the opinions very generally entertained by the community, enunciated by the Rev. Bishop Coxe, of Western N. Y., in his pastoral address, and promulgated by the resolutions of the Presbyterian Assembly held in this city last Spring." The evil pointed out is undoubtedly a fearful and growing one, and it is time an earnest and concerted movement was made to arrest it. We know not how the matter could be treated more delicately and judiciously than it is in this book; and yet it is treated thoroughly, and from a scientific and Christian standpoint. Pastors, parents, all interested, (and who is not?) in stemming the tide of error, sin and misery with which the community is being overwhelmed, and in saving the American race from extinction or at least from the preponderance of an emigrant population, should read and heed its lessons.

The Bible in the Public Schools. Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co. For sale by Carter & Brothers. 8vo. pp. 420. The discussion of this fundamental question is fast creating a literature of its own, and one that will be read with amazement by future generations. That the proposition to exclude the Bible from the public schools of this Christian nation out of

deference to the scruples of a sect everywhere and always hostile to education and free institutions, should ever have been seriously discussed and should have found advocates among Protestant ministers, and a portion of the Protestant religious press, will scarcely be credited. The whole argument for the exclusion, as Judge Storer remarks, is predicated upon the supposition that the Bible is a *Sectarian* book, which he denies; and his opinion seems to us incontrovertible.

This volume forms a valuable part of the history of this grave question—graver far than any which relates to reconstruction, or finance, or party issues. It contains in full the Arguments in the celebrated Cincinnati case (*Minor vs. Cincinnati Board of Education*) with the Opinions and Decisions of the Court. The case was argued on both sides with great ability and legal skill; and the opinions and decisions of the Court are of great moment in their bearings on the final issue of the question. We believe also that this decision will stand, for in spirit and principle it accords with other important legal decisions involving the same fundamental principles. Some of these cases are cited in another part of this REVIEW.

The Odes and Epodes of Horace. A Metrical Translation into English, with Introduction and Commentaries. By LORD LYTON. Harper & Bros. 12mo. pp. 525. A more elegantly printed volume, and one characterized by a more finished scholarship, has not often fallen under our eye. The Latin text used is from the editions of Orelli, Maclean, and Yonge, mainly the former. The Introduction is an admirably written essay, pointing out the causes of the popularity and some of the defects of a writer who, he affirms, "still reigns supreme as the lyrical singer most enthroned in the affections, most congenial to the taste of the complex multitude of students in every land and in every age." The notes prefixed to the Odes are designed to aid readers not acquainted with the original, and also to give, in a terse and convenient form, the opinions of the most eminent authorities who have made Horace a special study. The metres he employs are the same as those in the "*Lost Tales of Miletus*," which he considered at the time an experiment. He concurs with the majority of critics that the Odes, differing in this respect from the Epodes, consist of stanzas in four lines, and he so treats and translates them, with a few exceptions. All competent critics must agree that the present is a conscientious and painstaking endeavor to give as faithful an interpretation of the original as the difference of language will permit.

FICTION.

Hedged-in. By ELIZABETH STUART PHELPS. Fields, Osgood & Co. 12mo. pp. 295.

The Unkind Word, and other Stories. By the author of "*John Halifax, Gentleman*." Harpers. 12mo. pp. 418.

Janet's Love and Service. By MARGARET M. ROBERTSON. Randolph & Co. 12mo. pp. 581.

Adventures of Caleb Williams. By WILLIAM GODWIN, Esq. Complete in one volume. Harpers. 16mo. pp. 478.

Only Herself. By ANNIE THOMAS.

Kitty. By M. B. EDWARDS.

Found Dead.

Under Foot. By ALTON CLYDE.

So Runs the World Away. By Mrs. A. C. STEELE.

We have read Miss Phelps's story with unmixed approval. There is a purpose in it and a power, that ought to make it more popular than the "Gates Ajar"—which we felt constrained to condemn. It treats a delicate, difficult and commonly avoided subject—the duty of society to fallen women—with so rare a delicacy, and yet thoroughness—from so heroic a standpoint, and with such a clear apprehension of the spirit and principles of Christ's teachings—and at the same time with a heart so full of sisterly sympathy and love toward the unfortunate class—that no true man or woman can read it and not be moved in the right direction. There is no attempt to disguise the moral and social repulsiveness of the subject, or to overlook the real and fearful difficulties in the way of reformation. Nor is there any maudlin sentimentalism in the book, or overwrought statement, for effect. With a firm hand and an unfaltering purpose, the knife is made to cut clear through the mock modesty and false sentiment which prevails, till it lays bare the very core of the social evil. And the remedy offered is no human nostrum—no half-way measures—no patronizing and holler-than-thou policy—but simply the example of the all-pure and merciful Jesus: "Neither do I condemn thee; go and sin no more."

It is quite time that a new gospel were preached on this terrible subject. All honor to "Midnight Missions," "Magdalene Asylums," and similar reformatory agencies; but we hold with Miss Phelps, that "Mrs. Purcell" and her noble daughter, are the *true* types of Christian sentiment and conduct, and that no number of "Mrs. Myrtles," however sincere their purpose, will ever reform these social outcasts. The work loses nothing in interest or power of impression by being wrought into a story.

It is not necessary to commend a work by Miss MULOCK to secure for it numerous readers. All in all, there is no better female writer of fiction living, judging by a high moral as well as literary standard.

Janet's Love and Service, by a Canadian author, written to illustrate the power of religion in humble life to assert its moulding influence, is really a story of unusual interest—one of the best of the season.

It seems singular that the "Byron Scandal" should be the occasion of resurrecting a novel written almost a century ago by "William Goodwin, Esq." "Caleb Williams," however, notwithstanding the many brilliant works of the same class which have since adorned our literature, is a notable work.

The other works, whose titles we have given above, are all from the Harper press and belong to the "Library of Select Novels." Pity the publishers had not made it "Select" in fact as well as in name. In both a *literary* and a *moral* point of view three-fourths of these 236 novels are unworthy of such a place. We wonder, often, that a House of such high respectability and religious character, will be responsible in flooding the American market with so much that is flashy, false and corrupting in literature and in morals. We do not apply this criticism specially to the ones before us—for some of them are of the better class—but to the series as a whole.

ART. XI.—THEOLOGICAL AND LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

GERMANY.

Dr. Piper, in the Evangelical Calendar for 1870, brings to a close that exceedingly valuable and interesting series continued during the last twenty-one years (1850—1870). In addition to the improvements made in the *Evangelical Calendar* proper, Dr. Piper has given us many valuable papers upon Christian Archæology. But the most interesting portion of the work has been the *Lebensbilder* (Pictures of Life), presenting short biographies of the most important persons in biblical and ecclesiastical history, with their proper place in the evangelical calendar. There are in all 399 biographies and sketches of life, composed by 129 different authors, the most distinguished theologians in Germany, living and dead; e. g., Neander, Tholuck, Ullmann, Dörner, Lücke, Ranke, Lange, Krummacker, etc.

Dr. Piper is now in Italy making researches into Christian Archæology. On his return we may expect the renewal of his important labors in this department.

The Theological Reviews appear with their usual valuable contents.

The *Theological Studien und Kritiken*, 1870, II. 1. Beyschlag. The Vision Hypothesis in its latest form. The concluding article. 2. Wieseler. The 4th. book of Ezra investigated as to its contents and age, contending that it was composed in the reign of Domitian. 3. Christianity and Modern Culture, by the editor.

Zeitschrift für die historische Theologie, 1870, II. 1. Rabbe, Biographical Sketch of Dr. H. Weller. 2. The Easter Controversy of the 2nd century, by Dr. Schürer of Leipsic. 3. Thirteen Letters of Cassiodorus Reinius to Mathew Ritterus. 4. Letter of the Emperor Charles V. to the King of Poland, July 1, 1532 by Alf. Valdez: copy of the original in the historical archives at Frauenburg. *Jahrbuch für Deutsche Theologie*, 1969, IV. 1. Jäger, Theological Evidence—a contribution to theological Logic. 2. Schmidt. The Christology of John the Baptist—an interesting essay presenting the forerunner's view of Jesus. 3. Schenkel. Heathen and Jewish legends respecting the destruction and restoration of the world. Their relation to the teachings of Scripture. The yearning of heathenism. 4. Palmer. The Law and the lawful—Remarks upon Köstlin's Studies on the Moral Law. 5. Kienlen. The Eschatological Discourse of Jesus, Math. xxvi, with the parallel passages. This, the best of German Reviews, has its usual valuable criticism of new books.

Zeitschrift für die gesamt Lutherische Theologie und Kirche. 1. Müllan. Albert Schultens and his importance in relation to Hebrew Philology. 2. Frantz Delitzsch. The richness in form of the Historical Literature of Israel. 3. Rocholl. The Church and Materialism. 4. Preger. Master Eckhart's Theosophy in its latest presentation. 5. Knaabe. The Credibility of the words of Luther: "Here I stand; I can do no other; God help me. Amen." He shows conclusively that it is genuine. 6. Ströbel. Thoughts respecting the Romish General Synod, and the consequent Papal Arrangements.

From the Catholic press of Herder (Freiburg in the Breisgau) we have new editions of two elementary works on the study of the Hebrew language: "Rudimenta Lingue Hebræicæ Scholæ Publicæ et Domesticæ Discipline brevissime accommodata," and "Kurze Anleitung zum Erlernen der hebräischen Sprache für Gymnasien, und für das Privatstudium." Both of them are by the same author, Dr. C. H. Vosen, who evidently has made excellent use of his experience as a teacher of the Hebrew language. As the titles of the two works indicate, they are essentially the same, one being in Latin and the other

in German. The arrangement is very simple, and, with but slight aid from an instructor, the student can master the language from them alone. We should be glad to see an English translation of the little German volume.

Herr Herder has also published a new edition of Dr. Alzog's "*Sancti Patris Nostri Gregorii Theologi Vulgo Nazianzeni Oratio Apologetica de Fuga Sua*." The work is small, but we find that all the best authors have been consulted, and introduced to advantage. The great excellence of the work, however, is the choice extracts from Gregory Nazianzen's own works, each of which is premised by its appropriate heading, and in some cases by a little analysis.

The same publisher is proceeding rapidly with his "*Theologisches Universal-Lexikon zum Handgebrauche für Geistliche und gebildete Nichttheologen*" (*Universal Theological Lexicon for the Use of Clergy and Educated Laymen*). The articles are prepared with care, all of them are brief, and those of a biographical and literary character are specially commendable for the bibliography connected with their subjects.

Germany is excited, with the rest of the world, over the Ecumenical Council now sitting in Rome. The pamphlets fly thick and fast from all sides on the Roman question. The work of Janus, on "*The Pope and Council*," has obviously produced a profound impression. It so effectually demolishes the very corner-stone of the Ultramontane party that there is scarcely a man left to defend the dogma of infallibility. The fact that it was so promptly put on the Roman Index, and was so firmly demanded by the Papal party, has served to rouse the Catholic theologians and bishops to a more outspoken opposition to the course which the Council seems determined to pursue. All, or nearly all, the professors of the universities of Breslau and Bonn, and the theological faculties of Munster and Braunsberg, have thanked Dr. Döllinger for his manly words, in exposing the fallacies of those 400 bishops who have signed an address in favor of infallibility, and expressed their concurrence in his views. It is expected that nearly all the other theological schools will follow this example. And even the German bishops are indignant. Not only have they been almost unanimous in their protest against the promulgation of infallibility as a dogma; but when, in one of their meetings, it was proposed to censure Döllinger as using too severe language, the proposition was voted down, and the majority expressed their full approbation of the stand he had taken.

Prussia is also deeply interested in the development of the internal constitution of the church. Temporary Provincial Synods have been held in the six eastern provinces of the kingdom, in order to make arrangements for permanent Provincial Synods, and to recognize the already existing district and circuit synods. The views of the Unionists generally prevail, in spite of the strong opposition of the high Lutheran and Rationalistic parties, the one contending against the influence of laymen, the other against confessional restriction. The conflict rages upon the question of the so called (*bindende Vorschlagsliste*) compulsory lists of nominees. The custom has been that the pastor and the council of the congregation should make a list of nominees for the eldership and summon the congregation to elect these nominees, without their having the right of veto or of proposing other candidates. Thus the people had only an apparent representation, no *real* one. Furthermore, all persons have had the electoral right; for baptism and confirmation are legal steps which every good citizen must take, and which constitute him a member of the congregation.

The Evangelical party would reform these customs by demanding certain qualifications in the electors, e.g., a confession of the evangelical faith and a promise to fulfil the duties of an elector conscientiously and according to ability. Corresponding qualifications are demanded from candidates to the eldership. Furthermore, the congregation is to have the right of nomination and real representation. "Should this be carried out," writes a distinguished German theologian to us, "we will gain within the outer circle of the congregation an inner circle composed of the active, ruling members, and thus

there will result in German fashion a similar distinction to that existing in your church (the Presbyterian). In this way the distinction between Church and State, towards which we are advancing with giant strides, will be carried out in the fundamental distinction between the citizen's congregation, organized on political principles, and the ecclesiastical congregation, organized on ecclesiastical principles."

Against these principles the High Lutheran and the Protestant Association struggle, but their defeat is sure, and we soon expect the Prussian church to be reorganized on an evangelical Reformed Presbyterian basis. The congregational Presbytery already exists. The circuit Synod, composed of laymen and clergymen, the district Synods, similarly organized, corresponding with our presbytery and synod, have been in operation for some time. The provincial synod is now to become permanent, and soon to be followed by a more general synod of the entire Prussian, if not the entire German, evangelical church. We may mention that the Synods of Saxonia, Hanover and Bavaria, etc., have been held, which, while Lutheran in spirit and opposed to union, are really steps in the pathway of progress to the grand final result.

The new *Evangelical Church Gazette*, Edited by Messner, speaks in the highest terms respecting the approaching meeting of the American Branch of the Evangelical Alliance, and praises the liberality of the American churches. It hails with enthusiastic admiration the union of the two branches of the Presbyterian Church.

HOLLAND.

A new and enlarged edition of Nieuwenhuis' *Dictionary of Arts and Sciences* has been recently completed. It is in 10 quarto volumes; and is published by A. W. Sythoff, Leyden. H. Q. Janssen's *History of the Reformation in Flanders*, drawn chiefly from unpublished documents, has been issued in two octavo volumes by J. W. & C. F. Swaan, Arnhem. Dr. C. E. van Koetsveld, of the Hague, has completed his work on the *Parables of the Saviour*. It is in two royal 8vo. volumes, published at Schoonhoven by J. E. van Nooten. Dr. van Oosterzee's *Critique on Jacques Saurin* has been published by C. van der Post Jr., Utrecht. This is the second edition. It is in octavo form and contains 176 pages. *The Reformed Church in Holland* is the title of a work written by N. J. Engelberts, and published by order of the General Synod, in which the standpoint of said church is stated and its right defended. It is issued at Zwolle, by J. V. Oldenzeel. *The History of the Christian Church in Holland*, in two royal 8vo. vols. of about 1200 pages, has recently been completed. It was begun in 1860, and issued by subscription. It is printed on heavy white paper and in clear and large type. The work is written in graphic style. It is the joint product of some of the best writers in the church of Holland. Prof. B. ver Haar, and W. Moll, the most distinguished church historians of Holland, have had the editorial supervision of the work. They have been assisted by such men as Prof. De Groot, Van Oosterzee, Lorgion, Nieuwenhuis, Scheffer and Veth; and by several pastors, who have made a specialty of church history. Each writer is responsible for his own contribution. The work is designed for intelligent Christians. We regard it as a very valuable contribution to the history of the Church in Holland. A magnificent edition of the works of Vondel, the "Shakspeare of Holland," has been completed. It is in 12 8vo. volumes. It has been for several years in course of publication, under the editorship of the accomplished, and now lamented, Jacob van Lennep, who stood in the front rank of Holland's poets and novelists. *Commentarius in calceolum Micha*, is the title of a work on Micha, by Prof. J. Roorda. It is an 8vo. of nearly 200 pages, published at Leyden. The author is an eminent linguist. Dr. A. Pierson has completed the second volume of his *History of Roman Catholicism*, which extends to the Council of Trent. It is a

royal 8vo. of over 500 pages, and is published by A. C. Kruseman, Haarlem. The "Teyler Theological Society" has issued W. Scheffer's critical estimate of the labors of Ferdinand Christian Baur in the domain of theology. It is an octavo of over 500 pages, and is published at Haarlem by the Erven F. Bohn. *The Epistle of James*, a Contribution to the Knowledge of the old Christian Literature and Doctrine, is the title of a work by Dr. A. H. Blom. It is an octavo of 320 pages, published at Dordrecht by P. K. Braat.

FRANCE.

The Progress of liberal views in France, and the recent triumph of M. Ollivier's Ministry over the attempt at revolution, are events of no ordinary character in their bearings on the progress of religious liberty and constitutional government. The friends of true religion and of order are greatly encouraged.

The Doings of the Œcumenical Council are watched with extreme interest. Pressensé is giving a course of Lectures upon it that are attracting much attention. *The Revue Chrétienne* for January contained an able article on the same subject. The opposition to the dogma of infallibility, and especially the bold demand of the Emperor to be allowed a representative in the Council, are likely to produce great embarrassment, if not actual division in the Council.

Père Hyacinth has been released from his vows as a monk and reduced to the ranks of the secular priests.

Dr. Dörner's History of Protestant Theology, translated by Albert Paumiet, is in press and is to be published by subscription.

Sale of MSS. A very important sale of early manuscripts and rare books, on vellum and paper, took place in Paris in January—the library of the Marquis of Astorga. The gem of the collection is a large folio MS. of the twelfth century with 110 illuminations—a Latin commentary on the Apocalypse, followed by the Book of Daniel. Among the printed books are some very rare ones from the presses of early Spanish printers.

ENGLAND.

Chinese Literature in the British Museum. A collection of valuable Chinese works consisting of upwards of 1100 volumes, has recently been added to the British Museum. They were originally selected with a view to their bearing on the translation of the Chinese Classics, now in course of preparation by Dr. Legge, and the object for which they were imported having been accomplished, they were offered to the Trustees of the Museum. The value of these works to the student of Chinese can hardly be over-estimated. For in the classics alone are to be found the models of style and the germs of philosophical and political ideas, without a knowledge of which the structure of the later literature of China can not but be unintelligible, and its references obscure. For more than 1800 years these Classics have received the most minute criticism at the hands of the best native scholars, and some valuable commentaries on many of the more obscure and highly-prized of the varied books are contained in the collection referred to. Among the collection also are many critical works on history and chronology, as well as on the antiquities of China, with all of which subjects it is essential that the student should be acquainted before he can hope to obtain a right understanding of the true meaning and value of the Chinese Classics.

Trübner and Co. have in press a work of an extremely useful character by Rev. Ernest J. Eitel, a missionary of high attainments, residing at Canton in connection with the London Missionary Society. Mr. Eitel has for some years past made the Chinese literature of Buddhism an especial study, and has compiled a handbook or vocabulary of the Sanskrit sounds, which occur in most embarrassing profusion in all works of this category, as Rémusat, Klaproth, and other translators have found to their cost. The in-

finite trouble which has been given by the Sanskrit vocables, imbedded and disguised, almost beyond possibility of recognition, in works such as the *Foe Kuo Ki*, the *Travels of Hiouan Tsang*, etc., is a subject which forces itself upon the attention of every reader of the admirable translations heretofore effected of these works; and the object of the Rev. Mr. Eitel's present undertaking is to furnish an index to words and phrases of this kind, including historical, mythological, and geographical names, doctrinal terms, etc. etc., to each of which an explanation is appended. The work is at present passing through the press at Hong Kong, and will probably be published early in 1870.—*Trübner's Literary Record*.

The *Palestine Exploring Agency* has discovered in Dibon, an old city of Moab, a stone covered with an inscription recounting the exploits of Mesha, King of Moab, and very possibly the very Mesha who is mentioned in 2 Kings, iii, 4. The language is very much like the Hebrew, and is the first monument of that people yet known, with the exception of the prophecy of Balaam given in Numbers, which must have come from a Moabitish source, and three verses in Micah, which also give another version of Balaam's prophecy, but which are somewhat obscured in our version. At the instance of the Society, Mr. Palmer, the celebrated Arabic Scholar, has gone to Arabia, where he and a friend will spend some months among the Arabs of the unknown district bordering upon Sinai. Their object is to learn and to record the legends believed to be still existing there as to the passage of the Israelites and their sojourning in the neighborhood.

The *Czech works of John Huss* have been recently published at Prague by M. Erben, the learned archivist of that city. They consist of religious tracts, sermons, etc., some of which are remarkably eloquent. They form three 8vo. volumes. An 18mo. volume of extracts has just appeared. But the great work on Huss is M. Palacky's volume, noticed elsewhere.

Singular Coincidence. Just at the time when Tennyson has published his new poem, "The Holy Grail," a fragment of 800 lines of an early History of the Holy Grail, in alliterative verse, has been found in the noble Vernon MS., in the Bodleian Library, Oxford, by the well-known editor of Early English Texts, the Rev. Walter W. Skeat. The fragment is without beginning or end, but it describes chiefly the wondrous shield prepared by Evalash or Mordreins (Slow-of-Belief) for his descendant Sir Galahad. Its position in the romance is easily ascertained by reference to *Lancelot's* translation of Robert of Borron's French Romance, edited for the Roxburghe Club by Mr. Furnivall. This alliterative Grail fragment will go to press at once for the Early English Text Society.

Trübner and Co. have in press a work that will prove of general interest—*Lives of the Founders and Benefactors of the British Museum*, by Edward Edwards. One vol. 8vo. with illustrations. Also a *Chinese and English Dictionary* arranged according to the Radicals, by Rev. M. Lobscheid. The same house publishes a prospectus of a *Pali-English Dictionary*, with Sanskrit equivalents, and with numerous quotations, extracts, and references, in one imperial octavo. It seems remarkable that an Oriental language of such singular wealth and beauty, and embodying a literature of rare interest, should be practically destitute of grammars and dictionaries. The work will be of very great importance, as opening the study of the Pali language and literature to many who have been hitherto deterred by the want of a dictionary.

One of Trübner & Co.'s last announcements is "Buddhaghosha's Parables." Translated from the Burmese, by Capt. H. T. Rogers, R. E. With an Introduction, containing Buddha's "Dhammapadam; or, Path of Virtue." Translated from the Pali, by F. Max Müller." The same publishers have just brought out a bibliographical essay by Mr. Otto Kistner, which contains the titles of almost a thousand works on "Buddha and his Doctrines." They also announce that they will issue, at as early a day as

possible, the concluding volumes of Dr. Allibone's *Dictionary of English Literature, and English and American Authors*. The first volume was published in 1859; the two remaining volumes required to complete the work are now in MS. ready for the printer. They have likewise formed a list of books for the comparative study of the science of religion. It already includes Vedism, Hindoism, Zoroastrianism, Confucianism, Tanism, Mohamadism, and the mythologies of South Africa and the American Indians.

The second edition of *Sir John Lubbock's Prehistoric Times*, enlarged by the results of the author's travels, and explorations of all the museums of Europe, is published. Curious facts on this most interesting branch of inquiry crowd upon us from all quarters—as the recent announcement by Prof. Karl Voght made at the Scientific Congress at Insbruck, that the cultivated plants in the Swiss lake villages are now discovered to be of African, and to a great extent Egyptian origin, tending to show that our civilization came not from Asia, but from Africa! Still more remarkable are the discoveries in the volcanic islands of Santorin and Therasia, in the Archipelago. Here the clearing away, to make cement for the use of the Suez Canal works, has revealed a series of villages and dwelling-places, full of implements and remains of a people during the Stone Age, who were destroyed by some great convulsion of nature, whose effect has been to preserve intact the tangible relics of a prehistoric civilization. M. Fouqué, in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, gives the first account of the discoveries.

The venerable bishop of Lincoln has a new portion of his *Commentary* ready. It includes the books of *Jeremiah, Lamentations, and Ezekiel*, with *Introductions and Notes*, and gives promise of the speedy accomplishment of his great undertaking.

Some books of value may shortly be expected, including Prof. Alexander Bain's new work, *Logic, Deductive and Inductive*, in two vols. 8vo. *The Life, Correspondence, and Moral Philosophy of Benedict Spinoza*, translated and edited by Dr. Willis; *History of the Karaite Jews and the Progress of Rabbinical Tradition*, from the Closing of the Old Testament Canon to the Publication of the Talmud, by Dr. W. H. Rule; *History of English Neutrality during the late War in the United States of America*, by Prof. Bernard, of Oxford.

UNITED STATES.

MESSRS. CARTER & BROS. are about to publish a new work from the able pen of Dr. McCosh, which, we are sure, will be welcomed by the public, entitled, "*The Laws of Discursive Thought*," being a Text Book of Formal Logic.

MESSRS. HURD & HOUGHTON announce *A Treatise on the Christian Doctrine of Marriage*, by Hugh Davy Evans, L.D.D. The work is said to be a scholarly and thorough examination of the subject, introduced by a discussion of society, law, public opinion and private conscience, as bearing upon the matter, and passing the whole subject in review within the compass of an octavo of about 400 pages.

MESSRS. CHARLES SCRIBNER & Co. have in press a work on *Political Economy*, by Prof. Bowen of Harvard, which, from the well-known scholarship and ability of the author, can not fail to be one of mark. Also a work on *Oratory*, by Dr. McIlvaine, of Princeton. Also *The Sublime in Nature, Wonders of the Human Body, Wonders of Italian Art, Wonders of Architecture*, and other volumes belonging to "The Illustrated Library of Wonders," which, we are glad to learn, is meeting with decided success.

REV. G. R. ENTLER, of Franklin, N. Y., is engaged on a translation of *Hagenbach's Encyclopedia and Methodology of Theological Science*. His ripe scholarship, and critical knowledge of the language, are a guarantee that the important task will be well done. We may give our readers some portions of the work in advance of its publication.

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